Customer Reviews

On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (Dell War Series)

5 star:		(3)
4 star:		(1)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

 

 

This is not a blow-by-blow account of the Gulf War; indeed, the only actual description of the progress of the war itself is the Appendix, a transcript of General Schwarztkopf's 2/27/91 press briefing.

The bulk of Summers' book is a critical analysis of the historical factors that in large part determined how the war was prosecuted and that determined its outcome. Much of this is a re-examination of why we failed in Vietnam- a subject covered brilliantly in Summers' earlier "On Strategy:"- and the changes in US Military policy that followed. Particular import is placed on how the support of the American people and world leaders was cultivated to support the Gulf War.

For students of history, politics and the military, this is a must read.

Is probably the best analysis of why we succeeded so completely in the Gulf War. It covers the historical and the strategic ,(socio-political), aspects leading to the Gulf War from the American Military standpoint. It is closer to a collection of interrelated essays on the different aspects that lead to success in war, starting from what in essence led to the defeat of America in Vietnam. This is a must for those interested in more than just tactics or for those interested in being (or understanding) a great leader and the elements that make "great" policy.

"On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War" is a 1992 follow-up to COL. Harry Summers' highly readable "On Strategy", a thoughtful strategic critique of the US military effort in Vietnam. "On Strategy" was a staple of professional military education for a generation of US Army officers.

In "On Strategy II", Summers compares and contrasts the strategic thinking that went into Vietnam with that of the Gulf War, using the metric of the Clausewitz trinity of the people, the military, and the government. In a closely argued and logical narrative, he finds that the US government and the US military by and large avoided the mistakes of an earlier generation. The Gulf War marked the completed rebuilding of the post-Vietnam US military, and its successful application to an expeditionary environment in the Middle East.

"On Strategy II" was written in the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, and the accompanying sense of triumphalism pervades the book. From the longer perspective of the global war on terrorism, the first Gulf War doesn't look quite as complete a victory as it probably did in 1991. The first Bush administration made a reasonable decision to stick by its coalition partners and their shared goals. However, it has been argued since that the US might have been better served by finishing off the Saddam regime. It is a separate argument whether this was an immediately achievable military objective in February 1991.

"On Strategy II" is highly recommended as a further development of COL Summers' wonderfully lucid exploration of how the US makes war.

I lived through the Vietnam era and I did not understand the conflicting and seemingly irrational world around me. This book explains those conflicts and resolves the irrational and contradicting events that left most Americans, including myself, unsettled and unsatisfied with the "popular" or "partisan" explanations of the day. Without understanding the Vietnam era, you will never understand America in the 1990's.