Customer Reviews

Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862

5 star:		(8)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

Much praise has been heaped on Dr. Harsh for this defining work on the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Awards have rolled in - perhaps the setup for the Pulitzer Prize for his planned upcoming works on the Union Side of the first two years of the American Civil War in the eastern theatre. Certainly, Harsh's approach of - what did they know, when did they know it, what did they do with information? - represents a step forward in understanding this critical campaign. Perhaps this method is taken a little too far, perhaps the author is too contrarian, eager to dispel existing notions and overturn previous judgements, but that's the fun of it - great academic arguments will result. Harsh's academic method - he is currently Professor of History at George Mason University, a school that he originally lobbied to be called "The University of Northern Virginia" (non-ACW fanatics didn't get it) - is unquestioned. A critical, thorough survey has been conducted of available original source material as well as established secondary sources. All told, it is an amazing story. This work is the result of decades of labor on this subject (Harsh is a native of Hagerstown, MD). One of the great points to be made here is that Lee was human after all, he made some significant mis-judgements. If you didn't know it from other exposures to Dr. Harsh you couldn't deduce from this work that Harsh consider Lee to be one of our countries finest soldiers. Even the best have their bad days - or campaigns, in this case. This is an absolutely first rate work on one of the most important (Harsh obviously believes the most important) campaigns of the ACW. Unfortunately, because of its academic format and size, it will not reach wide audiences. For those willing to make the effort, they will be richly rewarded.

I agree with much the prior reviewers have said. Although I am not a Civil War buff, I found the book readable. I appreciate his methodology also. Harsh attempts to reconstruct the intelligence available to Lee when he made crucial decisions and to assess his decisions based on the moves he could have made given what he knew and in light of his strategic aims for the campaign. All historians should stick by this method. He also does a very creditable job in his attempt to ascertain what Lee knew. On balance very well researched and well argued. I especially enjoyed the end in which he places his argument within the context of existing historiography on the subject. One criticism I have relates to the maps, which is discussed in the review of one of Dr. Harsh's other books. I bought Landscape Turned Red as the result of reading Taken at the Flood. And the maps are much more helpful in that Sears's book. When you are dealing with a lot of different place names and different corps moving around, it makes the flow a lot easier.

(Disclaimer: I sat in on a few classes of Dr. Harsh's as an undergraduate).

This book takes a totally fresh look at the 1862 Maryland Campaign and the Confederate strategy. This is by far the best book I've read on the campaign, and there have been some good ones in the past 40 years (Murphin's Gleam of Bayonets and Sears' Landscape Turned Red, for example). The book is fascinating because the author exposes numerous myths about the campaign. I was impressed with the rigor and objectivity of his investigation and analysis. What I especially liked was his philosophy toward history set forth in the introduction, wherein he explains the dangers of relying too heavily on 20/20 hindsight. I was impressed that the author showed great fairness to General McClellan--judging his actions based solely on what he knew at the time, and what he had been ordered to accomplish. McClellan was far from perfect, but the relentless trashing he has taken from historians has alway struck me as excessive. The author, among other interesting assessments, points out that the Army of Northern Virginia was much larger than what we've always been told-- 75,500 troops rather than the 40,000-55,000 number that we've often heard. I highly recommend this book - the story is terrific and the footnotes alone are worth the price!

My kepi is off to Mr.Harsh. His latest work, dare I say, takes the place of Murfin's "The Gleam of Bayonets" The detail of troop movement is quite precise, and is followed up by sound research!

It's as if Harsh rode aside Lee as he spoke at length of his strategy, movements, and inner most thoughts, then Harsh carefully jotted them down and sent them off to the presses. The book is quite captivating, and pleasently lacks the usual focus on trivial matter. This book is truly the meat and potatoes of the "Maryland Campaign"

Other histories of the critical 1862 Sharpsburg campaign pale in comparison to this masterwork. Nobody else's work---nobody---can come close to Harsh's study.

Do not miss this; it is the standard by which all studies of the Sharpsburg campaign must be measured.

Joseph Harsh brings a very different but logical view to the Antietam Campaign in this book. This is NOT your first book on Antietam; you need to have an understanding of this critical event to really understand this book. In a very logical, systematic manner, we walk thru the campaign not as history but as the events take place. This approach puts the reader in the position of Lee or McClellan making decision with imperfect knowledge.

Starting with a full review of the CSA position after Pope's army escapes into the Washington forts to the return to Virginia on the 21st, the author display an astounding knowledge of this campaign. What he has to say about the Lee and McClellan will challenge many of the historical assumptions and make you think.

This is not an "easy read" BUT it is one that every student of the Civil War needs to read.

I agree with everything the previous reviewer said. Dr. Harsh's research and analysis sets a new standard. He seems to have found every document existing concerning this campaign, yet the book never bogs down under too much detail. Even though you know the outcome, there is a sense of excitement as if the events are taking place right now. This is the definitive book on the Maryland Campaign.

Far from the glossy perspectives of some history books, Harsh's Taken at the Flood takes excruciating effort to analyze the correspondence of Lee, President Jefferson Davis, and the multitude of Confederate officers involved in the fights at South Mountain, Harper's Ferry, and Antietam. What he uncovers is a strong argument that Lee's foray into Maryland--the South's first incursion into Union territory--was not about trying to obtain foreign recognition, attack cities such as Baltimore or Philadelphia, or even occupy Union lands. Lee's invasion of the North was conducted to relieve the pressure on Richmond and grant the lands of Virginia some respite from constant ravaging. By moving into northern land, Lee hoped to panic the Lincoln administration and force the Union army--heavily demoralized and fractured after three months of defeat at Lee's hands--to leave the confines of D.C. and give battle. Lee would then maneuver and destroy the weakened Union army. Lee acknowledged that the South's manpower and resources were already starting to dwindle. Riding the crest of multiple victories since taking over the Army of Northern Virginia, Lee felt that time was running out and that potentially the penultimate opportunity to end the war with one final campaign now presented itself. This campaign could complete the demoralization of the Union army and the northern public and force peace overtures by the Lincoln administration. Harsh reveals Lee's campaign plan, however, was far from well thought out. Lee made dangerous assumptions that the Union armies at Harper's Ferry in the Shenandoah Valley, where Lee wanted to establish his supply chain while campaigning in Maryland, would be vacated by the Union soldiers when they discovered Lee maneuvering northwards. The Union armies in the Valley elected to stand and fight, completely disrupting Lee's plans, forcing him to divide his army. George McClellan also departed the protective confines of D.C. much earlier than Lee predicted, resulting in heavy fighting at the gaps of South Mountain, where Lee's divided army took casualties it couldn't afford. Forced to wait for reunification with his army, Lee relinquished the initiative to McClellan. Pushing his soldiers too much over three months of campaigning resulted in broken and exhausted men, regardless of their high morale. Massive straggling culminated and Lee conceded that it directly contributed to his rebuke at Antietam. Indeed, Harsh pointedly states that Lee's obvious offensive mindedness blinded him to crafting a flexible campaign, one that also failed to properly utilize cavalry. After withdrawing from Antietam, Lee boldly maneuvered to resume the offensive by invading Maryland again, this time via Williamsport near Hagerstown. Only McClellan's probing at Lee's rear jostled the southern commander's realization that his time was up and his campaign was over. His campaign resulted in 31% casualties and the loss of over 50% of his line commanders. One cannot ignore Harsh's intriguing assessment of a very aggressive, and not always very tactically brilliant, Robert E. Lee.

I just finished reading "Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862"
by Joseph L. Harsh.

Ouch!!!! Talk about painful!!! Harsh (a history professor who grew up in Hagerstown) simply cannot write!! Some people can write well; others write poorly. Harsh is at the bottom of the latter group. (I feel sorry for his students -- they probably suffered severe ear and brain trauma from his lectures. And he writes as if he were lecturing!!)

He LOVES R.E. Lee. (According to Harsh, everything that went wrong was someone else's fault -- without exception!!) Then there are Harsh's numerous "moments" when he tells you what a particular person MUST have been thinking at any given time -- as if Harsh (or anyone else!!) could know! Finally come are his analyses of various events and situations. In Harsh's eyes, all ideas that contradict his opinions OBVIOUSLY MUST be wrong -- it's just plain "foolish" to think otherwise.

It's too bad that Harsh just didn't tell what happened and allowed us to form our own judgements. (By the way, he plays pretty "fast and loose" with the facts. Plus, he omits vital information that doesn't correspond to his interpretation.)
In his preface, Harsh even has the audacity to state that, besides his book, there are only one or two other books that cover the Maryland Campaign in depth. Well, I have been studying Antietam for over 35 years, have been there several hundred times, and have read literally thousands of books, articles, and documents about Antietam. Harsh is full of it!!

If you were thinking of buying this book, don't bother. You can gain just as much by pulling out all your teeth with a pair of pliars, then dropping a 200-pound lead weight on your foot.