Customer Reviews

Strategy for Defeat the Luftwaffe 1933 - 1945

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This is a "big picture" view of the European air war. It is not a collection of personal stories or battle accounts, but rather an analysis of how decisions at the highest levels about material and resources dictated the outcome in what became a titanic war of attrition. This book will contribute substantially to anyone's understanding of the war.

Murray makes a strong case, reinforced throughout the book, that German decisions about aircraft production made in 1940 essentially spelled the doom of the Luftwaffe in later years. Failure to mobilize their industry to maximize aircraft production early on, he argues, meant that the Germans never were able to meet the logistical challenges posed by the Allied air forces.

In his narrative of the war, Murray points out numerous cases where the senior German leadership made the wrong decision about production and allocation of resources. Not only did they fail to produce enough aircraft but they also failed to produce the right kinds of planes. In addition, Luftwaffe forces were wasted in many efforts that did not contribute substantially to the vital missions of the war.

The book also contains summaries of the same aspects of the British and American air forces, and thus is an excellent summary of the essential elements of the technological war of attrition, that, Murray argues, played a large role in the overall outcome of the conflict.

The reader should already have a good general knowledge of World War II in Europe to fully appreciate the insights in this work. Murray's book definitely will enhance your understanding of all aspects of the great European air war. One comes away from this book with the feeling, also supported by other works, that Hitler, Goering and other high Nazi officials probably never fully comprehended that they had begun a world war that would pit them against economies that Germany never could match.

It's more exciting to look at the WWII air war has a colorful clash between daring airmen and their particular mounts and discussions of the air war often become nothing more than arguments about the effectiveness of one aircraft versus another.

This is dry but informative book that demonstrates that modern war more than anything else is a clash between industrial capacities. It also demonstrates how the wrong decisions before a war can defeat you before you even fight.

Williamson debunks some common assumptions, such as the belief that the Germans never grasped the importance of a strategic bomber, they did, but other factors prevented them from realizing it.

With authoritative statistics Williamson proves that Germany was not ready for war in 1939 and the war became a type of war they had not prepared for. It was not the failure of her pilots or machines that defeated them but the failure of German leaders to insure they had an adequate industrial production capability before fighting.

The Luftwaffe's early victories nonetheless cost them equipment and in 1942 when Hitler stalled in Russia the war came down to who could best replace their losses and it was a battle the Germans lost for all their ingenuity in other areas.

This is an illuminating book about the real equation in the European Air War.

The author has acquired a lot of information towards proving his theory that Germany lost WW-2 bcause of industrial failures. If his theory had been that Germany had lost WW-2 because its movie industry didn't have Mickey Mouse, I suspect he would have found some data and written a book proving that, too.

The book misses or dismisses several major points along he way, such as that Hitler always realised he would need allies if his plans were to be achieved, hence why he courted Italy and Britain to form the Axis Powers. Also that the war escalated faster than Hitler had wanted... he simply never expected to be fighting Britain and America in a global conflict. Also it forgets that the Luftwaffe was primarily a spearhead and support force for the Wehrmacht in the early campaigns, it was the aerial part of the Blitzkrieg. This was the kind of air warfare it was equipped for, the kind it was meant to be fighting, and it was Allies who forced it to take on other roles. He fails to realise that the strategic bombers so beloved of the RAF and USAAF were sitting ducks without fighter escort, and the mortality rate amongst those crews was a dreaful human price to pay for a marginal military benefit. And finally he omits that German industry at the end of the war was at its highest state of production, producing more aeroplanes in a month than it then had pilots to fly them.

By the end of the war, the Luftwaffe had been shot out of the sky because it was routinely outnumbered, not because its machinery was inferior. It simply ran out of pilots. When it did appear, it was a respected opponent and could inflict considerable damage upon its enemy. Its aircraft were at least as capable as the allied machines, and were all produced by a German industry that remained competent under constant bombardment.

This is a poor and imbalanced book. It might be useful for the data it has collected, but beware taking much notice of any of the arguments presented.