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Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods

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During seven months in Falluja in 2005 I spent approximately 150 days in the city. The history alone in this book showed us just how much we may have been underestimating our enemies, and that if they followed their classical influences they could have done much more damage.

The history is priceless dating back to influences of the Samarai and how it came to bring the original Middle Eastern assassins, and how today's suicide bombers are like those in the past, only they have explosives instead of knives, and do not need as much skill.

John Poole had spent close to 30 years in the Marine Corps leading men as both a gunnery sergeant (when enlisted) and a Lt Colonel (when commissioned). He saw Vietnam first hand, and left feeling that he could have done more for the men he'd led. Although the officers that are in charge of teaching battle field skills are not fast to accept his methods the men on the ground who deal with the enemies in the streets of Iraqi cities know he is right.

This book is truly remarkable. In Tactics of the Crescent Moon, John Poole provides an incredibly insightful analysis of the Middle Eastern problem and our role in trying to resolve it. He explains extremely complicated issues with remarkable clarity, examining them from historical, political, cultural, military and moral perspectives. Despite the immense scope of the book, his key insights never get lost in the complexity of his subject matter. At the most fundamental level, John Poole provides detailed tactical descriptions of exactly how our Middle Eastern adversaries fight. To illuminate the big picture, he clearly shows how these tactical examples relate to the larger cultural and political issues. He goes on to propose solutions that can help American privates survive, help commanders make better decisions, help generals develop better strategies and even help politicians make better military policies. Most importantly, the book's profound morality offers insight on how to win what might be the most important battle of all, the battle for the moral high ground. We will not win this war on terrorism if we lose touch, even for a moment, with the great and noble values that make us who we are. John Poole reminds us that when Americans go to war we bring with us our honor, our compassion, our love of freedom, and our belief in the equality of all people. Our morality is our ultimate weapon.

To begin this look at H. John Poole's latest work, let's outline what it's not -
- Not a Middle East History tome;
- Not a guide to recent terror operations;
- Not a tactical discussion; and
- Not an approach to military reform.
No, it is not any one of the above - it combines all these into a coherent, concise guide to anyone interested in understanding our military problems in the Middle East.
Section one discusses Muslim military campaigns from Gallipoli during WWI to Israel's expulsion from Lebanon by the Hezbollah. Section two examines the different Muslim militant groups. Section three provides one of the first coherent looks at Muslim militant groups' training and tactical techniques - and tactical approaches to defeating them.
Certain themes, appearing in other works by Poole, as well as in "Tactics...", compare and contrast U.S. military traits and capabilities to our Muslim opponents', to include the following:
"Us" - doctrinally driven, top-down training environment; versus
"them" - bottom-up, experimentally driven.
"Us" - squads depend on artillery fire to advance; versus
"them" - primary groups that can move unnoticed.
"Us" - occuppies ground; versus
"them" - consolidates regions.
"Us" - training instructors stick to standardized procedures; versus "them' - training techniques developed through experience.
"Us" - enhance control by standardizing tactical procedures; versus "them" - disseminating battle-tested techniques for refinement through practice.
"Us" - handicapped by inane bureaucratic procedure; versus
"them" - copying tactical ideas from any source and experimenting under simulated battle conditions... A lot of America's adversaries, of late, seem to have these traits.
Poole also notes that to beat the Muslim terrorist in the military domain, our forces must, among other things -
- recognize the strategic significance of non-combatants and not treat them as so many expendable sacks of potatoes;
- provide the infantry squads with a much higher level of tactical training; and
- learn to evolve tactically on the primary group level.
Military reform has been bantered about in terms of "hi-tech" improvements to military infrastructure and precision "first-strike" weapons; Poole looks at the wars we fight now and notes that success will depend more on the "software" in the brain-housing groups of our infantrymen than that in our computers. Fourth Generation Warfare doesn't depend on hi-tech hardware and inexhaustible supplies of munitions - the guarantor of Western hegemony in the Twentieth Century - it depends on keen intelligence networks - humint as well as techint - agile tactical evolution of the mix of forces, their methodologies and training, and decentralized command. Most of our recent technology has facilitated ever more centralized direction of forces.
Will the U.S. war colleges and staff academies be looking carefully in Poole's recommended directions for military reform? Perhaps not - but Poole is addressing the conflict we'refighting. Anyone headed to Iraq or Afghanistan will find "Tactics of the Crescent Moon" a worthwhile read.

I would highly encourage any person who is Battalion staff or lower to read this book. All Army and Marine personnel should read this book on the jet flying them to Iraq or Afghanistan. This book will give a typical soldier or marine a good snap shot of how the Eastern combat mind thinks. Also, unlike much propaganda to the contrary, the Islamic soldiers fight using Eastern techniques. There is more hand-to-hand fighting than in the past. American's just can't call in their massive fire support because the targets may not be easy to hit.

This book is great for privates, sergeants, lieutenants, and captains. I don't know if the advice will be taken if it's read at the level of battalion or above. That is where the "rubber no longer meets the road". The staff disconnect from the soldiers begins.

For all war fighters this book is a must read. All ROTC departments, Marine, and Army infantry should have this book as required reading.

H. John Poole takes up the banner he flies in his earlier work The Tiger's Way. He addresses the challenges of what he calls Eastern-style light infantry fighting a Western-style force with the added wrinkle of Middle Eastern guerilla/insurgency. Poole's work in Crescent Moon is needed. Westerners look down our collective noses at Middle Eastern military capability. Poole attempts to shake us out of our arrogant torpor by analyzing just how the Afghans defeated the Soviets, how the Chechens are defeating the Russians, and how the Iraqi insurgency is making progress in Iraq. Unfortunately, Poole does not offer many specific solutions. However, I can overlook this shortcoming because I believe Poole's real focus is on convincing his readers that there is a problem. No solution will be palatable to Westerners until Westerners believe a solution might be needed.

Poole's model of Eastern light infantry emphasizes low-level decision making, flexibility, and an emphasis on deception, camouflage, surprise, ambush, and misdirection. Eastern light infantry fight their Western opponents by hiding from Western firepower in the earth. Eastern light infantry fights at night using infiltration along thoroughly-reconnoitered routes. Whereas the Western commander uses map reconnaissance, preparatory bombardment, and positive control from the top, the Eastern commander sends his people to scan every inch of the target area, then solicits their input into the plan before having his infantry launch their assault from hand grenade range.

Placed in a Middle Eastern guerilla context, Eastern light infantry becomes a highly decentralized force that concentrates where and when it wishes. When circumstances aren't favorable, the Middle Eastern fighter melts away. The Middle Eastern fighter uses the ground for protection and concealment, much like his Far Eastern counterpart. The Middle Eastern fighter uses the civilian population for concealment, and he draws support from the civilians. Suicide bombers are a Middle Eastern twist that has a lengthy history.

According to Poole, defeating Middle Eastern insurgents will mean taking them and their methodologies seriously. As long as Westerners dismiss their Middle Eastern foes as unwashed Muslim fanatics, Westerners will fail to see how and why Afghans drove out the Soviet Union, Chechens have fought Russia into a bloody stalemate, and Iraqi insurgents continue to plague US forces in Iraq. Understanding the enemy is the first step towards defeating him. Poole offers us Tactics of the Crescent Moon so that we might understand who the shadowy foes of the West are.

"Tactics of the Crescent Moon" is timely because of the wars raging in the Middle East. These wars include and are not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States has been targeted by Middle Eastern terrorist since the late 1960's. As long as any of these exist, the United States will face Islamic warriors on jihad: the existance of corrupt governments in the Middle East, the existance of the state of Israel, failure to convert wholesale to the "right flavor" of Islam, providing a market for Middle Eastern oil, and lack of a global Islamic empire. The United States first fought Islamic warriors at the beginning of the 19th Century, when a handful of Marines, Sailors, and mercenaries fought and routed the Barbary Pirates. Following the Spanish-American War, Filippino Moros (Muslim tribes on Mindinao) proved so fierce that the .38 caliber Colt revolver was replaced by the .45 caliber Colt automatic pistol. Thus, the Muslim irregular is an old enemy for the United States. Surviving this foe requires a comprehensive and multi-pronged strategy. Basic to a viable startegy is understanding who the enemy is, why he fights, and lastly, how. Poole concentrates on the tactical defeat of the Islamic militant.

American military units are poor at the short-range fight. Hand-to-hand combat has been neglected for reasons ranging from "why waste efforts on something of marginal effectiveness" to creating a female-friendly military environment. These lame excuses favored two groups--military careerists, and the enemy. Close combat training is difficult and dangerous. A zero-defect mentality coupled with the desire to empower women--without giving women the tools that empower--is being overtaken by current events. Units going to Iraq or Afghanistan are getting crash courses in city fighting, room-to-room combat, firing from moving vehicles, and reacting to ambush. Combat units are learning to detect and defuse ambushes before they occur. The US bases in the Middle East are hard targets, with defense in depth. Poole alludes to the timidity about sustaining casualties--it does hamper operations. Also hampering operations is the fear of inflicting collateral damage. Poole points out that skilled infantry can defeat the enemy with a minimum of casualties. This has been happening in Iraq, and the new Iraqi forces are taking over the burden of fighting the Iraqi insurgency. Unlike South Vietnam in 1968, there are not neighbors ready to pounce on Iraq with a large conventional army equipped with lots of tanks, artillery, and aircraft. And if there were, tanks and artillery and aircraft battles are the United States' strong suite. The war for Iraq will be won or lost in street battles. Poole advocates bottom-up squad-focused training and doctrine to defeat the Islamic irregular fighter threat. Because the United States is fighting a war, many of the careerists now recognize that small arms training, squad tactics, and yes, plain old brawling have to be part of the bag of tricks. Marines paid at least lip service to this new old doctrine--now the Army, the Navy, and even the Air Force are conducting realistic and rigorous squad-level training to better-prepare American service members for duty in the Middle East. Trouble is, old habits die hard. Poole recommends that the US goes further, adopting a bottoms-up tactical doctrine that is "circumstantially unique, surprise oriented, and threat compensating." This will shift a larger burden to junior leaders. The biggest shift will be to the individual soldier or Marine on patrol--currently, the capability to run each fire-team size patrol (four or five soliders) from the White House exists. There is a great temptation to do so, even though President Bush was a fighter pilot, not an infantry team leader. Poole argues that the man on the spot is better able to decide what action to take. He's correct as long as the man on the spot has both situational awareness (something that is hard or impossible to do by remote control) and has the other information needed to make the dicision. Plus one more thing--a doctrine that puts decision-making at the lowest possible level. America's most effieicnt industries do this already--the same high-quality people are in business and in our all-volunteer military. It takes time and effort to make a well-rounded knowledgable soldier.

It will be a difficult task. Saddam's minions were specifically trained in deception techniques. The laundry list Poole provides in "Tactics of the Crescent Moon" read like a James Bond movie: advanced psychological training, mind control techniques, and a ruthlessness not possible if we are to meet American societal norms and what Poole terms "moral behavior." One section of Chapter 11 is titled, "Tactics and Morality Are Not Mutually Exclusive."

The Islamic warrior can be beaten. Poole examines the tactical shortcomings of several Islamic jihad groups. A major problem with the Islamic imperial movement is that the jihadists must play first to the Islamic world. It isn't that the jihadists are ineffective playing to a Western audience--they are many times more effective at the media game against the West than the West is against the Islamic world. The guerrilla theater bombing of Madrid did cause the withdrawal of Spanish soldiers. Kidnapping foreigners and holding them hostage until a Western government complies isn't working out very well now, but held great promise while it was still novel. More effective is that the kidnappings have slowed down the flood of foreign workers into Iraq--there's more to winning a guerrilla campaign than killing American soldiers. Guerrilla war is a war of ideas and images.

Poole identifies a major weakness of American forces: movement skills. How can American infantry move through a foreign urban area unseen? The jihadists do so routinely. Some elements, such as Al Queda, have recently began losing their "invisibility cloak" because they're outsiders and don't blend in as well as the insiders. Al Queda's operations have been increasingly directed at Iraqi civilians--the US forces are bottled up in their fortified bastions and there are fewer foreign workersl By necessity of having to act, and having driven off most of the targets, Al Queda has to conduct ethnic cleansing, and is alienating Iraq as a result. The US is not only increasing its mobility when it does patrol, but increasingly the new Iraqi police and Iraqi army are becoming more effective at confronting and destroying Al Queda and other insurgency movements. The number one problem in Iraq is still criminal gangs. This fragmented opposition to the new Iraqi government is compartmented by accident and has trouble coordinating large-scale operations, but is resistant to disruption because the many elements are seperated from each other. In many cases the seperate elements are actualy bitter hereditary enemies--temporarily united to fight the "Crusader" invaders. The fragility of this alliance is off-set by the fact that all these insurgency movements are self-contained. If Al Queda was smashed today, it would be a body blow to the insurgency, but not a knock-out punch. The insurgents use the Iraqi population as a shield and data bank. US artillery crews are being used as infantry because the cannon shells are not very useful in this war, but infantry patrols are indespensible.

Will the US military establishment finally follow the model of Heinlein's 1956 novel, "Starship Trooper?" Heinlein's elite force was the Mobile Infantry, a handful of high-tech troops that applied force surgically in surprise raids that combined speed, stealth, firepower, and intelligence. When one of these four was missing, the raid came to grief. In that novel, the most dangerous enemies, the "bugs," moved underground unseen (much like the Oriental warriors in Poole's books) and defeated Earth's soldiers in close combat where the humans were at a disadvantage. The hero of that novel, a sergeant named Zim, used initiative and on-the-spot situational awareness to capture a "bug brain," winning a hard-fought campaign. Heinlein's novels showcased the strengths and weaknesses that Poole's book discusses--both American and Oriental warrior. The Islamic warrior is not as readily identifiable as Heinlein's bug warriors. The Islamic terrorist is no hive creature--and the hive in that science fiction novel proved to be crafty and innovative.

One last note--suicide warriors are nothing new for American GI's. The Japanese kamakazi was the most-organized and may be the most famous example, but he wasn't the first. Many American Indian tribes ritually purified their warrior's souls before battle--the warrior didn't enter battle to die, but was already dead. This freed him from worrying about death and made him more effective. The US cavalry was more worried about catching fleeing Indian bands than encountering "suicidal" Indian braves. In the Philippines, the Moro ritually prepared himself to enter Paradise prior to running amok with a barong among US troops. About the same time, the Boxers in China underwent pre-battle preparation that made them "immune" to bullets and was more or less funeral rites. Despite being "godless communists," the Chinese and North Korean soldiers sometimes used the suicide option, complete with body bomb. The Viet Cong and NVA were credited with doing this frequently. My question is why American soldiers are not better-prepared to face this common threat. Suicide bombers proved to be cost-effective in lives for the PLO--one truck bomb took out the Marine barracks in Beruit and killed over 240 Americans. One PLO suicide driver died. The American response was to bomb a refugee camp--two aircraft shot down, two naval aviators killed, and one captured--and zero PLO fighters were in the camp. Given the disparity in firepower, the suicide bomber seems to be a lifesaver for the insurgency movement. Non-suicide ambushes between American forces and insurgents in Iraq typically end one of two ways--the insurgents escape inflicting few casualties, or the insurgents get wiped out while inflicting multiple American casualties. One successful Iraqi tactic is to drive a car bomb into an American convoy. Because many of the drivers are now contractor personnel, the suicide bomber may only kill some poor kid from Pakistan or another Islamic country--but suicide bombers die so that the insurgency can strike blows with minimal losses. Sometimes a car bomb will kill four or five American servicemen and make headlines.

Poole mentions how the human wave attack seems to disregard human life, but actually is a smart, life-sparing tactic for America's Oriental enemies. Rather than wasting the lives of the Iraqi insurgency, suicide bombers seem to be a cost-effective way of killing the intended target, and have the bonus of psychological impact on the Western media, and the American soldier. So why is America still surprised by ruthless, violent, often suicidal close-range attack?

This book should be read by a variety of folks that desire to understand even a little bit more about what is happening and happening to US in the middle east. It is not a book that spends countless pages complaining about the state of union. This book will enable the tip of the spear as we are so fond of referring to our fighting forces, concise and credible information with regard to the mindset of their opposing forces. I have been told over and over, that you cannot defeat an opponent unless you understand how he/she thinks. It does shed some light on how the military-industrial complex is steering the people of many countries wrong by proposing extensive, expensive weapon systems that separate the men from the battle and advertise a zero loss of life war for our side. (Both sides should just throw rocks, it'll be simpler) And above all it mentions the one issue that is generating higher and higher turnover rates, ARMCHAIR war fighters, and the military personnel system, that rewards compliance and not innovation, that condones individualist and fails to properly reward teamwork. Battles should be fought from front to back and not the reverse as we are doing. I recommend this book to all, and not just to those in uniform.

Unlike many other reviewers, I am only interested in military affairs, not a professional. I definitely liked this book, at times.

There are really 3 parts to it:

- Review of past Muslim/Middle Eastern tactics, mostly in Afghanistan. There is excellent value in knowing what was done, just to avoid it happening to you. Not all armies fight like Western armies, especially now. Is all of it well presented and researched? Not sure, but there are surely gems to be found in the case studies, such as the practice of attacks to lure reaction units out of their base, to attack them as they come out.

- Some speculations on who is behind the current unrest in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran is named at every turn, perhaps more than bombings against Shias in Iraq would seem to warrant. But China too??? Shaky analysis here and perhaps of limited usefullness anyway. Who cares, at the _tactical_ level, which is the book's reason for existence.

- Suggestions and criticisms of current Western tactics.

If our airforces regularly drop bombs on civilian houses to kill terrorists, do you think we have a moral high ground against someone who uses IEDs against our troops? Poole doesn't think so. Leaving asides the questions of ethics, killing enough civilians by mistake will drive other civilians to support the rebels. Do it for long enough and you will suffer more casualties than if you had opted for riskier and more surgical tactics. Besides you don't have to convince me of your moral superiority, you have to convince the Afghanis/Iraqis. Yeah, Zarqawi got what he deserved that way, but after many mistaken bomb runs. Those civilians deaths may not always make it to CNN, but you can bet they make AlJazeera's news.

Inability to foster and nurture innovation at the small unit level. Reminds of a book I read about VC tunnels and US tactics in Vietnam. The US tried everything - tear gas, sending men into the tunnels, etc... The one real success story seems to have been a colonel who just parked his regiment on top of a tunnel complex and shot/captured anybody that came up over a period of days. Unfortunately that tactic never came up on the Pentagon radar screen and was never followed up. Is there a process to capture tactical innovation? This is similar to what Toyota did when it allowed assembly line workers to shut off production lines in case of failure and asked for their input.

Wrong equipment/training emphasis. Face it, until/if China becomes an enemy (keeping fingers crossed that never happens), the US isn't looking at full army-to-army contests. So soldiers need to know much more about policing, investigation and crowd control. Soft skills and man to man combat, not just laser guided bombs. Guerrilla wars will be won by who best provides relief to the civilian population, while neutralizing the other side's coercions. Finally, winning will require moral leadership at the top level, to avoid line soldiers losing their moral compass in what is a much more stressful situation than any of us civilians can imagine.

Most worrying of all is Poole's warning that US/coalition forces are gradually withdrawing into fortified bases and control nothing much. When they do come out, they use heavy AFVs and choppers and end up posing little risk to rebels as long as the rebels do not try to challenge them. Canadian forces in Kandahar are now urgently asking for tactical transport helicopters to avoid IEDs. Fine for attacking identified enemy locations, probably not so good at locating those enemies in the first place though.

All my best wishes to the troops out there, who deserve our support until our governments decide their mission is over. If you don't like those wars, then change the governments.

addendum Aug 08: Upon re-reading, my remark about transport helicopters strikes me as fundamentally foolish. Though there is over-reliance on choppers to conduct operations that should aim for discretion, clearly it makes sense to minimize risks to the troops during supply missions.

As a Career Marine I understand tactics. Poole breaks it down so that the small unit leader can better understand and interpret intelligence. His ability to walk you through each scenario and give you a concise look into the enemy's thoughts and reasoning allows small unit leaders to train their personnel on the proper techniques to defeat the enemy. Because he has over 30 years of experience, conducts intense research and has the ability to be put it into words, he is the perfect author of a book on tactics. This book should be required reading for every member of the US Armed Forces.

There is a double feeling with this book by Poole. On the one hand, he has managed to point out some interesting facts and characteristics of what he calls 'militant muslim combat methods', their origins and the ideas behind them. However, there are some flaws, there, too; rather conspicuous ones.

For one, the book is divided into really short sections. This does not make for easy reading: it is hard to get into the whole deal as the flow of information is interrupted constantly. Because of the extensive direct quoting from news articles, websites, etc., it seems as though most of the abovementioned sections are comprised entirely of one or two quotes, as if Poole has let others do the analyzing for him. There is not that much analyzing in the first place. Points he is trying to prove are made, in this repsect, in a rather superficial fashion. He touches on some subjects which seem out of place, or, when they are worth mentioning, are left largely unexplored ("the power of muslim chants" in relation to ninja's (180) (??) or "the martyrdom tactic" (212)).

Arguably, there are some better publications out there, books that deal with this sort of tactics in broader and more theoretical or political terms. When it comes to guerrilla warfare, can it be said that there is a special 'muslim' brand in the first place -besides, maybe, and in some cases, a fundamentalist inclination? Surely, every limited (guerrilla) conflict has its own characteristics and flow of events, but most of these wars/emergencies have much in common: some of the subjects Poole discusses here are rather typical. As such it is not necessarily a 'must-read' for anyone interested in the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan.

One last thing: the quality of the illustrations in this book are far below standard.

To summarize it can be said that Poole has done a fine job in giving an oversight of some of the tactics used by militant muslims etc., but with some shortcomings.