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Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (Studies in Intelligence)

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There are four essential accounts of the deception operations of World War II: this is one of them. ...What distinguishes these volumes from other accounts of deception in World War II is their analysis of the continuous evolution of the deception process. That is, they go beyond simply detailing the historical facts of deception operations to explain how the deception planners adjusted and adapted their deception operations throughout the war based on their successes and failures in fooling their Nazi enemy.
Basically, the Americans and British succeeded in convincing the Nazis throughout the war that they were far stronger than they truly were, while the Russians continually fooled the Nazis into thinking they were far weaker than was the fact.
What is also both remarkable and significant is that, up to 1941, the Nazis were masters of strategic and operational deception, having fooled the Poles, Czechs, British, French, and Russians about German intentions and capabilities, and achieving overwhelming surprise in the blitzkrieg invasions of Poland (1939), Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, France (1940), and Russia (1941, while feinting an invasion of Britain). Being a world-class deceiver did not allow Hitler to see through the deceptions that were skillfully practiced against him.
"Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War" is based on papers delivered at an international conference on "Intelligence and Military Operations" held at the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA in 1986. Like all works edited or written by the late Professor Handel, formerly of the Army War College and the Naval War College, this collection is thoroughly researched, with soundly founded historical judgments, prepared by leading historians and analysts of twentieth century deception, including David Glantz, Katherine Herbig, Klaus-Jürgen Müller, and John P. Campbell. Particularly interesting is Klaus-Jürgen Müller's revisionist account, "A German perspective on Allied deception operations in the Second World War," that dismisses Allied deceptions as having any impact on German defenses. Michael Handel's "Introduction" effectively demolishes Müller's arguments in detail and routs the general thesis that Allied deceptions had no impact on German decisions and operations.

This is a collection of case studies and essays on the uses of deception. It consists of papers from a series of international conferences held at Carlisle, Pa. Like all works monitored or written by this compiler, a professor at the Army War College, it is thoroughly researched and full of sound judgements prepared by many of the leading scholars of twentieth century intelligence history. Frank Cass, the publisher is noted for quality studies produced for the specialist and scholar. The volume was originally a special issue of the journal Intelligence and National Security. It is intended as part of a series of thematic texts.
Belongs on the shelf of every serious researcher of the uses of intelligence.