Customer Reviews

On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War

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Summers doesn't even bother to examine the customary, bubble-gum explanations for the US failure in Vietnam (media backstab, anti-war movement, reliance on conventional tactics to deal with a guerilla enemy) that the general public has come to accept. Instead, he uses his experience in the military and his mastery of Clausewitzian war theory to explain, precisely, how our political and military leadership mismanaged the war. That's what the book is, really: a Clausewitzian indictment of the US political and military leadership. It's also what Summers finds most alarming about the US performance in Vietnam--we failed to abide by rules that we should have had committed to memory by 1965, and in ignoring them, we actually found the North Vietnamese beating us at our own game.

To my mind, the colonel hit on two themes that I found interesting and edifying as I tried to come to my own conclusions about why we lost in Vietnam. These are themes that I have not seen mentioned elsewhere, which is why I will cite them here.

First, Summers begins his book trying to convince his audience that the "National Will" to fight the war was impaired from the beginning. It's not that Americans didn't support the war at first--they did, but only as an afterthought (keep in mind that Vietnam was not front and center in 1965). But out of fear of losing his Great Society programs and possible re-election in 1968, Johnson made a deliberate decision not to mobilize the passions of the American people. A national will was never built. There was never a formal declaration of war. As a nation, we never announced our intentions to go to war. Instead, Johnson and his circle of advsiers crept into Vietnam, believing the war could be fought on a limited scale, by the military, without the full commitment of the American people. Because he never envisioned the kind of engagement we would find ourselves in after 1965, Johnson thought it was possible get in, get out a short time later, and then turn his full attention to his domestic programs.

But when the war began to run long, and as our policies shifted in response to an adversary that was vastly more determined than we had anticipated, the American public perked up. First it became annoyed, then deeply irritated, and finally lashed out against the political and even military establishment. Summers would exonerate the public completely, because, in his view, since the national will to fight was never built, it can hardly be said to have collapsed. I thought that was interesting.

The one great idea I take away from the colonel's book, however, is his thesis that the United States lost the Vietnam War primarily because it oriented itself on destroying the VC, which Summers says was a myth, a facade, a smokescreen, a secondary force that American forces exhausted themselves on. The heart of the enemy's strength was the North Vietnam conventional forces--the NVA.

The importance of this insight cannot be overstated, because it is indispensable to understanding the dissolution of the American homefront. The US thought it was pursuing the strategic offensive by organizing 'search and destroy' missions against the VC spread across South Vietnam. In reality, we had adopted the strategic defensive, since we were not taking the fight to the enemy's main force--the NVA. We mistakenly identified the VC as the enemy's center of gravity, spent years hunting the VC down as public support ebbed away, and in 1973 watched bitterly from afar as NVA tanks--not VC--overran Saigon.

Summers is saying we fought the wrong guys in Vietnam. This is remarkable all by itself, but it also (if true) invalidates the cacophony of criticism that disparages the US (and attributes our failure) for not incorporating more counter-insurgency tactics against the VC.

Thank you, Harry Summers.

Summers recounts an exchange between himself and a former NVA officer some years after the war. It went something like this Summers: "You never defeated us in the field." NVA Officer: "That is true. It is also irrelevant."

I recently saw this bumper sticker on a Vietnam veteran's car: "I don't know what happened. When I left we were winning." To find out what happened, read this book. Summers gives an insightful critique of the strategic failure using the Nine Principles of War and the doctrine of Clausewitz.

I read this book a few years before the Gulf War, and as I watched that war unfold, I kept "On Strategy's" teachings in mind. It seemed to me at the time that those charged with the conduct of the Gulf War effort were applying "On Strategy's" doctrine chapter and verse. Read the book and review the Gulf War effort, and see if you don't agree.

One of the enduring ironies of military history--and the history of military thought--is that the most profound analysis, clearest insights, and most enduring illumination of the principles and practice of warfare has been accomplished by military professionals of relatively modest rank.

To the distinguished list of Colonel Clausewitz, Captain Mahan, and Captain Hart, add Colonel Harry Summers.

ON STRATEGY is certainly the most important book on military theory to appear since WWII and is perhaps the most important work of this century. Potential purchasers need have no fear that this book will be out-of-print for the foreseeable future; the presses will keep running because ON STRATEGY will be required reading in every military academy in the world for many decades.

ON STRATEGY is "about" the Vietnam War in much the same way that Clausewitz is "about" the Napoloenic Wars or that Mahan is "about" 18th-century naval struggles between France and England. That is, Summers uses the Vietnam War as a vehicle for analysis and illustration of principles of war that apply universally.

Aside from the clarity of his thought, Summers' most remarkable achievement is his writing style: For all of its subtlety, this book is accessible and valuable for readers who may have little background in military affairs.

At the end of WW II, the United States created special five-star ranks to honor it most senior commanders for their contributions to victory.

A book review is a poor substitute for a richly-deserved star to reward extraordinary service to the nation. But for his brilliant analysis and articulate writing, pin Five Stars on Harry Summars' collar.

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The reviewer is a former military intelligence analyst.

This is the best and primary work on what went wrong with the
U.S. military effort in Vietnam. Its biggest shortcoming is
that it does not indicate clearly its origin and importance.
This was the U.S. Army War College's commissioned study of
what lessons should be learned from the Vietnam conflict. It
became the standard text, and the basis for the course, on the
subject, not only at the War College but also at its Navy and
Air Force counterparts. These are the institutions where those selected as prospective generals and admirals are trained in the principles of flag-level command. (The book's
history and importance are described at some length in Summers'
sequel, _On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War_.)
Following Clausewitz' classic overview, Summers meticulously shows how the U.S. failed to follow established principles of warfare and how these failures led to the bad result.
The book's history as a War College study also explains some
biases and omissions. U.S. doctrine emphasized the defeat
of the enemy's military, as Clausewitz did; Summers had no
choice but to follow Clausewitz and dismiss or ignore such
writers as Sun Tzu and B. H. Liddell Hart, who argued for winning by attacking the enemy's will to fight. Yet his opening quote from the NVA colonel, and his selective use of
Clausewitz (he quotes Clausewitz extensively on matching
goals to available means, but not on defeating the main body
of the enemy), put the real message there plainly enough,
if between the lines: the U.S. paid too little attention
to the aspects of war that take place off the battlefield.
This book will repay careful study. It certainly did for
the U.S. military, as the Gulf War attests.

Col Summers wrote the seminal book on what really happened to America in its involvement in the Viet Nam War. He clearly explains why we could not win it as we fought it and why we were constrained from fighting it to win. He ties these insights to the great philosophers of war (Sun Tzu, Clausewitz). This book was written in the late 1970s and served to greatly becalm the internal turmoil in the US military structure. Instead of "What happened" or "Who betrayed us;" talk turned to agreeing or disagreeing with the different parts of his theory. Most found it to be on the mark.

If you want to know why we went in, read "The Pentagon Papers." If you want to know why we were doomed to fail when we did, read this. Well written, not dry or tedious, but complete.

This book should be required reading for all field grade colonels on up. In meticulous detail it details the failing of military strategy in Vietnam because clear goals were not identified and political support obtained for same. It correctly identifies the limitations of military power, which cannot "win hearts and minds" but only bury them. The best tribute to this book is that every Americal military leader fighting a war after this book was published has followed the the letter and tenor of the recommendations set forth in the book. Summers should have recieved numerous decorations for the contributions to military strategy this book contains. Instead he was shunned by the military establishment who nevertheless reads and follows his book, because he had the ordacity in his book to name names and criticize those in power who failed to follow even the most basic military tenets in conducting the Vietnam War. However, long after those leaders are long forgotten, this book will still be required reading for American Military Leaders who do not wish to repeat the mistakes made in the Vietnam War.

In "On Strategy" Summers analyzes the Viet Nam war using Clausewitz's principles of war. While his analysis is rigorous, Summers never shows how the war could have been won. As he points out, the US was unable to pursue the war into North Viet Nam for fear of China entering the war on the ground. The American planners also feared that if China attacked through North Vietnam, they would also attack in Korea. And the US could not support a two front war in Asia without serious hardship at home.

The only strategy he mentions for "winning" the war was to put enough troops on the border to prevent North Viet Nam's army from coming into South Viet Nam - sort of turning the American army into the Border Patrol. But that approach would never have been successful. The US could not maintain that troop level indefinitely and North Viet Nam would just have waited us out.

Once the decision was made not to invade North Viet Nam, the war was un-winnable. And if you can't win, don't go to war. That is the real lesson of Viet Nam.

Colin Powell learned that lesson and applied it in the first gulf war. Too bad it was forgotten for the second gulf war.

I had heard a lot about this book before I decided to buy it and after reading it I must confess that it is a splendid work of strategic analysis which overturns many of the established myths. I totally agree with Mr Summers that the US defeat in Vietnam was a matter of massive conventional attack by the NVA and that counterinsurgency was valid only until the Tet Offensive in 1968. I have the same opinion with Summers, that the first and foremost task of US forces in Vietnam should be the closing of infiltration routes and the isolation of the field of battle, and the Americans should let South Vietnamese to deal with the insurgents. This is a valuable lesson also for the current painful situation in Iraq, where the balance of power is different but at least the US does not have to face a regular army of invasion as opponent in the neigboring countries. The author makes heavy use of Clausewitz's monumental book "On War" and examines the principles of war in the light of the Vietnam experience. A small drawback is that the book focuses on the US side, with only passing reference to the North Vietnamese but overall it is a great read. Through it I came to appreciate also Dave Palmer's "Summons of the trumpet".

This book is very readable. Almost anyone could pick it up and get through it. Col. Summers writes in a clear, concise style that gets straight to the point.

The review of our national policy and military strategy during the Vietnam War is brutally honest and points out the definite limitations on what our armed forces can accomplish and what we, as citizens, should all be aware of when our military forces are sent to war.

This is particularly relevant today. The mistakes in the conduct of the war in Iraq become much clearer when you understand the basic principals of war. Understanding the real mistakes helped me strip away the political posturing (which there is far too much of on both sides) from the war and really understand what is happening.

Since it seems likely that our forces will be sent to war again within our lifetime it would be very helpful if more Americans understood strategy and national policy better. It is, as Col. Summers makes clear, our army and we should know something about its use.

I reccomend this book without reservation and urge you to buy and read it. It is a must read for all Americans.

Colonel Harry G. Summers' seminal 1982 book, "On Strategy", is a critical analysis of the Vietnam War using Clausewitz's classic principles of war. Nearly thirty years on, the subject has lost none of its applicability. Readers need not agree with Summers' conclusion to appreciate the rigorous logic, and respect for democratic institutions, that should go into strategic thinking, and the consequences of failing to do so.

"On Strategy" was a staple of professional military education for an earlier generation of US Army officers. Summers' closely reasoned argument identifies the failure by American leadership to properly characterize the nature of the Vietnam War, and to match military means to appropriate strategic ends, lessons that won't be lost on the current generation of military members, with their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

On a related topical subject, Summers provides a frank discussion of the Johnson administration's failure to ask for a declaration of war in Vietnam in 1964. That discussion provides some interesting insights into the dilemma of the current US administration, which initiated military hostilities against Libya in March 2011 without asking for a Congressinal authorization, and now finds itself awkwardly afoul of the War Powers Act 100 days later.

"On Strategy" is very highly recommended for its rigorous strategic analysis of the Vietnam War, which critique may be useful to a more recent generation of soldiers and policy makers.