The Strategy of Conflict [Hardcover]

Thomas C. Schelling (Author)

Product Details

• Hardcover: 320 pages
• Publisher: Harvard University Press; 1St Edition edition (1960)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0674840305
• ISBN-13: 978-0674840300
• Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.8 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (8 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #2,313,556 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

90 of 98 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Schellings major contribution to game theory, August 6, 1998

By A Customer

This review is from: The Strategy of Conflict (Paperback)

Schelling's major contribution to game theory (and the study of culture) was the concept of focal points. He observed that in real life bargaining each player would rather make a concession than fail to reach any agreement at all. And there are a wide range of outcomes that would be preferable to both of them than no agreement at all. Now without some procedure to select among those acceptable alternatives, people might never come to a satisfactory agreement. This is where the key concept of "focal points" comes into play. Schelling defines focal points as "intuitively perceived mutual expectations, shared appreciations, preoccupations, obsessions, and sensitivities to suggestion." He criticized traditional game theorists for failing to recognize that "players" actually achieve much better coordination and cooperation when they are able to rely upon focal points. Although he does not make this analogy, it seems that focal points represent some sort of a "templat! e" or "blueprint" that helps to unify understanding and coordinate action. However, for Schelling, "focal points" are quite arbitrary-whether and to what degree they serve to coordinate action and expectations is the key question.

28 of 28 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Everyone should read this book, September 7, 2006

By 

P.C. "Popcorn" (Taiwan) - See all my reviews

This review is from: The Strategy of Conflict (Paperback)

"The Strategy of Conflict" changed the development of game theory in several ways, but none was more important than Schelling's focus on real life examples, situations or games that are relevant to what we encounter in our daily lives. Before Schelling, game theory analysis was abstract and mathematical; it focused on zero-sum games, where interests were purely conflicting and there were no incentives to cooperate. Game theorists built convincing abstract models for these types of games, but its application was limited, since most interactions were a mixture of conflict and mutual dependence. In other words, analysis focused on pure conflict, a limiting cases of real world interactions, while in "The Strategy of Conflict" Schelling attempts to generalize game theory analysis to richer games that are `played' in the real world. His generalization introduced the concepts, commitments, threats, promises, communication systems, focal points, and randomization of strategies into game theory (chapters 1~8), which was then used to analyze the its applications in national security (chapters 9 and 10).

If you are studying game theory, this book is a must read. If you are just interested in game theory, I'd recommend reading this book too.

30 of 31 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars fascinating, December 6, 2002

By A Customer

This review is from: The Strategy of Conflict (Paperback)

I disagree with the review that describes Schelling's primary contribution here as the idea of focal points. This is one of the key insights in the book, but only one. He also has a fascinating discussion of threats, promises, and credibility and the relation of these issues to national security issues. The connection is explored further in Schelling's Arms and Influence, while this book is more theoretical in its orientation. I highly recommend this book to anyone who knows a little game theory but is frustrated by the level of abstraction which pervades the theory.