Customer Reviews

Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy

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This is an engaging read for students who want to grapple with a lot of
the details of Darwinism that tend to get left out of more fluffy
popularizations of evolution. For example a good chapter reviewing
the basic (but rarely reviewed) facts supporting the theory--
in particular the subtle difference between early hominids' and
homo sapiens' abililty to develop articulate speech. Particularly
excellent, though, is the last chapter dealing with the rhetorical
(but scientifically empty) attacks on Darwinism made by some
conservatives.

The biggest mistake that a non-fiction author can make is not writing for their intended audience. Ruse claims to write for both the professional and the general reader, but if you aren't a professional philosopher, this book is NOT for you. Trust me.

The idea is great, and I would like to see more books like this. The execution, however, leaves much to be desired. Ruse seems to get constantly sidetracked on what, to me, seem to be obscure philosophical discussions. Maybe they are actually quite pertinent to his argument, but if so, I didn't see it, and he didn't explain it. That's the problem. There is no explanation as to why he is following certain reasoning paths. The professional philosopher will probably pick it up, but the general reader is left lost and bored.

There are some interesting ideas here, and Ruse does come to some useful conclusions, but there is not nearly enough in here to justify the read. He spends too much time trying to reconcile his philosophical view with the views of past philosophers like Kant and Hume. This seems to have very little to do with what the book was actually supposed to be about, and once again is of interest to the professional philosopher only. I honestly feel that this book could have been reduced to a quarter of its size without losing any original content. And at under 300 pages, that amounts to not much worth reading.

This book claims to evaluate two Darwinian off-shoots: Evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics. Ruse claims he is a Darwinian naturalist, philosopher, and historian. Charitably, Ruse's interpretation of Karl Popper differs widely from my own, but Ruse's own juxtaposition of texts betrays his own interpretation. He quotes Popper, "growth of our knowledge is the result of a process closely resembling what Darwin called 'natural selection'," to which Ruse retorts, "Popper is still convinced that scientific knowledge is truly exactly analogous to the change which occurs within organic groups" (62). Yes, "resembling" is a form of analogy, but not "truly exactly analogous." Ruse is misstating Popper with interpolated hyperbole. Why? Then Ruse complains that Popper makes these "mistakes" to preserve his "metaphysics" (64). The mistakes are all Ruse's, especially if Ruse thinks Popper has a "metaphysics." One is free to misinterpret and mis-characterize Popper, but claiming Popper's mistakes flow from his metaphysics is one of the most outrageous claims I've ever read, unless Ruse's private language has a special meaning for "metaphysics."

It gets worse. Apparently Ruse does not know the difference between "ethics" and "morality," which is incredible if he claims to be a philosopher. But he uses "ethics," when he clearly means "morality." And Ruse means deontic morality in specific (which excludes de facto ethics). "Morality," writes Ruse, "is about what we 'ought' or 'should' do . . . it is a set against universal prohibitions . . . there is a certain 'prescriptive' as opposed to descriptive, air to morality . . . about 'good,' 'bad,' and 'right,' and 'wrong'" (69, passim). But he really wants "ethics," despite his dogged moral deontology. For only benevolence ethics fits an evolutionary ethics, and evolutionary ethics is his focus. So, who does he cite for his "evolutionary ethics?" Why Kant and Bentham, the two most deontic moralists, who cannot be "fit" into an evolutionary ethics.

Of course, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid, the 18th C. benevolence theorists would have been the "obvious" candidates for Ruse to use to describe benevolence ethics, which, as history has shown, anticipates beautifully "reciprocal altruism" empirically validated two centuries later by Trivers, Williams, and Hamilton. Does Ruse cite these Scots? He briefly introduces Hume, but mischarcterizes Hume too! Does he draw the "obvious" connections between Smith's benevolence ethics in the "Theory of Moral Sentiments" and Trivers's "Reciprocal Altruism?" No. Smith isn't mentioned. Nor is Trivers. So what "evolutionary ethics" does Ruse have in mind? Why Kant's categorical imperative and Bentham's utilitarian calculus! Huh? One cannot get to an evolutionary "ethics" from the deontological moral imperatives of Kant and Bentham!

The final straw was Ruse's use of Hume's "is/ought" (fact/value) distinction, which Ruse identifies as the "naturalistic fallacy." (Technically, many philosophers do this, even through the latter is G. E. Moore's jargon for a different species of distinction altogether.) But then, Ruse cites G. E. Moore and proceeds to ignore the fact that Moore's naturalistic fallacy is NOT the "is/ought" distinction of Hume! If Moore had not been introduced, we'd overlook the retrograde nominalism of Hume's "is/ought" distinction and call it the "naturalistic fallacy" without being too technical about the misuse. But to raise Moore just won't allow the conflation of Moore's naturalistic fallacy with Hume's is/ought distinction. And Ruse then misses the whole point behind Moore's idea (Moore was addressing the "good" which is not the Humean fact/value distinction at all.)

These three examples allow a charitable description of Ruse as "confused, naive, and ignorant." But, if Ruse cannot get right what are ostensibly his "targets," it really matters not what he attacks, because he's attacking his own straw men or other fanciful notions, but not the ACTUAL subjects that he mislabels evolutionary epistemology and ethics at the outset. Unfortunately, similar ruses occur in other Ruse works (another whopper is his "Homosexuality"). One has to wonder where he gets his mistaken ideas, or why he thinks he "slays" targets that don't even exist? Or else just ignore his particular projects as tangential incoherences at best.

Evolution and ethics? Natural selection and morals? Michael Ruse's penetrating survey deftly handles these contentious topics. In this superbly conceived and illuminating book, he presents the foundations of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection. He goes on to explain how the long-standing philosophical questions can be addressed through a better understanding of evolution. Ruse accepts evolution as a fact, asserting we must reconsider traditional concepts to adapt to that reality. While he uses biological examples to illustrate some of his points, the important theme is to adjust our thinking. Clearly, he reminds us, evolution is more than a mechanical process. We must understand it in order to comprehend ourselves and to address our own future in a rational manner.

Many have attempted to engage in that process with varying degrees of success. He explores the realm of evolutionary epistomology - how theories of knowledge were changed by Darwinism. How has it been applied in human affairs? Here Ruse displays his excellence in addressing this fundamental issue. His strengths as a philosopher and Darwinist are combined to explain Darwin's idea in light of human experience. Not many historical commentators have been successful at this enterprise for various reasons. Natural selection usurped the notion of a divinity guiding nature's course. What then, could be considered a replacement for divine intervention? Philosophers such as Herbert Spencer replaced divine guidance with the notion that evolution was a progressive force. There was a goal to the process, and that goal in his view [and that of many others] was the evolution of humans.

Humanity's intellect led to issues of ethics and morals - we could pose questions about the value of life and how we interact with one another. What is humanity's place in the world? What, if anything, is beyond what we can perceive? Although many philosophers and commentators permeate this study, the figures of Immanuel Kant and David Hume loom large. Kant, of course, finally concluded that a divine must be present as a prime source for human values. Hume's stress on empiricism was more applicable in a Darwinian view of the world. Yet, Ruse stresses, none of these thinkers was able to address "fundamental" questions realistically, since they lacked the information the Darwinian Revolution set in motion.

None of these thinkers were able to address questions of morality and ethics in a Darwinian sense. Ruse, himself, takes up that challenge resolving it successfully. He cites the new generation of studies centred on evolutionary psychology. The application of game theory, modern genetics and kinship altruism are carefully explained and applied to the human condition. Ruse is an effective narrator is presenting the various arguments that have been set forth by various philosophers. He's attentive to central themes and provides them in meaningful fashion. He points out where the proposals break down and why. In the end, there is one man who stands above all contenders. That man, of course, is Darwin himself.

Given the nature of the material, this is a book to be read with care. Although Ruse's style is clear and unambiguous, the concepts are important. He gives them due recognition and explains them fully. But these are not topics that can be glossed over with a simplistic style. Ruse does an excellent job, giving this book a unique place in evolutionary studies. Thoroughly researched and ably crafted, it's a welcome effort. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]

TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY by Michael Ruse, a philosophical look at natural selection at the borderline of chimpanzees and humans, both of which must have started with some forms of adaptation that produced science and logic, which are now much easier to see in the humans, keeps returning to the desire to find that science was a result of epigenetic rules. The philosophy sought as a support for science and morality clings to respectability in the face of the outrageous absurdity which is typical of sit-com situations and modern life. Since Popper produced the idea in 1959, 1962, that "a genuinely scientific theory must expose itself to the real world. It must be falsifiable" (p. 151), the world has provided impressive support for the comic supposition that we have probably been wrong about everything so far, whenever stupidity is rapidly gaining ground, and we have plenty to laugh about with good reason.

There is some informative material on Kant, a philosopher not known for comedy. "This was the nub of Kant's so-called `Copernican revolution' in philosophy. The mind does not passively receive knowledge. It actively participates in its creation." (p. 179). Throughout the book, credit is given to whatever cultural accomplishments of our biological ancestors produced the ultimate survival of a bipedal big-brain species such as we are, which must be the result of superior adaptation to the conditions of existence. Like Kant, who once investigated fantastic stories about Swedenborg, being familiar with the common form of religion as it is practiced by his contemporaries is no barrier to the thoughts of Michael Ruse in trying to figure out how people have become far more successful than we might otherwise have been.

Taking a thoroughly modern view, the book of Job in the Bible is summarized in terms we should understand. "A happy and successful businessman is tormented by one misfortune after another, and none of it of his own making. Why did not Job curse God, which would have certainly been the rational thing to do? Because, as the astute author of the Book knew full well, when things go wrong you need something to help you go on living (literally). And if that something is belief in a supreme being, then so be it, even though such belief may be blatantly anti-scientific." (p. 177). The Prologue of the Book of Job tells us that the fire of God fell from heaven and burned up his sheep and shepherds, but it also gives us, as readers, a basis for blaming Job's troubles on Satan, the Sabaeans who stole his oxen and donkeys, and the Chaldaeans who raided his camels. TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY was published in 1986, a year in which Libya was condemned by our global superpower for terrorism on a scale that would have been as annoying to Job, but not quite on the scale of what finally happened on September 11, 2001, when religious fanatics were a major force (using airplanes instead of a gale) directed against great wealth precisely like Job 1:19: "when suddenly from the wilderness a gale sprang up, and it battered all four corners of the house which fell in on the young people. They are dead: I alone escaped to tell you." In 2003, news is often about bombs which have shown the same antipathy and effect on buildings, buses, and military vehicles, in a manner which reflects Job 3:8: "Let them curse it who curse the day, who are prepared to rouse Leviathan." Back before we had a settled order, cursing was a common experience of those who were not settled, and, as THE JERUSALEM BIBLE explains, Leviathan was "The dragon of primeval chaos; he might be roused by a curse against the existing order."

There is not much on destruction in TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY, and the attention to philosophy is directed mainly to supporting a scientific conception of rules which work, as opposed to techniques which might end all life as we know it. Reproduction and sex are not listed in the index, which is mostly last name, first initial, though "Creation-science" is listed to make sure that no one misses the arguments against it. "Note also, incidentally, how frequently devotees of non-science defend their beliefs and practices by reference to supposed principles of science, real and apparent. Astrologers claim to be more scientific than astronomers, chiropractors more scientific than doctors, and Creationists more scientific than evolutionists (Gish, 1972). Rationality is important to us all, no matter how strong may be the call of other forces. (Although Creation-science was developed as a political ploy, I am sure its devotees think it is genuinely scientific)." (p. 178).

What humankind has shown most abundantly is a desire to make the rules, whatever form the rules might take in a particular setting. Calling Job a businessman might be appropriate for a scholarly milieu in which business is expected to employ most of the students when they graduate, and business is the primary source of research contracts and grants for expansion. Michael Ruse finds much more progress (trying to reach an explicit goal) in science, our ability to understand the basic situation which we face in the universe, than in the success produced by random, gradual changes produced by selection of naturally occurring genetic variety. I continue to think that Darwin was willing to show that sex could be considered a major factor in selection of whose gene pool would be reproduced in each generation, but Michael Ruse might be more traditional in thinking that morality is the major factor limiting sex, and upper crust in thinking that sex is the major selection mechanism likely to produce a future in which humankind could be much less scientific than we are today. We will certainly be much less scientific than we could be, but our cursing might become better, for all that.

This work is of ironic interest to a skeptical critic of natural selection for the clarity of its presentation with the resultant demonstration of the exposed flank of Darwinism in relation to issues of ethics, indeed philosophy in general. This is a new edition of Ruse's book, with its embrace of sociobiological thinking, with an additional chapter that amounts to not much except indignation on the recent attacks on evolution by the Intelligent Design movement. A strange thing happens as the philosopher construes a theory of ethics in relation to evolution. We see the proper and interesting treatments of Hume, Kant, substantive and meta-ethics, with a prompt dismissal of some of the more baseless versions of sociobiological thinking. Hume has won out, Kant is off the team, all is empirically nip and tuck and we are sailing away under epigenetic steam. The problem as ever is the inadequacy of the basic assumption, that natural selection is the prime mover of all forms of evolution, and therefore an ace in the hole for the evolutionary thinker, a problem solved. Without that ace, the Darwinist is stripped of his science medal and cast out with less assurance into the ranks of bedouin philosophers, and other hard luck cases trying to play Socrates in public places, probably between bumming meals. The treatment of Kant would suggest the basic difficulty in the whole project of evolutionary ethics, granting Ruse's reasonable and not uncommon (though probably wrong!) critique of the Categorical Imperative. But behind that issue lies the deeper significance of the Kantian challenge to the combined failure of rationalism and empiricism, along with its exploration of the antinomy of freedom and necessity that forever haunts producing a theory of ethical evolution. Kant's thinking forewarns sternly of the concealed reverse-metaphysics of Darwinian empiricism, and experience shows us that 'natural selection' is really a metaphysically charged thesis, indeed precisely because of its erstatz claims on all ethical questions, as a decision procedure against all other philosophizing. Something wrong somewhere! In general, we must believe that natural selection resolves the interiority of 'self' that is presupposed in a creature, but no creature thus is truly found by a Darwinist. In the end, the philosopher of evolution must ask what grounds he has in general to select among philosophies, if a theory of evolution must explicate the emergence of philosophizing. Hegel, whatever we think of him, knew he had to explicate 'all thought' for an account of evolution. We should remain suspicious that no theory is possible that includes the present, and that man has not yet evolved an ethical understanding to do evolution at all. Without some statement as to the cutoff between history and evolution, we are confronted with a theorist inside evolution trying to observe what he is in fact still evolving. These paradoxes nullify all hard claims to science in the basic endeavor.