Customer Reviews

Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency

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i disagree with most reviewers in their criticism of mybundy's handling of this book. i thought it painted a fair picture for criticism of nixon and kissinger. rarely do you find a book that doesnt overpraise them or treat them as war criminals. mr. bundy did both v ery well here. the layout of the book and the smotth read of text made this an enjoyable and learning experience. i highly recommend

Bundy's book is in-depth, comprehensive and far-reaching, covering every imaginable aspect of Vietnam-era foreign policy from Bretton Woods to U.S. elections to "peace with honor" to Watergate. Since the volume is organized by years in office, however, and not subject matter, there is considerable discontinuity in discussion of topics like the end of the Vietnam war and improving Chinese relations which took place over a number of years of Nixon's presidency. This discontinuity is worsened by the sheer amount of information presented in each chapter, leaving as many as 100 pages between discussions of any topic. There is little summarization of events in each chapter, leaving the reader at a loss for conclusion at the end of each presidential year. As an overview, the volume is simply overwhelming, but for the in-depth scholar, Bundy puts all of Nixon's foreign policy in one convenient location.

Provides an excellent description of the Nixon/Kissinger approach to diplomacy. The density of the volume, and the complexity of the thesis coupled with the format in which it is presented (a chronological instead of by subject) makes this ideal for scholars, but may be to difficult for those who are looking for an overview of the period.

The book has over 500 pages following a broadly chronological order. This has the disadvantage of addressing key issues on a fragmented basis and a reader wishing to focus on a specific area of foreign policy (e.g. detente with the Soviet Union) has to jump around and follow a snapshot approach rather than get into the meat and ongoing development of strategy. Nevertheless, Bundy provides a good overview and introduction to US foreign policy in the Nixon/Kissinger years and provides the stimulus to investigate further.

Sadly, some things never change. And like Robert McNamara, William Bundy is also in denial over his culpability, along with the rest of the LBJ crew, for the Vietnam war and its resulting American and allied dead and wounded.

While taking extremely cheap shots at Nixon and Kissinger for their hard-headed realism in getting the US out of this "best and brightest"-induced war - with some measure of national prestige intact - Bundy at no point explains how he and his ilk would have either extricated America from the disaster, apart from cutting and running, or ended the war on something approaching favourable terms.

As a result, one is left reading this pious and quite cringe-worthy critique wondering whether to take Bundy seriously due to his reluctance to engage in sincere, non-partisan reflection and self-criticism. Indeed, the whole book is very McNamaraesque - ie brief with regard to personal responsibility for the tragedy and long on hand-wringing and finger pointing.

If the United States (and their allies) are to prevent another foreign policy catastrophe like Vietnam from re-occurring, one can only hope that readers of this book will take away from its pages an abiding desire to avoid placing undue faith in spineless, if intelligent, individuals like William Bundy. Given the shoddy thinking behind the Vietnam commitment and the debacle of an operation which is currently unfolding in Kosovo, where a war is being waged for humanitarian reasons but without any decipherable political or strategic vision, this book should provide a healthy wake-up call to all who would demonise the Kissingerian policy of unsentimental realism.

Mr. Bundy puts the worst possible spin on every foreign policy initiative by Richard Nixon. Whatever truth there is in this tome is buried beneath a biased account told with the sort of arrogance which got us into the war in the first place. In fact, the primary virtue of this book is to give us insight into the intellectual and character flaws of the author, one of the major architects of the Vietnam fiasco. Above all else, this is an extraordinarily uncharitable and ungentlemanly work. Thanks to Mr. Bundy, his brother and the Presidents they served, Richard Nixon held the weakest hand of foreign policy cards of any President-elect since Abe Lincoln. Whatever his mistakes, Richard Nixon tried his best and he left America in a better position than the one he inherited from Mr. Bundy and his fellow conspirators, which is something Mr. Bundy cannot claim about his own public service. Common decency should have compelled Mr. Bundy to let someone else write this book. Someone else would have done a better job than this nasty, twisted, deeply flawed work.

Bundy's book reads like a tedious chemistry textbook. While Nixon's entire administation is covered, it is in so much unnecessary detail that one is hardly able to decipher the important from the merely anecdotal. Many better assessments of Nixon and Kissinger are available in more concise and interesting forms.