Customer Reviews

Strategy: Second Revised Edition (Meridian)

5 star:		(29)
4 star:		(10)
3 star:		(8)
2 star:		(3)
1 star:		(2)

 

 

I apologize in advance for my lack of brevity, but to be fair to the author I feel that I must analyze this book at length.
While somewhat unimpressed by Hart's biography of Scipio Africanus, Hart's enviable reputation and the praise he garnered from some of our century's greatest generals encouraged me to give Strategy a chance. At first it looked like another disappointment, but I have come to appreciate this as a truly worthwhile book.
The bad first: The opening section of this book is an attempt by Hart to trace the entire history of Western warfare and demonstrate that in each era of history the indirect approach has worked better than direct assaults. For 143 pages he makes this point over and over again without adding any more detail. I quickly began to feel that he was oversimplifying events, and several times he seems to make very tenuous stretches between events and his theories. At other times it feels like he is attempting to stretch events to fit his theories when there is an insufficiently strong connection. He also seems to have an inadequate grasp of some of the historical periods. His knowledge of the American Civil War seemed a bit piecemeal to me, and his assertion that McClellan's indirect approach during the Peninsular campaign failed due to Lincoln's refusal to increase McClellan's forces does not match well with what I have heard from other sources, which blame McClellan's failure on his own hesitations.
After this section Hart enters into the period of the World Wars. Here he truly starts to shine. The campaigns are described in much greater detail and readers are treated to much better examples and explanations than previously. At last his theories can be envisioned and we hear something more detailed than the monotonous (if correct) repitition of the phrase "indirect approach."
After this excellent analysis of the World Wars, Hart moves on to discuss his theories. Here at last is the brilliance that had been promised. As irritated as I was with his history, his abstract writings were beautiful, concise, and thought-provoking. He is even-handed, imaginative, and rather than the over-simplification that I criticize him for in his earlier chapters he gives excellent and informative explanation. Of particular merit is his discussion of the limitations of Clausewitz (as commonly interpreted).
His final chapter discusses guerilla warfare and raises some fascinating questions about the downside of encouraging guerilla warfare against your enemies. While I think Hart might have erred on the side of caution here, the points he raises all have great merit and the fact that US-funded guerillas in Afghanistan later became a threat to the US bears out his warnings. My one criticism of this chapter is that it feels unfinished; he does not develop both sides of the argument and he does not suggest measures to help with the problems that he foresees.
On the whole, I find Hart to be an uninspiring historian but a brillian strategist and highly recommend this book for anyone who has an interest in grasping the true art of military matters.

Here Liddell Hart sums up his principles of strategy, illustrating his ideas with examples throughout history. Critics have claimed, with some justice, that he got too wrapped up in his major idea, the "indirect approach," and oversimplified the campaigns he reviewed here to bolster his point. What a reader must realize, however, is that by the time this book was written, much of Liddell Hart's approach had been battle-tested, with spectacular results: among those who credited him were Guderian, Rommel, and Montgomery. If his "indirect approach" is not universally effective, especially against opponents who have also read the book, it is still brilliant and valuable.
Liddell Hart seems to have fallen into disfavor in U.S. military circles, to a degree that cannot be explained simply by his disagreement with Clausewitz about the necessity of destroying the main force of the enemy. While not crediting him, the U.S. applied an indirect approach, emphasizing rapid maneuver, with great success in the Gulf War. Perhaps the explanation lies in a careful reading of the last chapter, added in the 1967 edition, in which he suggests that counter-guerilla warfare must aim to disrupt the guerillas' sources of supply and liaison with allied regular forces nearby -- in short, to win, the U.S. needed to isolate the battlefield. Maybe the U.S. thinkers didn't want to hear this -- and it hasn't helped that, once again, he was absolutely right.
So, by all means, read this book carefully. But then also read
his critics. Nobody, even Liddell Hart (or Clausewitz, or Sun Tzu) had all the answers, and the art of applying past principles to future conflicts keeps changing.

Liddell Hart's thesis on indirect strategy has always been grounded on two things: the use of surprise and the importance of manoeuvre. This indirect strategy is predicated on his firm belief that wars/battles should be won quickly, decisively, and with the least amount of casaulties. In this book, he continuously demonstrates to the reader that, ironically in almost every century, the uses of surprise and manoeuvres have largely been ignored by most military leaders except the competent ones. This book then is therefore not only a commentary on strategy but it is a voice intended to remind the reader the necessity and usefulness of a strategy that could minimize deaths and has proven itself to be most effective way of winning a war. Hart strongly believes that we should learn from history to avoid repeating the same mistakes over and over again. As always with Liddell Hart's work, this book is written in a lucid manner and full of life. Highly recommend.

I have an original edition of this book and found it useful to read at odd moments. As a naval oficer and one-time World History teacher, I found the early parts of the book fascinating and useful. And by the time Hart reaches his discussion of the age of Justinian and the re-conquest of the Roman Empire by Belisarius, one really has learned quite a bit about Western Civilization and its war history.

The chapter on Belisarius should be committed to memory by all of the current administration's strategic advisors should, because it was Belisarius who developed the Byzintine Empires strategy of winning wars by not "fighting" them.

Belisarius realized that a defeated Roman Empire could re-emerge as a great threat to Constantinople, as could the re-energized Persian Empire and the numerous babarian states surrounding Byzantium. And even with its great position as a world culture and trading capital, neither Justinian nor his empire could afford to engage every threat directly. Therefore, surrogates, feints and his age's version of "gunboat diplomacy" was much more cost effective. In fact Belisarius was one of the most effective generals of all time, even though his actual field leadership experience in battle was relatively limited.

(As an aside -- I would not be surprised if Belisarius was studied vigorously by every Soviet general who ever served. It seems that even though their government carried out a flawed political ideal, their strategies definitely articulated many of Belisarius's military ideas.)

Although I teach corporate strategy, I read this classic work on military strategy to broaden my understanding of the nature of strategy. In particular, this book emphasized the utility of the indirect versus direct attack, and drew examples from the Civil War, WWI, and WWII. Unlike Clauswitz approach of massing strength and marching up the middle as expected by the enemy, Hart's indirect attack epitomizes the expression, "Choose your battles". This means forcing the enemy to engage when and where you prefer, in a battle that works to your advantage and their disadvantage. The indirect attack is the unexpected route; it opens up a new front where the foe is unprepared to fight, much like the action taken by Norman Schwartzkopf in Desert Storm with his now famous "left hook" maneuver. The logic of the indirect attack is that it changes the point of engagement at an inopportune moment for the enemy, and in doing so, captures the initiative, creates a dilemma for the opposition, gains the psychological upper hand by catching the opponent off-guard and confusing their response.

The indirect strategy applies equally well to the military as it does to business, not to mention football, chess, politics, debate, the list goes on. I see parallels in this, for example, with Hewlett-Packard's indirect attack on the computer industry, which avoided its rivals superior strength in PCs, and instead attacked at the periphery in the printer market where the rivals were weak and caught by surprise. Overall a very interesting book.

This book was used by the Air Force for training 10 years ago; I don't know whether it still is (it certainly should be). The book is divided into two sections, a survey of military strategy from ancient history through the end of WWII, and then a summation and analysis of the lessons learned (with some discussion of the pros and cons of Clausewitz's On War). While a bit dense, the survey is important as it gives you a much better understanding of Liddell Hart's brilliant indirect approach.

Liddell Hart does not follow the Clausewitz-ian theory that "blood is the price of victory". Rather he views strategy as a way to minimize the need for armed conflict through moral and physical dislocation of ones enemy. He also keeps an eye on grand strategy and the quality of the peace that is to be achieved after a conflict (something that Clausewitz loses track of).

I want to start by saying that I recommend this book to people that like to read about military history and strategy; however, I am not that high on this book as other reviewers.

"Strategy" was written with the purpose to prove one thing: battles and wars are normally won by unbalancing the enemy at all the levels, a strategy the author coins as the "Indirect Approach", not by attacking him directly. The book has two sections, one which narrates the history of warfare from the Persian Wars all the way to the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. The second section postulates the principles of Indirect Approach and "revisions" on Von Clausewitz's postulates.

That said, unlike other reviewers, I believe that there are two landmark books on War better than this one, Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" and Von Clausewitz's "On War". While Liddell Hart had the benefit of living on the time when Von Clausewitz's war "premises" were revised after the massacres of WWI, and Liddell Hart is one of the grandfathers of modern tank warfare, I think his concept of "Indirect Approach" is a modernization of Sun Tzu's principles on deception in warfare. That is why I think this book does not have the theoretical value other reviewers want to give.

As for his historical evidence about the application of the "Indirect Approach", I think many accounts are based on biased reports that don't truly tell us the complete picture (for more on this, I recommend Hans Delbruck's History of Warfare series, which is the best I've read). If this is correct it would undermine the supposedly "overwhelming" evidence of his theory. I would add, however, that his description of WWII is extraordinary and I consider it the best analysis on the overall conflict I've ever read.

Overall, I think two thing makes the book worthy. First, the Indirect Approach has the spirit of Sun Tzu in it. The way this concept clarify's some of the old precepts on the chinese manual about war is extraordinary. Besides, it completely modernizes the spirit of the "Art of War" and proves there are many ways to outclass an enemy and force him to make a mistake in modern times. It also presents a great principle on winning the Grand Strategy, in the realm of politics, before even considering victory at the Strategic and Tactical levels. I would recommend the book because of this and because of the great description on WWII.

B. H. Lidell Hart has written a masterpiece in "Strategy". His survey of history and it's successful generals all point to one, irrepressible conclusion; that to win, you must do the unexpected. Hart's main contention is that from acient to modern times, the generals who win, and win consistently, do so not by beating their heads against impregnable positions or trying to bring the enemy's main body to battle by direct action. Instead, he argues that in war, the object is to achieve victory at the least cost--in other words, use economy of force. The "indirect method" which he speaks of has been tested over time, and has proven itself repeatedly. Of the truly decisive campaigns from all of history, 90% of them were won, not by direct assault, but by maneuver, cunning, and by forcing an enemy army to prepare for multiple contingencies. In short, this book is not a handguide to winning a war, and does not present itself as such. What Hart does is show what history's successful captains have done, and leaves the reader to draw his own conclusions, and apply the facts that Hart presents. Overall, a well-written survery of military history that tests many of our preconcieved notions military success.

This is what Montgomery, surely an expert, said about Liddell Hart, in the introduction to Montgomery's "A Concise History Of Warfare":

"I did make attempts to read the writings of Clausewitz and Jomini but I couldn't take them in. ... Of the military historians of my own nation, language and times, I found Sir Basil Liddell Hart far and away the best: his military thinking has always appealed to me, and it had a definite influence on my own conduct of the war.Some historians are wise after the event; Liddell Hart was wise before the event -- a prophet at last honoured in his own country. Where he stands supreme is that not only is he an historian, hut he is also a theorist, and had produced from his vast knowledge a philosophy of war; and unlike many theorists he has generally proved to be right."

My experience was more like that of Prof. Domicio Proenca Jr., except that Clausewitz doesn't work for me. I found Machiavelli much more helpful as a philosopher of politics-including-war, and J.F.C. Fuller more helpful in interpreting the lessons of the careers of top generals. For me, David G. Chandler strikes the right balance in "The Art Of Warfare On Land": he grossly simplifies Liddell Hart's "indirect approach" and calls it one of the seven or eight "classical manoeuvres of warfare" -- a fine thing, in other words, always to be kept in mind, but not the only tactical tool you'll ever need, use or want to own.

I think if you're a paper-and-pencil (or roll the dice or free-form) war-fighter, looking to "lift your game", to impress a smart, well-read gamemaster or even to learn to gamemaster yourself, it's not a question of signing up with the "one true religiously correct way of war" but of (reading military history and) finding the paper coach or coaches who will help you most. You want to make the best decisions, not write the most prestigious footnotes, yes?

Liddell Hart might be the coach for you, and if so you'll soon know it. "Strategy" is practical. Liddell Hart meant for his ideas to be grasped quickly and applied by warriors, not just critics. His writing is beautifully clear, so you won't waste weeks, as you can do with a prolix and murky writer, looking up obscure battles and going: "What is he really saying? Am I doing this wrong? Or what?"

Another good point about Liddell Hart is that it's quite OK to take his ideas wildly out of context and use them in any whacky sort of situation: if there's Klingons on the starboard bow and elves and orcs slugging it out on-planet, you can still look for an indirect approach.

Clausewitz's "On War" is definitely one of the books you should look at. His fans are numerous. But his military thought is anchored in his time and place in Prussia, and shouldn't be read or applied wildly out of context. Reading and applying things wildly out of context is exactly the point to reading military history for games. Machiavelli and Sun Tzu have similar (but in my opinion lesser) faults of focusing on Rome/Italy and on ancient China. "Strategy" is meant to be used in all sorts of situations nobody had thought of before, including yours.

"Strategy" is one of the first books I would recommend any gamer to get hold of if they are having trouble graping what to do when war arises. It may do you a lot of good, and if it does you'll be in great company with Monty.

This is a brilliant book. The author surveys history's greatest campaigns to illustrate the "indirect approach" and the virtues of mobility in both offense and defense. Mostly the secret is about avoiding contact until you can position your forces in such a way that victory is assured or almost assured. Unfortunately this book is not meant for the casual reader. It's difficult to read and requires a lot of thought to properly absorb the author's concepts. Moreover, the author assumes the reader knows much of the history of several battles and the leading figures.

Some may argue that outflanking an opponent is obvious and hardly worth the long chapters that Liddell Hart devotes to it. It's true that the object is to dislocate an enemy's defenses by taking the route of least resistance to turn the opponent's moral and physical position. Yet this misses the crucial point. The route of least resistance is the route of least expectation. Making the route of least expectation one that puts your forces in a superior position requires knowing the mind of the opposing general. Then you must lure your opponent by playing on those expectations, or altering his expectations in a way that promotes your intentions. As an example, Liddell Hart takes Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, where the French leader lured the Russian's into a valley by presenting them with a relatively weak force, then he reinforced this perception of weakness by sending an offer of peace to the Austrians (the Russian's ally). Next, Napoleon lured the Russians to extend their left wing by presenting another seemingly "vulnerable" target before he struck at a crucial joint in the Russian lines and created such a decisive victory that Austria surrendered within 24 hours.

If you choose to read this book, prepare to spend a good amount of time considering the subtlety of the author's concepts, or else you will find it disappointing.