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On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War
 
 
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On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Paperback)

~ (Author) "Vietnam was a reaffirmation of the peculiar relationship between the American Army and the American people..." (more)
Key Phrases: strategic headquarters, tactical offensive, symbolic reassurance, North Vietnamese, South Vietnam, New York (more...)
4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (21 customer reviews)

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  • This item: On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War by Harry G. Summers

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Editorial Reviews

Product Description

Summer's inspired analysis of America's war in Vietnam answers the most pressing questions remaining from that terrible conflict more than a decade before Robert McNamara's painful admissions.

Product Details

  • Paperback: 225 pages
  • Publisher: Presidio Press (June 1, 1995)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0891415637
  • ISBN-13: 978-0891415633
  • Product Dimensions: 8.1 x 5.3 x 0.7 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 9.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (21 customer reviews)
  • Amazon.com Sales Rank: #207,895 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Harry G. Summers
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Customer Reviews

21 Reviews
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 (16)
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 (3)
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Average Customer Review
4.5 out of 5 stars (21 customer reviews)
 
 
 
 
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22 of 23 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars Tactical Victory -- Strategic Defeat, July 6, 2000
By George R Dekle "Bob Dekle" (Lake City, FL United States) - See all my reviews
(TOP 500 REVIEWER)      
Summers recounts an exchange between himself and a former NVA officer some years after the war. It went something like this Summers: "You never defeated us in the field." NVA Officer: "That is true. It is also irrelevant."

I recently saw this bumper sticker on a Vietnam veteran's car: "I don't know what happened. When I left we were winning." To find out what happened, read this book. Summers gives an insightful critique of the strategic failure using the Nine Principles of War and the doctrine of Clausewitz.

I read this book a few years before the Gulf War, and as I watched that war unfold, I kept "On Strategy's" teachings in mind. It seemed to me at the time that those charged with the conduct of the Gulf War effort were applying "On Strategy's" doctrine chapter and verse. Read the book and review the Gulf War effort, and see if you don't agree.

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17 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars Five Stars for Colonel Summers, April 17, 1999
One of the enduring ironies of military history--and the history of military thought--is that the most profound analysis, clearest insights, and most enduring illumination of the principles and practice of warfare has been accomplished by military professionals of relatively modest rank.

To the distinguished list of Colonel Clausewitz, Captain Mahan, and Captain Hart, add Colonel Harry Summers.

ON STRATEGY is certainly the most important book on military theory to appear since WWII and is perhaps the most important work of this century. Potential purchasers need have no fear that this book will be out-of-print for the foreseeable future; the presses will keep running because ON STRATEGY will be required reading in every military academy in the world for many decades.

ON STRATEGY is "about" the Vietnam War in much the same way that Clausewitz is "about" the Napoloenic Wars or that Mahan is "about" 18th-century naval struggles between France and England. That is, Summers uses the Vietnam War as a vehicle for analysis and illustration of principles of war that apply universally.

Aside from the clarity of his thought, Summers' most remarkable achievement is his writing style: For all of its subtlety, this book is accessible and valuable for readers who may have little background in military affairs.

At the end of WW II, the United States created special five-star ranks to honor it most senior commanders for their contributions to victory.

A book review is a poor substitute for a richly-deserved star to reward extraordinary service to the nation. But for his brilliant analysis and articulate writing, pin Five Stars on Harry Summars' collar.

- - - - - - - - -

The reviewer is a former military intelligence analyst.

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13 of 14 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars The single best accounting for the US failure in Vietnam. . ., May 7, 2006
By Thompson (Alliance, Nebraska) - See all my reviews
Summers doesn't even bother to examine the customary, bubble-gum explanations for the US failure in Vietnam (media backstab, anti-war movement, reliance on conventional tactics to deal with a guerilla enemy) that the general public has come to accept. Instead, he uses his experience in the military and his mastery of Clausewitzian war theory to explain, precisely, how our political and military leadership mismanaged the war. That's what the book is, really: a Clausewitzian indictment of the US political and military leadership. It's also what Summers finds most alarming about the US performance in Vietnam--we failed to abide by rules that we should have had committed to memory by 1965, and in ignoring them, we actually found the North Vietnamese beating us at our own game.

To my mind, the colonel hit on two themes that I found interesting and edifying as I tried to come to my own conclusions about why we lost in Vietnam. These are themes that I have not seen mentioned elsewhere, which is why I will cite them here.

First, Summers begins his book trying to convince his audience that the "National Will" to fight the war was impaired from the beginning. It's not that Americans didn't support the war at first--they did, but only as an afterthought (keep in mind that Vietnam was not front and center in 1965). But out of fear of losing his Great Society programs and possible re-election in 1968, Johnson made a deliberate decision not to mobilize the passions of the American people. A national will was never built. There was never a formal declaration of war. As a nation, we never announced our intentions to go to war. Instead, Johnson and his circle of advsiers crept into Vietnam, believing the war could be fought on a limited scale, by the military, without the full commitment of the American people. Because he never envisioned the kind of engagement we would find ourselves in after 1965, Johnson thought it was possible get in, get out a short time later, and then turn his full attention to his domestic programs.

But when the war began to run long, and as our policies shifted in response to an adversary that was vastly more determined than we had anticipated, the American public perked up. First it became annoyed, then deeply irritated, and finally lashed out against the political and even military establishment. Summers would exonerate the public completely, because, in his view, since the national will to fight was never built, it can hardly be said to have collapsed. I thought that was interesting.

The one great idea I take away from the colonel's book, however, is his thesis that the United States lost the Vietnam War primarily because it oriented itself on destroying the VC, which Summers says was a myth, a facade, a smokescreen, a secondary force that American forces exhausted themselves on. The heart of the enemy's strength was the North Vietnam conventional forces--the NVA.

The importance of this insight cannot be overstated, because it is indispensable to understanding the dissolution of the American homefront. The US thought it was pursuing the strategic offensive by organizing 'search and destroy' missions against the VC spread across South Vietnam. In reality, we had adopted the strategic defensive, since we were not taking the fight to the enemy's main force--the NVA. We mistakenly identified the VC as the enemy's center of gravity, spent years hunting the VC down as public support ebbed away, and in 1973 watched bitterly from afar as NVA tanks--not VC--overran Saigon.

Summers is saying we fought the wrong guys in Vietnam. This is remarkable all by itself, but it also (if true) invalidates the cacophony of criticism that disparages the US (and attributes our failure) for not incorporating more counter-insurgency tactics against the VC.

Thank you, Harry Summers.
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Most Recent Customer Reviews

5.0 out of 5 stars Definitive
In On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Viet Nam War, Colonel Summers places the blame squarely on America's top military command, including the Commander in Chief and the... Read more
Published 4 months ago by Reader in Matawan

5.0 out of 5 stars Ojective and Unity Of Command
On Strategy is a careful postmortem on the American phase of the Viet Nam War. Col. Summers analyzes why we failed in Viet Nam; as B. B. Fall did for the French. Read more
Published 15 months ago by B. SMITH

5.0 out of 5 stars Theory of Friction In War - Worth the Read Alone
A strategic examination based on the classic principals of war that provides insight into how a superpower with overwhelming conventional superiority can exhaust itself against a... Read more
Published 22 months ago by Richard Quis

5.0 out of 5 stars On Startegy is about the best thing I have read on Vietnam
The title of my review was actually made by Drew Middleton, The New York Times. Coming from that source with the agenda they have, it's a pretty compelling endorsement, and it is... Read more
Published 22 months ago by Peter R. Dinella

1.0 out of 5 stars Unmitigated garbage
Read this when it first came out and cannot believe the gullibility of some of its present reviewers. Ah, we could have won if only (fill in the blank). Read more
Published on July 27, 2007 by Robert M. Gillespie

5.0 out of 5 stars Mandatory reading for current days
I heard about this book while reading Fiasco.

This book seems near mandatory reading due to our current woes in Iraq. Read more
Published on August 6, 2006 by B. Jacobsen

5.0 out of 5 stars Particularly Relevant Today - A must read for all Americans
This book is very readable. Almost anyone could pick it up and get through it. Col. Summers writes in a clear, concise style that gets straight to the point. Read more
Published on June 8, 2006 by D. Axthelm

4.0 out of 5 stars Good Analysis but No Path to Victory
In "On Strategy" Summers analyzes the Viet Nam war using Clausewitz's principles of war. While his analysis is rigorous, Summers never shows how the war could have been won. Read more
Published on September 20, 2005 by Bernie Bernbaum

5.0 out of 5 stars A common sense analysis of the Vietnam War
I had heard a lot about this book before I decided to buy it and after reading it I must confess that it is a splendid work of strategic analysis which overturns many of the... Read more
Published on August 28, 2005 by Dimitrios

5.0 out of 5 stars What Really Went Wrong?
Col Summers wrote the seminal book on what really happened to America in its involvement in the Viet Nam War. Read more
Published on April 4, 2002 by Frank

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