'Recent controversies between analytic and historic-sociological approaches to the philosophy of science have not diminished its significance; in fact, it seems to me that the pragmatic component in Nagel's have not diminished its significance; in fact, it seems to me that the pragmatic component in Nagel's thinking may be helpful for efforts to develop a rapprochement between the contending schools' - Carl G Hempel.
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16 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The Documentation of the Nature of Science,
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This review is from: The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (2nd edition) (Paperback)
There's lots of talk among people over what "science" really is and what constitutes "scienticity". Despite the fact that the word science comes from the Latin word "scientia" (literally meaning "knowledge"), most defenders of science are simply not familiar with what "science" truly is. Most people seem to blindly and ignorantly assume that science is "empirical" or "conclusive" or "strictly observationally based" or "skeptical" or "exclusively inductive" or "strictly peer reviewed" or other ignorant maxims popularized by science magazines and channels [National Geographic, Discovery, Scientific American, etc]. In reality science is all over the place and really overlaps superstitions at times too. Basic things people do, play key roles in science like inquiry, thought, and reason as the basis of investigations of nature. These are also the basis for investigating local events or picking a car insurance wisely or how to invest one's own money or how to solve personal problems.This work puts many of these beliefs to rest by describing with heavy detail the very nature of science. Ernest Nagel does a phenomenal job of putting science where it belongs - as philosophy. "Natural Philosophy" (the common name for "Science" before the 20th century) to be more precise. This book does a good job of making the distinction that science is not nature and that nature is not science. The study and attempt of simulation of nature is what leads to any science, whether it be a superstitious science, statistical science, an abstract science, a true science, or a false science. The term "Scientist" emerged in 1834 by William Whewell, who was an Anglican priest. Titles like "Natural Philosopher" or "man of science" were common titles before 1834 and slightly after. Empiricism and physical evidence constitute a decent chunk of "science", but overall, metaphysical aspects like: methodology, knowledge, understanding, ideas, thinking, reasoning, verification, clarification, assumption, inquiring (what, when, where, how, why), explanation, validation, prediction, modeling, numerical analysis, truth seeking, theories, mathematical rigor, basic common logic, laws, models, and "certainty" make up the vast majority of what is called "science". We all gather information from nature all the time (empirical data), but it's what we do with the gathered information that makes up science. Furthermore, the metaphysical nature of science is seen in the top title of nearly every scientific field - "Ph.D". It stands for "Doctor of Philosophy". Also in popular science media, philosophers of science like Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper are used and referenced perpetually to define what "is" and what "is not" science. Reading primary sources by scientists themselves also support this (see comments section). Lord Kelvin's text in Physics, for example, is called "Treatise on Natural Philosophy" and is a modern physics textbook which includes - calculations and models with lots of old theories that are still in use today because they are really good and effective for modern situations since nature doesn't change. Our understanding of nature is what changes, if there is a need for it. I know that some people think that science and philosophy are different, but the evidence speaks volumes to the contrary. Note: The words "Nature", "Science", and "Technology" are not the same thing and should NOT be used interchangeably due to their separate spheres of occurrence: what physically exists (Nature), assumption and modeling (Science), and application of and enhancement of science (Technology). If anyone ever traces the history of some theories, perhaps people will notice that "modern" science isn't really that "modern" at all, but instead is very ancient and medieval because people in the past weren't ignorant, they were usually ahead of their time in many fields. Few examples: * the heliocentric system is more than 2,000 years old and predates Copernicus by more than 1500 years (Aristarchus of Samos is called the "Ancient Copernicus" because he is the earliest known source to posit the heliocentric view). * "atoms" being popular today, were first lively posited more than 2,200 years ago (Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, and others) and definitely even before that. * high school geometry is good old fashioned Euclidean geometry and we still do our proofs basically like Euclid did more than 2,100 years ago. * Eratosthenes (2,200 years ago) and early Christian encyclopedists (1,400 years ago) like Isidore of Seville knew of the sphericity of the earth. It should be remembered that science grows on top of the work of previous generations. I will write the Chapter titles and give some objects of discussion found in these chapters. 1. "Introduction: Science and Common Sense" What makes science different from common sense, specificity of systematic explanations, the rise of science from practical advantages, systematic configuration of information, specificity of "scientific" languages as explanations of explanations 2. "Patterns of Scientific Explanation" The place of the explandum in statements of explanations for "why" questions, illustrations of scientific explanation, 4 types of explanation (with corresponding problems in their usage as explanations): Deductive Model of Explanation, Probabilistic Explanations, Teleological or "Functional" Explanations, and Genetic Explanations. Lack of explanations for the "necessity" of the ontology of natural phenomena. 3. "The Deductive Pattern of Explanation" Problems and insights explanation, applications of explanations on the conformity of natural laws, explanations applied on individual events, common emergence of generality found in explanations, epistemic requirements for Deductive Explanation including the Aristotlian view of appropriate adequacy for premises in Deductive Explanation 4. "The Logical Character of Scientific Laws" Accidental and Nomic Universality, difficulties of arguing of laws as necessary constructs of reality, the nature of nomic universality, contrary-to-fact universals, critiques of Hume's nomic universality, causal laws. locus of inference. Along with multiple historical examples emphasizing the significance of these issues. 5. "Experimental Laws and Theories" Distinctions between experimental laws and theories, descriptions as non-logical constructs in experimental laws, the 3 major components of theories (Physical and Chemical mostly): 1. abstract calculus, 2. rules that reference empirical content, and 3. interpretation the unites the abstractions and references, lack of direct empirical evidence for many aspect of theories, vagueness of some theoretical language. 6. "The Cognitive Status of Theories" Analogy as basis for theories, Descriptive View of theories, translatability, or lack thereof, of theoretical languages among theories and other theories, Instrumentalist View of theories, abstractive and hypothetical theories, theories based on "Ideal" conditions, parameters, and shapes. 7. "Mechanical Explanations and the Science of Mechanics" What a Mechanical Explanation is, the history of Mechanics - Statics and Dynamics, detailed discussion over Newton's 3 Laws of Motion and their significance, limits of using mathematics for deriving laws, ideal state problems as a guide to Mechanics, the logical status of mechanical science. 8. "Space and Geometry" Classical Mechanics and Euclidean (pure) Geometry 9. "Geometry and Physics" Inadequacy of Classical Mechanics and the rise of Relativity and 2 Non-Eucladian Geometries: 1. Lobachewskian Geometry and 2. Reimannian Geometry 10. "Causality and Indeterminism in Physical Theory" Deterministic structure of Classical Mechanics, alternate descriptions of physical states, atomic statistically properties of substances, lack of empirical evidence for components of statistical hypotheses, Probabilistic Explanations, language of Quantum Mechanics, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, problems and misinterpretations of uncertainties, dual nature subatomic constructs, Psi functions as statistical magnitude measurements, indeterminism in Quantum Theory, principle of causality, Chance as meaning scientific ignorance. 11. "Reduction of Theories" Autonomy of sciences, reduction of sciences, reductive explanations, reduction of the thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, formal conditions for reduction, non-formal conditions for reduction, borrowing of theories and laws by other sciences, doctrine of emergence, possible changing of laws of nature, wholes, sums, and organic unities. 12. "Mechanical Explanations and Organismic Biology" Objections to Biology being absorbed or reduced to Physics, structure of Teleological Explanations, "design" or "functional" language almost impossible to avoid in biological and physiological systems (i.e. God-of-the-Gaps fallacy and the Evolution/Chance-of-the-Gaps fallacy), spatial and temporal organization statements as implying a "final end or purpose", standpoint of Organismic Biology, reduction and "primary sciences" and "secondary sciences", lack of complete autonomy of Biology as of yet. 13. "Methodological Problems of the Social Sciences" Objections to social sciences (Anthropology, Social Science, Political Science, Economics, Psychology, etc) as being true "sciences", Controlled Inquiry as a core method, Controlled Experiment difficulties, problems with social relativity and social laws, bias, knowledge of social phenomenon as social variables, subjective nature of social subject matter, "behaviorism", "Value-Oriented" bias of... Read more ›
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