An expert war strategist analyzes how the American military resurrected itself after the setbacks of the Vietnam War to perform successfully during Operation Desert Storm.
Book Description
Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
Military strategist Summers ( On Strategy : A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War ), who made some 125 television appearances during the Gulf war, here argues persuasively that changes in U.S. military doctrine, undertaken after the Vietnam war, helped U.S. forces prevail in the Gulf. Summers looks at overall strategy, not daily tactics. In Vietnam, he notes, the U.S. failed to follow the lesson of the classic war theorist Karl von Clausewitz: a successful war depends on public support. In the Gulf, Summers argues, such support was generated by participation of the reserves and the announcement of clear war goals. Moreover, after Vietnam, the military gave up its Cold War doctrine of limited war, its branches learned to work together and commanders finally stressed the training of troops for battle rather than troop maintenance and management. However, Summers fails to examine the role of oil in U.S war aims or why U.S. forces allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power. He approvingly cites the international and Middle East coalitions against Iraq without noting the considerable arm-twisting by the U.S. Such lack of skepticism is perhaps predictable in a book dedicated to Summers's friend and Leavenworth classmate Gen. Colin Powell.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.
From Library Journal
Summers's latest book is mistitled: its focus is not the Gulf War, but rather the renaissance of the U.S. military after the dark days of Vietnam. Summers argues perceptively and accurately that for 40 years, nuclear-tipped superpower diplomacy generated a defensive national strategy that was neither fully understood nor adequately explained. Only as containment of the Soviet Union gave way to cooperation did the offensive once again become a viable U.S. option. But the military system that translated political circumstances into battlefield victory was the product of comprehensive restructuring in the post-Vietnam armed forces. Separately and together, the services after 1975 found the moral courage to face their institutional shortcomings and develop the methods and doctrines so brilliantly successful in the Persian Gulf. Summers's clear account of the processes and personalities involved in America's military rebirth will inform general readers and provoke specialist inquiry. Recommended for all collections.
- D.E. Showalter, U.S. Air Force Acad., Colorado Springs
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.
- D.E. Showalter, U.S. Air Force Acad., Colorado Springs
Copyright 1992 Reed Business Information, Inc.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Brilliant Historical Perspective,
By Michael J Edelman (Huntington Woods, MI USA) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER) (VINE VOICE) (REAL NAME)
This review is from: On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (Dell War Series) (Mass Market Paperback)
This is not a blow-by-blow account of the Gulf War; indeed, the only actual description of the progress of the war itself is the Appendix, a transcript of General Schwarztkopf's 2/27/91 press briefing.The bulk of Summers' book is a critical analysis of the historical factors that in large part determined how the war was prosecuted and that determined its outcome. Much of this is a re-examination of why we failed in Vietnam- a subject covered brilliantly in Summers' earlier "On Strategy:"- and the changes in US Military policy that followed. Particular import is placed on how the support of the American people and world leaders was cultivated to support the Gulf War. For students of history, politics and the military, this is a must read.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent analysis leading to the victory of the Gulf War,
By Janet Maffei (Sonora, CA USA) - See all my reviews
This review is from: On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (Dell War Series) (Mass Market Paperback)
Is probably the best analysis of why we succeeded so completely in the Gulf War. It covers the historical and the strategic ,(socio-political), aspects leading to the Gulf War from the American Military standpoint. It is closer to a collection of interrelated essays on the different aspects that lead to success in war, starting from what in essence led to the defeat of America in Vietnam. This is a must for those interested in more than just tactics or for those interested in being (or understanding) a great leader and the elements that make "great" policy.
4.0 out of 5 stars
Compare and Contrast...,
By
This review is from: On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (Dell War Series) (Mass Market Paperback)
"On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War" is a 1992 follow-up to COL. Harry Summers' highly readable "On Strategy", a thoughtful strategic critique of the US military effort in Vietnam. "On Strategy" was a staple of professional military education for a generation of US Army officers.
In "On Strategy II", Summers compares and contrasts the strategic thinking that went into Vietnam with that of the Gulf War, using the metric of the Clausewitz trinity of the people, the military, and the government. In a closely argued and logical narrative, he finds that the US government and the US military by and large avoided the mistakes of an earlier generation. The Gulf War marked the completed rebuilding of the post-Vietnam US military, and its successful application to an expeditionary environment in the Middle East. "On Strategy II" was written in the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, and the accompanying sense of triumphalism pervades the book. From the longer perspective of the global war on terrorism, the first Gulf War doesn't look quite as complete a victory as it probably did in 1991. The first Bush administration made a reasonable decision to stick by its coalition partners and their shared goals. However, it has been argued since that the US might have been better served by finishing off the Saddam regime. It is a separate argument whether this was an immediately achievable military objective in February 1991. "On Strategy II" is highly recommended as a further development of COL Summers' wonderfully lucid exploration of how the US makes war.
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