Philosophers from Hume, Kant, and Wittgenstein to the recent realists and antirealists have sought to answer the question, What are concepts? This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension.Particular concepts are also treated within the general framework: perceptual concepts, logical concepts, and the concept of belief are discussed in detail. The general theory is further applied in answering the question of how the ontology of concepts can be of use in classifying mental states, and in discussing the proper relation between philosophical and psychological theories of concepts. Finally, the theory of concepts is used to motivate a nonverificationist theory of the limits of intelligible thought.Peacocke treats content as broad rather than narrow, and his account is nonreductive and non-Quinean. Yet Peacocke also argues for an interactive relationship between philosophical and psychological theories of concepts, and he plots many connections with work in cognitive psychology.Christopher Peacocke is Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy in the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford.
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This book provides a detailed, systematic, and accessible introduction to an original philosophical theory of concepts that Christopher Peacocke has developed in recent years to explain facts about the nature of thought, including its systematic character, its relations to truth and reference, and its normative dimension.
About the Author
Christopher Peacocke is Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at the University of Oxford, a Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, and a Fellow of the British Academy.
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14 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
A Difficult Conception of Concepts,
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This review is from: A Study of Concepts (Representation and Mind) (Paperback)
In my work I have found it much important to develop my understanding of semantics, concepts, and meaning. Peacocke's book is a scholarly and powerful treatment of concepts (for which it get 5 stars), but it is also difficult and one-sided. I highly recommend anybody to read the review by Herman Philipse in Inquiry, 1994, 37, pp. 225-252. The reviewer writes that Peacocke leaves out any full treatment of the relations between Concept possession and linguistic understanding. "While the philosophical tradition from Plato to Husserl endorsed it, revolutionary philosophers such as Schliermacher, Nitzsche, Peirce, and Wittgenstein held that it involves a fundamental mistake".What I have found extremely useful for my purpose and for my understanding is the article by Georges Rey on concepts on pp. 185-193 in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (ed. by Samuel Guttenplan. Published by Blackwell, Oxford, UK. in 1994 (and later reprints). I also strongly recommend Frank C. Keil: Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1989.
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First Sentence:
There can be few areas of philosophy where the issues do not at some point turn on the nature of a particular concept. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
spurious hypothesizer, protopropositional content, predicational combination, observational concept square, positioned scenario, possession condition for conjunction, subintentional states, normative liaisons, ascription procedure, complete propositional contents, pure propositionalist, presupposed range, empirical mental states, light gray things, deflationary description, unassuming view, conceptual representational content, individuating account, spurious hypothesis, spurious hypotheses, possession conditions, reductio strategy, subpersonal psychology, subpersonal states, deflationary tactic Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Discrimination Principle, Lincoln Plaza, Generality Constraint, Ratification Thesis, Referential Explanation, Productivity Principle, Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright, Evans's Thesis, Gareth Evans, Hilary Putnam New!
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Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
There can be few areas of philosophy where the issues do not at some point turn on the nature of a particular concept. Read the first page Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
spurious hypothesizer, protopropositional content, predicational combination, observational concept square, positioned scenario, possession condition for conjunction, subintentional states, normative liaisons, ascription procedure, complete propositional contents, pure propositionalist, presupposed range, empirical mental states, light gray things, deflationary description, unassuming view, conceptual representational content, individuating account, spurious hypothesis, spurious hypotheses, possession conditions, reductio strategy, subpersonal psychology, subpersonal states, deflationary tactic Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Discrimination Principle, Lincoln Plaza, Generality Constraint, Ratification Thesis, Referential Explanation, Productivity Principle, Michael Dummett, Crispin Wright, Evans's Thesis, Gareth Evans, Hilary Putnam New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Back Cover | Surprise Me!
Citations (learn more)
This book cites 67
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100
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- Remnants of Meaning (Bradford Books) by Stephen Schiffer on 4 pages
- Reflections on Chomsky by Alexander L. George in Back Matter (1), Back Matter (2), and Back Matter (3)
- Philosophical Investigations (3rd Edition) by Ludwig Wittgenstein on page 196, and Back Matter
- Ontological Relativity by W. V. Quine on page 142, and Back Matter
- Representation and Reality (Representation and Mind) by Hilary Putnam in Front Matter, and Back Matter
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- Knowing Our Own Minds (Mind Association Occasional) by Crispin Wright on 8 pages
- Reflections on Meaning by Paul Horwich on 5 pages
- Perceptual Experience by Tamar Szabo Gendler on 4 pages
- Essays on Nonconceptual Content by York H. Gunther on 4 pages
- Kant, Science, and Human Nature by Robert Hanna on page 85, page 115, and Back Matter
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