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Lessons learned included the folly of employing heavy, road-bound, mechanized/armored forces that were highly vulnerable to Viet-Cong (VC) ambushes, effective use of the jungle as a sanctuary by the VC, underestimating the stamina of the VC, and the ultimate war-weariness that caused the French public to rebel at fighting a seemingly endless conflict for no tangible gain. Add to this, the close coordination of political and military objectives that caused the Viet-Cong to sacrifice people, places and things to achieve a single objective: A Vietnam united under Communism. Does this sound familiar? This book, published in 1961, was readily available in the U.S. If it was read, it was ignored.
Fall gives detailed accounts of communist tactics and the results that accrued to French commanders who refused to recognize the fact that, "the (tactics) book," they had been schooled under simply did not apply in Vietnam. Amazingly, the U.S. then deployed our troops to Vietnam, with our own officers schooled by the same, "book!" Gallantry, esprit-de-corp, machismo, and/or faith in a righteous cause were no more effective against well-laid ambushes in the `60s and `70s than they were in the `40s and `50s. The lessons of history were there for the reading. Why we refused to heed them is a mystery that still calls for an answer.
Street Without Joy is not a left-wing condemnation of western "imperialism," or, the evils of "intervention." Fall neither condemns nor condones the goal of containing communism. He merely analyzes reasons for the French defeat. There was no precedent for fighting a "revolutionary war," prior to the French experience. The same could not be said for the U.S. If the French defeat was borne of ignorance; America's came seemingly from arrogance.
George Santayana said, "Those who do not remember the past are condemned to relive it." There are two lessons to be learned here: First, tactical schemes should be derived from the terrain and situation, not from blind adherence to, "the book." Books can be altered. Terrain, climate, and enemy forces cannot. Second, never again should U.S. troops be compelled to walk any, "street without joy," that is combat, without conducting a thorough review of the mistakes made by our predecessors. Reinventing the wheel is not only inefficient; in war, it is deadly! Ninety-four thousand, five hundred eighty-one crosses scattered throughout Indo-china, each bearing the name of a French soldier testifies to the truth of lesson one. Over 50,000 American names on, "The Wall," silently attest to the second.
While many in Washington in the early 1960s claimed to have read this book, obviously, very few heeded its message. Had they done so, it would seem that the United States, despite all its arrogance, might have avoided the quagmire that Viet Nam became and the multitude of deaths that occurred as the result of our hubris.
Published in 1961 (more than 4 years before the beginning of the US build-up in SE Asia), Fall provided his readers with an exceptionally strong historical and political analysis of the region, its people and their leaders. Again, the Washington elite seemed to have disregarded the quality of the material and the skill of the messenger as they barged head-long into our longest and most divisive war. It was one that would ultimately cause America to question itself and to cause the American people to question the honesty and integrity of their leaders. That could have been avoided had more people heeded the message contained within the covers of Fall's outstanding treatise.
To be sure, Fall's loyalties were divided and often conflicted. Born and raised in France, he came to the USA after WW II to study. He first saw Viet Nam as a Fulbright scholar. He returned many times and became a recognized expert in the cultural, political and economic realities of the region. He knew Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap personally and had great admiration for their ability to unify and motivate the Viet Minh against the French Expeditionary Corps and later, the armed forces of the most powerful nation on earth. But, he also respected and admired the courage and professional ablities of French soldiers fighting for a cause few at home cared about. At the end of the supply and communications lines, the French Army in Indo-China was mired in a war they had little control over and governed by successive regimes in Paris that had no clue as to what might be needed to effectively and successively defeat the Communist Viet Minh. Despite all these failings, Fall never lost sight of the fact that the soldiers from metropolitan France did their best for a lost cause and a populace at home who cared less.
After the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, France realized that continued attempts to hold onto Indo-China were futile. They eventually left, only to be replaced by the United States as the benefactor for the nominally democratic republic of Viet Nam, which had established itself south of the 17th Parallel. American arrogance and pride of position surpassed anything before by the French and the proof in the pudding is that we heeded none of the lessons offered in this fine book or others coming from on-scene observation.
Much as in his outstanding successor volume on the Battle of Dien Bien Phu entitled HELL IN A VERY SMALL PLACE, Fall doesn't miss a thing as he writes of the end of France's empire in Indo-China. The key personalities are all here, as well as the battles that undid the French military position in the region. His descriptions are accurate and unbiased, although on occasion they do carry a melancholy tone as he reveals the thoughtlessness of the French commanders and colonial administrators in the region.
If you want to read a single volume that will lead you to an understanding as to how the United States could have made such a colossal error in its thinking by choosing Viet Nam as a place to make its anti-Communist stand, then you need to read this book. Like its companion volume on Dien Bien Phu, it is a must for any serious student of Viet Nam and the war that drained the best from two of the world's most modern and professional armies. This book is also must reading for teachers of recent American and European history because the events of the late 1940s through the late 1950s were instrumental in what followed in the 1960s and 70s.
If you really care about the hows and whys of America's part in the tragedy of the Viet Nam War, then you MUST read "Street Without Joy."
Paul Connors
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