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Surprise, Security, and the American Experience

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The surprise attack of September 11 brought about, in the eyes of many learned observers, a radical shift in American national security policy. Since World War II and up until the collapse of the Soviet Union there was a policy of containment and deterrence. During the 1990s, in the wake of the collapse, there was a feeling that democracy and capitalism would eventually triumph everywhere; the Clinton administration reasoned that the US "only needed to engage and the rest of the world would enlarge the process."

In response the 9/11 attack the Bush administration formulated a new strategy, outlined in the national security speech at West Point on June 1, 2002. This speech called for a new strategy which looked like a departure from American tradition. The key elements of this new strategy were preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. In the beginning, it was little noticed; however, in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, people began to examine this strategy more closely.

Yale professor John Lewis Gaddis, in this short and well-written little book, argues that this was not a new policy, in fact it had deep roots in American history that go back to the earliest days of the republic. Gaddis demonstrates that after the British attack on Washington DC during the War of 1812, the then secretary of state, John Quincy Adams asserted the same three principles. Preemption was the rationale for Andrew Jackson's invasion of Florida, the "failed state" of its day being a haven for marauding Seminoles, runaway slaves and profiteering pirates. With the diminishing authority of the Spanish in Latin America, the US sought to restrict the influence of other European powers in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine was a unilateralist declaration even though the US did not have the means to enforce it without the backing of the British navy. And in the end, the policy of John Quincy Adams was to be the predominant power in the Western Hemisphere, or at least on the North American continent - a hegemon in all but name.

Preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony was indeed a US strategy up until World War II. The US was seeking merely to assure its security by keeping the European powers out of the hemisphere. Most Americans believed it was a mistake to seek an oversees empire as the brief foray into the Phillipines proved in the early part of the 20th century.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt was forced the build alliances with the Soviet Union and other great powers in order to defeat Germany and Japan. It was thus necessary to forgo preemption and unilateralism in deference to the alliance. During and after World War II, the US took the lead in building multilateralism institutions - a multilateral system that not only ensured American hegemony, but made it desirable at the same time. Forgoing preemption gave the US the moral high ground, which it maintained until the invasion of Iraq.

The Bush administration's invasion of Iraq had all the elements of a grand strategy: preemption, unilateralsim - when multilateralism failed - and American hegemony. There was also an innovation to this strategy: there would be an active promotion of democracy in the Middle East. This idea swayed many liberals to the cause, including members of the media and the academic community.

The problems with this strategy became apparent after the invasion. They are too numerous to go into and obvious to anyone following the news. The mistakes made during the occupation leaves the Bush Doctine with only a few remaining supporters. The failure to enlist the great powers, not to mention many of the smaller powers, destroyed our status as a benign hegemon and jepardizes our moral high ground.

Gaddis does an excellent job of explaining the grand strategy and showing that it has precedents in history, better than Bush or anyone in his administration. However, he does not show that this strategy is justified, morally or legally, and he does not seem to fully appreciate that many of our friends and allies find this strategy frightening and repugnant. They do not call us arrogant for nothing.

Nevertheless, the jury is still out. Immediately after the invasion, it looked as though one regime after another would fall in the region, along the lines of the dominoes of Eastern Europe. At the present writing, with the Iraqi elections approaching, a decent outcome seems remote and a civil war possible. Yet, there are stirrings of hope and change elsewhere in the Middle East, such as in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The upheaval in Iraq is also creating debate that did not exist before in Egypt and the Gulf States. The pendulum may again swing the other way and the grand strategy may be working inspite of itself.

After 9-11, when the Bush administration began laying out the framework for a new strategy to deal with security threats to the United States, several scholars and commentators judged elements of the nascent strategy to be without precedent in American history. John Lewis Gaddis, a scholar who has written extensively about the history of U.S. national security, argues otherwise. Rather than an unprecedented strategy, Gaddis says the Bush administration has put forward a security framework that reaches back into the nineteenth century for its central ideas.

This short book, which was based on a series of lectures Gaddis presented at the New York Public Library in 2002, builds its case of an evolving U.S. security strategy around three events: the 1814 burning of the White House by the British, the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, and 9-11. Gaddis argues that each of these events forced the U.S. to change its strategy to fit the new circumstances of the time. Bush's recent unilateral policies after 9-11 and FDR's multilateral response to the U.S. entry into WW2 (that was also the basis of the U.S. Cold War strategy) are familiar to most readers, but it is Gaddis's description of John Quincy Adams and his nineteenth century strategy (one that was largely followed by almost all American presidents until 1941), and the comparison of Adams's strategy with Bush's, that is likely to spark the reader's interest.

Gaddis makes the case that Bush's so-called "unprecedented" strategy combining preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony finds its precedents in Adams's policies. Like Bush, Adams felt it necessary to occasionally preempt neighboring states, non-state actors (Indians), and even failed states (Spain's faltering hold on its colonial possessions). Like Bush, Adams felt unilateralism was sometimes necessary to secure America's long-term interests. And finally, like Bush, Adams sought U.S. hegemony; the only difference between the two presidents was one of degree; Bush seeks to maintain U.S. global hegemony while Adams had to make due with the goal of regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

Gaddis does not claim that the Bush administration borrowed consciously from Adams, and the scholar concedes there are differences between the nineteenth and twenty-first century security environments for the U.S. He maintains, however, the similarities are striking enough to note. He also argues that there is a common thread to American strategy passing from Adams to FDR to Bush: whenever Americans have felt threatened, their response has been to take the offense, not to play defense; to expand, not to shrink behind walls; to confront and overwhelm, not to flee.

This is an excellent book, concise and strikingly persuasive. It makes the Bush case for a new U.S. strategy better than the administration itself has made it, and yet Gaddis is not a Republican supporter. By giving historical precedents to the controversial tenets of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony, Gaddis attempts to show that Bush's new security framework is less radical than many now fear.

For all that has been written about the American reaction to September 11, who could have thought that a mere 128 pages could offer a sweeping and refreshing look into America's historic quest for security-and to do so while demonstrating the relevance of that historical exercise for the present.

John Lewis Gaddis, a historian at Yale University, aims at "an admittedly premature effort to treat, as history, an event that remains inescapably part of our present": the September 11 attacks on America and the Bush Administration's response to them. The product is an intellectual and historical tour de force, which dissects the American desire for security by looking at what its government did the last two times it was faced with a similar predicament: after the British burned the White House and Capitol Hill in 1814, and after Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941.

The three dominant themes employed (or conceived) by John Quincy Adams were unilateralism, preemption, and hegemony. Roosevelt's reaction to Pearl Harbor, on the other hand, rested on multilateralism and a rejection of preemption; ironically, he still achieved the third: hegemony. The book then proceeds to carefully craft an analysis (and critique) between those two historical precedents and President Bush's reaction after September 11.

It is hard to imagine another book that can look so clearly and refreshingly at the major security issues confronting American foreign policy at the time; and to do so in so few pages. Nor is it imaginable that anyone could have summarized in a single paragraph his or her suggestion about what America foreign policy should be aimed at (no spoilers here: read the book). Yet, this is precisely what one will encounter reading "Surprise, Security, and the American Experience."

Mr. Gaddis has written one of the best books on current US foreign policy available. His grasp of history provides a strong context for analyzing the Bush administration's policy in a way many commentators, particularly from the left, overlook. Gaddis clearly sees the grand strategy (the Vision Thing) that animates Bush and his foreign policy team. Gaddis connects this vision to similar events in American history, then provides an analysis that compares and contrasts our times with those earlier "suprises" of 1814 and 1941. This brief book (you can read it in a couple of hours) operates at a wide scope of time, yet provides a clear structure that links the past with the present in a rational and empirical way. Regardless of your political philosophy, this is a book you should read if you want to form a thoughtful opinion.

There are not many people who could write a book that is this wide, deep, and clear (the Vision Thing again, but it belongs to Mr. Gaddis - what kind of seminar this guy must run); I am moved to a great deal of respect for Mr. Gaddis and his skill as a thinker and writer. I also appreciate that he considers in his analysis other strong writers like Francis Fukuyama (End of History and the Last Man), Samuel Huntington (Clash of Civilizations), Fouad Ajami (Dream Palace of the Arabs), and Bernard Lewis (What Went Wrong).

This is a very strong book.

American foreign policy and international relations are made up of wars, treaties, doctrines, and so forth. A lot of details and sometimes a unifying perspective (e.g., Cold War and containment of USSR/Communism) gives us the sweep of history and content for many other books.

This little book offers something a little different: the meta-policy of America. The even larger scale of American foreign policy. On this scale the grounding in the country's principles together with the continuity of concerns and decisions becomes clear and understandable.

Three attacks surprised Americans - the burning of the capital in 1814, the attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941, and 9/11/2001. Based on concern for security and national principles the foreign policy (on this scale) was set, driven by three leaders.

The first leader was John Quincy Adams. The meta-policy combined notions of preemptive action, unilateral authority, and hegemonic power. The scope for these was this hemisphere. The meta-policy lasted pretty well until Pearl Harbor, though in practice it was not regi;ar;y (or even at all?) applied after World War I.

Second was Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the policy altered the notions somewhat. For WW II and the Cold War era. The scope was world wide and the actors were nation states and alliances of nations.

Third is George Walker Bush. In this era America has reverted somewhat to the Adams era approach. The scope is still world wide however the actors include transnational entities (such as al Queda).

I will leave the review there. The author marshalls events, documents, and the usual historical elements to support this continuity of American meta-policy. While President Bush's doctrine of preemption has far more historical context and perspective than many give him credit for (the neocons hardly invented this), there are also deviations and expansions that the author calls into question.

This book is neither a critique of Bush, nor a full fledged critique of these policies. The author does not attempt to compare President Bush to President Roosevelt for greatness.

The book left me considering a much larger historical perspective for American actions, and a greater sense of continuity and even consistency than the chattering press credits. It might also be good for a few foreign correspondents to read since it seems many outside American are unaware of American foreign policy (there is none, or it is shoot-from-the-hip Cowboyism) and American perspective on security. For all who read this book tomorrow's newspaper articles on the war, Iraq, terrorism, etc. will read just a little bit different.

Readers should take note of Gaddis' disclaimer in the opening chapter of this compact volume, that, "... we might as well try to know our recent history as best we can, however imperfect the exercise may be." This largely describes this thought-provoking, yet ultimately intellectually rushed volume.

Gaddis argues that the United States has historically ensured its security through expansion rather than isolation and that the current administration's policy of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony has roots in American 19th century foreign policy. What can be easy to miss in the theory is that Gaddis delineates a difference between preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony limited to the Western Hemisphere and that which is used today to protect American global interests.

In my opinion, Gaddis' historical examples do not specifically define what he believes preemptive action is and he does not answer the critical question that exists today: Is it justified? He writes that in the 19th century the US employed the doctrine of preemption in several instances. Along the Western frontier, President Jackson argued that preemption was necessary to safeguard the lives of pioneers and settlers against potentially hostile Native Americans. The resulting preemption evenutally expanded the boundaries of the US to the Pacific Ocean and pushed these populations into easily controllable reservations.

On the international stage, Gaddis writes that President Adams believed that in any situation where a state within the US sphere-of-interest might fail or create a power vacuum, the US could preempt this occurrence by force. So, for example, the possibility that a canal might be built by European powers in Panama allowed the US to foment the secession of Panama from Colombia and then create a Canal Zone controlled by it.

Seen from a realists' geopolitcal perspective, these actions make perfect sense, but Gaddis' correctly states that the US believes in its exceptionalism and in the "empire of liberty". These two divergent strands of realism vs. idealism are not fully explored, and with regard to the justification for preemption, Gaddis simply writes that we must, "acknowledge the moral ambiguity of our history."

The US unilateralism and hegemony that Gaddis links from the present to the 19th century was only possible then because of America's unique geopolitical situation. The US had no equal in the Western Hemisphere and never had to engage in balance-of-power relations as did the nations of Europe. What Gaddis calls American unilateralism was indeed so when it came to issues in the Western Hemisphere, as put forth by the Monroe Doctrine, but was also a refusal to enter into any binding relationships with European nations and the balance-of-power dynamic on the continent. America's hegemony rested on its isolationism that was itself guaranteed by the buffers of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Whenever the US reversed its isolationism and entered into relations with the Eastern Hemisphere, it was on the principle of collective security and multilateralism, as seen in China's Open Door Policy, President Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the creation of postwar institutions such as the United Nations and the Bretton Woods organizations.

It is a shame that after all the historical background, Gaddis only spends 20 pages on questions about the translation of preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony from a Western Hemispheric sphere of influence to a global one under President Bush's grand strategy. Gaddis briefly writes that the invasion of Iraq was a military success but diplomatic failure. He raises questions about whether democracies can be created among cultures that share different values, and even whether such democracies would not become tyrannies of the majority. He also asks whether the US can be seen by the rest of the world as an "empire of liberty," and even says that the parallel he previously drew between President Adams' and President Bush's policies ends here in, "an American government that deliberately goes abroad in search of monsters to destroy - lest those monsters attempt to destroy it."

I would have liked the book more if Gaddis had spent less time trying to force the words preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony to fit historical events, and more time elaborating on the questions he raises near the end, but the book is nevertheless ambitious in its scope and immensely thought-provoking.

In the past few months I have read a number of recently published works that might fall into the general category of "political science." Other reviewers do a far better job of recapping the salient points of the books, so I leave it to myself to comment on the readability and ability to contradict the facts and assertions of each book. Fantasists and conspiracy theorists see only what they want to see. Historians argue (what else do they have to fill their time,) but historians at least base their opinions in fact.

This book is a little gem. I read it in about 2 hours, learned a great deal about the political history of the United States (all those old dead Presidents actually did stuff!) I came away with new insights and new lines of inquiry. This is not an in depth study but rather an essay that introduced me to an interesting interpretation of the "grand strategies" of the United States through history. A fun read, I recommend it as a wonderful breath of fresh air when the more dense (what do we do after 9/11?) writing gets you down.

Gaddis attempts to walk us through two previous suprise attacks in American history, the sack of Washington in 1814 and Pearl Harbor. Both of these resulted in revolutions of foreign policy. John Quincy Adams, as Monroe's Secretary of State, articulated a strategy for maintaining American safety and values in the Western Hemisphere. Later, FDR invented a functional multilateral world order that the United States could harness to fight World War II and the Cold War.

He then observes that, contrary to chattering-class opinion, Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy is perfectly well inline with these traditions. He also relates the ideas in the National Security Strategy, which tragically few people read, to these policies, previous expressions of doctrine, and concrete changes in the world context. There is a shocking lack of discussion of this new context.

Now the threat is non-state actors beyond a couple of significant hold-overs like China, North Korea, Iran, etc. Today threats emerge from terrorist organizations (and their allies such as international organized crime, etc.) It is important to realize that multinational corporations and NGOs have also become signifcant non-state actors on the international scene. These are not participants in our multilateral world order, and they cannot be swayed, in the end, by the same tools that we use in an international order. Thus, President Bush has asserted that politics is the root cause of terrorism and threats, and has started down a, possibly too bold, path to change the political culture of the world. While his problems are radically different than Adams and FDR faced, his solutions are completely continuous and completely American. This must be grasped to think about serious policy alternatives in our new context.

The only reason that I can fathom that this book has not recieved more press is its brevity. Really "important" books are supposed to be doorstops and need to be filled with impenetrable, turgid prose. Almost as remarkable as Prof. Gaddis' arguments is the fact that he has packed everything in a very easy 160 pages.

Gaddis acceptst the fact that Bush's foreign policy is a break from post-WWII strategy. He also makes it clear, however, that far from being a departure from American principles it is in fact firmly rooted in them. Gaddis chronicles the evolution of American Foreign Policy from John Q. Adams to the present. He notes that principles espoused then, preemption, unilateralism and hegemony, are once again our calling cards. The scale has changed, hegemony used to apply only to the Americas and the Caribbean basin, but the ideas remain the same.

Gaddis does not completely admonish the Bush Administration for some of its actions, but it is more a question of style than substance.

Gaddis voice is a welcome addition to the discussion on what our grand strategy should be in the age of terrorism. This book is a must read for anyone who loves American history or is concerned about our foreign policy.

John Lewis Gaddis presents a very persuasive argument in his book, about the shifts undertaken in American foreign policy once American security was challenged by foreign threats. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience is a concise well-thought argument interpreting the history of American foreign policy reaction to surprise attacks and security threats to the homeland. And how these threats have altered the way the US acts on the world stage, whether isolationist, neutral, or ally. He uses three principle events in American history to outline the three Bush administration's foreign policy strategies of, preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. The three principle events in which these shifts in strategy occurred were the burning of Washington by the British in 1814, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, and the Al-qaeda terrorists attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001.

The first monumental shift in American foreign policy occurred in 1814 after the destruction of the capital by the British. The US had not ventured into this realm of diplomacy at this point. America had not recognized that its interests lay in taking part on the world stage, whether with the world or against it, but always engaging with it. President Jefferson had kept the US out of war with the British in the early 1800s by hiding from the direct conflict.

Jefferson had used a multi-faced policy of expansion, belligerency and appeasement. He acquired the Louisiana Purchase from the French, and at the same time reduced the size of the army and the navy. During the Napoleonic Wars when both Britain and France were violating American maritime rights Jefferson called for a trade embargo. He contracted American interests, eliminating the threat to America by disengaging from the field, refusing to defend America's right to trade. This was humiliating to the Congress and the people, and by 1811 both began calling for a defense of all American interests, whether it was possible or not. The British response was to invade the US and burn down Washington.

After negotiating the Treaty of Ghent to end the War of 1812 John Quincy Adams became US Secretary of State in 1817 and began a major reformation of American foreign policy. The US was in a difficult position after the war. It had a huge land mass with vast borders to defend and only limited means to defend them. It was therefore prudent to acknowledge that the US must first be willing to take action before a crisis ensues. That is to use a doctrine of preemption. Adams first applied this idea to the `failed state' of Spanish Florida. (pg. 17) The vast open border of that territory allowed many non-state actors, such as Native Americans, slaves and the French to cross into the US and attack its citizens. Adams instructed Spain to ensure that this no longer occurs by staffing it with more soldiers or Spain must cede Florida to the US to prevent future attacks. This doctrine of preemption came to justify many subsequent American foreign policy engagements, from the annexation of Texas in 1845 by President Polk, to the American invasion of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898 by President McKinley.

The next diplomatic strategy that Adams helped establish was the doctrine of unilateralism. This doctrine would be spelled out clearest in the Monroe Doctrine, which states that the US would have been the exclusive participant in the western hemisphere. The Europeans were forbidden from intervening in the affairs or colonizing any country in the western hemisphere. This was a dramatic shift in American policy considering the fact that the US had no way of enforcing it without the participation of the British Navy. Adams had checkmated the British attempt at a joint Anglo-American statement about future European involvement in the western hemisphere, presenting instead a unilateral statement from the US determining the course of events in its own backyard.

The third strategy presented by Adams was the doctrine of hegemony. As he saw it the US had time on its side, while the Europeans time was running out. Population, economy, and potential strength were all increasing meanwhile the Europeans were beginning to reach the limit of their potential. For Adams there was no reason to hide hegemonic aspirations. The US was by far the strongest nation on the continent and shared that stage with no one else. It was not enough to conquer lands and create empires, `security could best be assured, instead, by making certain that no other great power gained sovereignty within geographic proximity of the US.' (pg. 29)

The preponderance of power lay with the US in 1941 but a surprise attack using new weapons and tactics brought the weaknesses of that power home to millions of Americans on December 7th. President Roosevelt choose to embrace a different a course for American policy then did Adams. FDR accepted America's role in the world and formed alliances with other nations to protect our hegemony. He did not sacrifice American power but dropped two key components of Adams strategy, preemption and unilateralism. Americas' hegemony and preponderance of power ensured that the US could almost simultaneously bring to a close two separate wars, with the US coming out stronger. FDR never let proclaimed interests extend beyond actual capabilities. This was the genius of his strategy, unlike Wilson whose ideals for democratizing the world was not feasible and made the US look hypocritical and weak. FDR believed US security was enhanced by embedding `unilateral priorities within a cooperative multilateral framework.' Global American hegemony was now to `arise by consent.' (pg. 54)

After the Cold War American political leaders had neglected the building threat of global terrorism. It was a symptom of the American psyche to ignore the invisible threat in the absence of visible danger. They assumed that American power was supreme that with the fall of the Soviet Union no other country could or would directly challenge US power. They believed they had won the game and they assumed that the `rules by which the United States, its allies, and its defeated adversaries had played' could never be challenged or broken. (pg. 80) None state actors, terrorists acting without sovereign support became a foreign policy reality on September 11th.

The Bush Doctrine states that the US will identify and eliminate terrorists wherever they are, together with the regimes that sustain them.' (pg. 86) This policy no longer respects sovereignty and implies that the rules that by which the world was playing were no longer going to be respected by the US. The Bush administration was embracing preemption to find the terrorists threats before they attack us, which is also the policy of unilateralism which is needed when the world community is unwilling to recognize the threat. Preemption in the Bush doctrine requires American hegemony, `the capacity to act wherever one needs to without significant resistance from rival states.' (pg. 87)

Gaddis cites Fareed Zakaria whom I wholeheartedly agree. Zakaria says that order, prosperity, and justice, the necessary building blocks of a stable society are not found in democracies. They are found in liberal autocracies like China, Taiwan, Singapore and Chile. According to our political ideologies these places are not democracies. But they are ordered stable secure societies with limited freedoms. Unlike the present situation in Iraq where massive amounts of freedom exists things are extremely unstable and insecure. Democracies according to Zakaria do not do a successful job at providing the necessary order and stability to maintain a civil society like Iraq.

I believe that Gaddis has written a very informative and effective argument for the current strategies of the Bush administrations War on Terror. I think his reasoning is sound and his method of merging commentary and history is excellent. I was however not that impressed with his minor criticism of the Bush Doctrine in the last portion of the book. I had hoped to read more on the criticisms of the Bush Doctrine and its many flaws in presenting this strategy to the world and its failures at maintaining the good relations the US had had after the September 11th attacks. Their exists many outcomes to the present Bush administration strategy, since this book was written, those outcomes have not been looking good for American interests in Afghanistan or Iraq.

I believe Gaddis has written an outstanding book that ultimately changed my perception of the Bush administration and its strategy for change in Iraq. I was not convinced of America's right to act unilaterally or preemptively in this case. I always believed that the threat of WMD was a sales pitch for the war and not evidence of anything. I still agree with one of the merits for our invasion of Iraq, such as spreading democracy, but the methods for achieving this are proving disastrous. I believe that we cannot simply throw-out the rules to the game because the terrorists no longer play by them. I do not trust unchecked American hegemony where we no longer respect the rules we helped write and cherish.