Customer Reviews

A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and the Hard Lessons of War (International Studies Intensives)

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A Tale of Two Quagmires is a meticulously-researched

examination of how the American public was misled into

ruinous military adventures in Vietnam and Iraq and of

the "crucial lessons" that must be acknowledged in order

to avoid such debacles in the future.

Once a young, battle-hardened, Marine determined to

survive his time in a war of dubious necessity; now a

highly-regarded scholar of international affairs,

Professor Ken Campbell offers a reasoned alternative

to this cycle of deception and quagmire. In doing so

he does not entirely reject the necessity of wars:

only those without legitimate purpose and clear-cut

strategy.

The wisdom contained in A Tale of Two Quagmires has

the potential to put the United States on a road to

recapturing "the moral high ground in international

relations" and, in the process, spare humanity the

horrific consequences of such senseless and protracted

conflicts -- a gift beyond value to future generations.

I did not know of Kenneth Campbell but I do now. This is by far one of the clearest and most concise treatments of the subject. I found almost all of my questions anticipated and fully answered. I'm sure I'll be re-reading the book many more times.

Professor Ken Campbell was a combat Marine in Vietnam in 1968-69; today he is Director of the International Relations Program at the University of Delaware. His first-hand wartime experiences coupled with his educational background give meaning and relevance to his analysis of the two wars, Vietnam and Iraq.

His analogy of what he calls two quagmires is an objective comparison, from one extremely well qualified to provide a spin-free overview. A must read for all who want no-nonsense, lucid comparisons of Vietnam and Iraq and the horrors of war.

There are indeed some hard lessons of war. Professor Campbell has thoroughly analyzed the reasons for America's slow slide into the debacle of Vietnam and compared that situation to the current situation in Iraq. In both cases, there were solid reasons for the end result. In spite of all attempts to portray them as different, they are in essence, very similar.

In many respects, my experiences during the Vietnam War were similar to the author's. I was an F4 Phantom II fighter pilot at Ubon, Thailand at the same period of time. Although most of my missions were flown over North Vietnam and Laos, I flew strikes against Khe Sanh at the height of that battle. At the start of the war, I was a "true believer" in the cause and was most eager to participate. It's hard to give up ideas you've held onto so tenaciously for many years, but over time, I came to the belief that our involvement in Vietnam was a tragic strategic mistake. My recent book, Phantom Reflections: The Education of an American Fighter Pilot in Vietnam was my version of how those deeply held beliefs changed significantly over time.

At the start of the Iraq War, I had grave reservations about the wisdom of our proposed course of action for many of the same reasons I thought our Vietnam adventure was ill advised. This book does an excellent job of comparing the two situations and hopefully, will generate some significant discussions among those in a position to influence policy. Well done!