A new genre of foreign policy writers is emerging in the United States. They are called "realists", but defining the term defies precision. Following the "neo-con" works extolling the idea of the US flexing its military and economic might came the "soft power" advocates. The latter declared that overbearing foreign policies were counterproductive. Power must be curbed or withdrawn in favour of more conciliatory policies, preferably multilaterally decided and applied. Stephen Walt's approach is a middle ground, without being conciliatory to either of the previous stances.
Walt opens with a summary of all the aspects of might available to the USA. This is the foundation of the "realist" genre - the power is there and Walt catalogues it nicely. The USA is at once the strongest power militarily and economically, influencing many by sheer presence. It has far outstripped whatever competition it might have had. A military defeat is out of the question and even economic challengers can only hope to share, not dominate, markets. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the USA in the role of world primacy. That unique position has led other nations to view such solitary might with distrust and resentment. Walt explains brilliantly why these countries are suspicious. Any nation confronted with such prowess will naturally be wary. He generally avoids value judgements in the depiction, but he notes how poorly informed the leaders and general populace of the USA are about the resentment. How other nations do and should react becomes the theme of most of Walt's remaining chapters.
Once he's described what he calls "the roots of resentment", Walt describes the reactions by nations uncomfortable with the USA's "primacy". He lists various "strategies of opposition" and "accommodation". Opposition to such prowess must range across many options. Can it be direct? Walt shows how resistance to US demands might depend on the severity of the issue, whether other distractions command greater attention or whether the resistance might reach across more than one nation. Excessive power is a fine tool for forging opposition alliances. Where open and direct alliances may be lacking or impractical, various forms of "balancing" may be established to offset US hegemony. The most extreme form of "balancing" is the terror attack, but many other methods are available, from "balking" to blackmail. It's important to note that with a single power to contend with, continuous or sustained tactics to counter US strength are unlikely. There will be shifts and rearrangements until new balances are struck. Pejorative references to "Old" and "New" Europe, for example, are counterproductive. They only serve to demonstrate inflexibility and increase disaffection toward the US leadership.
Where direct opposition to US hegemony fails or is impractical, there are various forms of accommodation that may be adopted. Understanding that each nation has its own interests to follow, "accommodation" is a term of wide and flexible definition. One strategy is to call in the "debts" of past cooperation. That may lead to modification of the original demands by the US. "Bandwagoning" is Walt's term for a nation agreeing to a US policy, but with an eye to later possible challenges. It's a rare tactic, but one used effectively in the proper circumstances. "Regional balancing" is another form of manoeuvering. It was used successfully during the Cold War, and lingers in some of today's national alignments. A more blatant form of accommodation is the use of "penetration" of domestic politics. Here, Walt treads on shaky ground as he depicts the extensive lobby groups run by Israel and India. These forces have gone beyond seeking accommodation to actually guide US policy-making. His recommendation to banish these groups as inimical to US long-term interests will certainly lead to protest by vested interests. Walt further recommends the blatant and unhindered support of Israel in the Middle East is causing more problems than benefits. The US should cut Israel loose and strive to broker a new arrangement based on the establishment of a Palestinian nation.
Walt stresses a point often lost in discussions of US power and policy. It is a mistake, he notes, to think other nations resent or "hate" the people of the US. Except through the leaders they elect, the people of the US aren't held accountable for mistaken policies. The failures of successive administrations are regrettable, but the peoples of other nations generally accept the foundation of "good intentions" in US actions. What is needed, Walt suggests, is to prove that good intentions work. This can be accomplished by the US using its might with circumspection. "Offshore balancing", the solving of problems by negotiation with the might of the US present in the background, has been successful and should be applied more often. The present administration has abandoned "offshore balancing" in favour of a declaration of "preventive" war against nations it deems unaccommodating. This, in effect, is a declaration of war against the rest of the world. Instead of asserting its power, Walt argues, the US should assume a stance of playing "hard to get". Other nations should be welcomed in bringing problems to the US instead of the US intruding unilaterally. He calls this approach a "mature foreign policy".
Who will tame this powerful eagle? Chairs and whips are for lions, so something else must be applied. It is the ballot that will curb excess or foolishly applied power. Walt intends this book as a non-partisan prescription for improving the awareness of the US electorate. He notes that many of the problems in international affairs his nation is facing are of recent origin. It isn't too late to employ corrective action, but voters and their representatives must be better informed of the issues and how policies are irritating other nations with which the US must coexist. Read this book and learn where to start. [stephen a. haines - Ottawa, Canada]
