Stress and the waxing and waning symptoms of Tourette's syndrome [Unknown Binding]

Cheryl Palter-Zadek (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: 1991

It will shake up the ideas of all those who regard the staff of the Nazi-dominated German Army as paragons of military competence.--The Economist

--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

The German Army under Hitler is examined; conclusions are drawn from archives containing data on resources, manpower and tactics as well as from the works of war historians and the memoirs of generals involved. PW noted that Cooper's interpretations "will be a challenge to specialists, and his sweeping narrative absorbing reading for the layman." Photos. Military Book Club selection.
Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Product Details

• Unknown Binding
• Language: English
• ASIN: B0006DBRLM
• Average Customer Review: 3.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (15 customer reviews)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent, July 25, 2004

By 

Michael A Dorosh (Calgary, AB, CANADA) - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: The German Army, 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure (Hardcover)

Amazon's new "real name" policy means that my older review is no longer associated with my profile - so I will reiterate my comments earlier plus a couple of new observations.

I have no idea why anyone would suggest that Cooper's book is flawed because it doesn't mention the Holocaust - it is simply not about that.

What this book does do is examine in detail the myth of Blitzkrieg and the inner workings of the command structures and way of waging war. Cooper lays out very clearly how the old myths were started, and describes very clinically how the German Army was a victim of its own traditions - both in its way of making war (modern "Blitzkrieg" actually can be dated back to at least 1866, as Cooper points out) and in its subversion by Hitler - obedience to a man (emperor or Fuehrer) was the tradition by which the German Army ensured its own destruction.

Rivetting reading. I can't offer any deeper insight into the accuracy of some of the discussion - the earlier reviewers may have valid points about Enigma and the Russian Archives - but certainly this is the way to open one's mind to the idea that the German Army really wasn't all that revolutionary in its warmaking concepts.

Many of the conclusions do seem to be supported by statistical "facts" such as the continuing theme of shortage of supplies, basic equipments, etc. How much this information has changed since Cooper wrote the book is open to interpretation - but it seems unlikely that the Russian archives would shed much light on German logistical requirements.

I kept looking for Cooper to lay blame for the war on the Generals, or to absolve them completely - he does neither, as far as I can tell, though a book this dense needs to be read more than once for its full impact to make itself felt.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars An excellent book, September 18, 2006

By 

J. S. Diehl - See all my reviews
(REAL NAME)   

This review is from: German Army 1933-1945 (Paperback)

I found this to be a great book, it covers everything someone intrested in the German army of WW2 would want to know. I personally found the chapters dealing with the pre-war German army to be very illuminating. I havent found another book that covers the birth of the WW2 Wermhact in such detail. The absolute weakness and unreadiness of the German army is coverd very well, and it will suprise those who have the usal misconceptions about the mighty German war machine.

My only gripe is that I agree with other posters who say that the book relied to much on senior German officers memoirs who sought to project thier own failures on to Hitler. But for those who say this book dosen't cover the holocaust I say there are tons of other books that do that. Don't critisize this book because it dosen't cover something outside of it's own subject. And people who are mad that the book occasionely complaments the German soldier in the field aren't worth even listening to because their own bias is to much to be objective.

5 of 6 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars Decent Book with Flaws, May 6, 2005

By 

A. G. Corwin - See all my reviews
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This review is from: German Army 1933-1945 (Paperback)

There are several excellent points made in the other reviews which I won't rehash here, but I'll attempt to present another view of the book.

The book reads easily, and Cooper has a certain elegance to his language. He does not get bogged down in technical jargon that would not be accessible to the non-expert. He has done considerable research utilizing primary sources. His major themes are the German officer corps and its principles of Duty, Honor, Country, and how those principles affected the Wehrmacht's dealings with Hitler and its strategic approach to the subsequent war. A secondary theme is the strategic course of the Wehrmacht and the influence of the Generals and Hitler on that course. An interesting thesis in which he makes eloquent arguments but one that to some reveals a neglect of strategic factors outside of Germany. As Cooper himself states, however, in his introduction, "I deal solely with the themes outlined above," hence presenting a narrow field of view.

Cooper believes that the Officer Corps' abrogation of responsibility and acceptance of Hitler's orders led to Germany losing the war. The book relies heavily on post war memoirs and collections, notably those of Kesselring, von Manstein, Guderian, and Keitel, and their hindsight opinions affect Cooper's conclusions. This is why other reveiewers have mentioned a "pro-german" bias. Cooper makes no deliberate attempt to discuss in detail the influence and effectiveness of Allied armies, mainly because he intended to stay focused on the one topic.

For the everyman, its an interesting look at the German Army during the pre-war years, the internal politics of its Officer Corps and General Staff, and how those interactions affected the course of the war. For the historian or gifted amatuer it lacks impact. It would be well suited as a general read, but it would behoove the reader to contrast this book with one that focuses on the Soviet side of the Front and then make one's own assessment.