Customer Reviews

Tannenberg: Clash of Empires 1914 (Cornerstones of Military History)

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(5)
3 star:		(1)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

For those wishing to read about this forgotten battle of the Great War, or who wishes to read something with a more interesting perspective on Tannenberg, this is the book.

Dennis Showalter not only has put together an orginal history using first sources, but his lively prose make this a very enjoyable book. Dennis Showalter attempts to put to rest many misconceptions that still surround the Battle of Tannenburg to this day. Here are a few:

1)The Russians armies were poorly led and poorly armed.
2)The Germans won primairily because of deep anomositiy between Rennemkampf and Suramenov, and poor signal intelligence on the Russian part.
3)Hidenburg and Ludendorf saved the day for the Germans

Dennis Showalter also points out that there were so many tactical errors committed on both sides for various reasons that it is a wonder that any side won.

The book is outlined chronologically. However, the author also gives plenty of social, political, and anthropological information that presents the reader with a very intimate and clear view of how the battle unfolded. This is not just a recitiation of map movements. Dennis Showalter obviously has much empathy with the common foot solider on both sides, and presents how difficult it was to fight this battle of movement under the hot August sun.

The Battle of Tannenberg was the first modern battle of movement where the field commanders had no view of the battle as it unfolded (Sedan was the probably the last large scale battle where a general sitting a top a hill could control events as they unfolded). Denns Showalter gives the reader a front and center seat of the battle from the gunner's and high commander's perspective. He showed how difficult it was for the high commanders to gather intelligence, issue battle orders and direct strategy using horse calvary, bicycle troops, Zeppelins, and wireless and telephones. The battle was actually a series of battles fought over 180 miles of a very fluid battle field. In a world where we are use to GPS navigation, network centric information centers, and satellite communications, it is easy to forget how difficult it was for a field commander responsible for over a 100,000 soldiers to get good intelligence and issue timely orders over a battle field that was almost 200 miles in length. Dennis Showalter does not let the reader forget.

I also admire that the author didn't show any bias even though the book was written mainly from a German perspective. He clearly presents the facts that the Russians in many ways were superior soldiers during the opening months of the war. The Germans clearly had the Russians beat in the field of administration and logistics, but the Russians were superior in the art of concealment, artillery fire control, and at times daring.

The only problem I had with the book with a lack of maps. There are maps, but they are so few and far between that I constantly had to refer back a hundred pages or so to find the lake, village, or forest where a action took place.

This is the first book I read by by Dennis Showalter, and I place it up there with Alistair Horne's Price of Glory: Verdun.

In terms of pure information, this book is a must have for any student of WWI who isn't reading from primary sources. The level of detail shows a command of the subject matter that is really amazing.
That said, maybe a few of the details could be tossed to the side, or added in the back as appendixes, and we could get a bit more flow to the story. While I enjoyed the information, reading the book was such a slog that I sometimes forgot information that was back 20-30 pages and I had to re-read several sections. It's not something that normally happens to me, but I got lost in the details here.
I recommend the read, just don't plan on ripping through it in a weekend.

The relationship of Germany to Eastern European powers in the latter part of the 19th and early 20th Centuries is often overlooked. Anyone interested in the First World War is obliged to review both threats and aspirations of the greatest power in Western Europe. This book gives insights into those threats, perceived or otherwise, which consumed Germany at a time when the nation had ambitions but anxieties about fighting on two fronts. It is easy, when reading the first part of this book, to come to the conclusion that war between Germany and Russia was almost inevitable and that the Western front was a sideshow. That it did not quite turn out like this resulted from miscalculations and a failure to update military thinking. This is well brought out in the first part of the book. Whether one agrees with the author's interpretation of events and of German-Russian politics is not necessarily the point, since what the book does do (for me at any rate) is to provide another perspective for the tensions that led up to the Great War. The second part of the book relates more to a description of the war on the ground in the East. It is still well written, but for this reader the most valuable part of the book was the part as described above.

This is considered a classic work of modern military history, a "standard" work. Its at the level of, if you say you are a WWI buff, but have never read this book, you essentially have no credibility. More than that, it should be part of the library of every military history buff. It has been extremely influential on modern military historians, has sold pretty well, and Showalter has done a lot for military history through his role at the History Book Club.

All that said, and noting that you, as a military history buff, must buy & read this book, a few comments. First of all, the maps pretty much suck. This is problematical because it is very hard to follow the quite detailed narrative of group movements without the help of good maps. Maybe the recent 2nd edition has better maps. Second, when Showalter really gets into the movement of troops, down to quite a lot on the regimental level, it does not always make scintillating reading. Third, where Showalter really shines is in sections like Chapter 10, Opportunities & Illusions. This is sort of written in an essay form and is quite fascinating. Showalter's knowledge spans way beyond WWI, and he reaches out throughout history to clarify and magnify points. Fourth, and finally, this will not be a very satisfying book unless you are quite knowledgeable about history, because the author so frequently alludes to matters from Cannae, to the Thirty Years War, to Kharkov. Unless you are educated or have read to a Master's level of education, you will miss a lot.

A masterful book by a wonderful historian. No one knows more about the Battle of Tannenberg than Dennis Showalter. He expertly uses archival evidence, official histories, and first-hand accounts to give us the most subtle and persuasive account of the full meaning of this key battle of the Great War. Along the way, he teaches us a lot about how armies fight in the first few weeks of a war. Even the much-vaunted German Army made mistakes, as Showalter clearly shows. Yet, their system was able to recover from these mistakes far more quickly than the blundering Russians. Even so, Tannenberg was decisive only in prolonging the war--not in ending it. Showalter points out the many ironies of this battle that will resonate with readers today. A great book; its only fault is its slow beginning.

Dennis Showalter, a dean among America's contemporary military historians, has written an epic account of an epic campaign. With a smooth narrative style he covers the convoluted waterfront thoroughly and effectively, starting with a long (perhaps a bit overlong) discussion of how the First World War came to pass -- a topic which, Lord knows, has filled many a bookshelf to the groaning point. But Showalter's synthesis of modern scholarship is on the mark, and he follows up with chapters covering the organizational, technical, and cultural aspects of the contending German and Russian armies before moving the narrative along to the campaign itself. Here he captures the action at every level of warfare, from the tactical to the strategic perspective. We see the genesis of the Hindenburg-Ludendorff partnership and how well it functioned as a spur-of-the-moment replacement for the prewar 8th Army leadership team, which had with shocking quickness forfeited the confidence of the General Staff in the war's opening battles. The Russian side of the story is not neglected, Showalter emphasizing how the courage and steadiness of the Russian infantry was fatally undermined by command and control failures at the higher levels. In every respect this is a superb work of military history.

this is an extremely engaging book. the introduction is very well written, points out unconventional views (sazonow's very aggressive position vis a vis partial mobilization), places the change of command from prittwitz to hindenburg/ludendorff extremely well. 4 stars only because despite a very detalied narrative (and MAPS), one cannot picture the flow of the battle. maps are not overlapping, and there is a lot of geography to be aware of, which are not indicated on the maps. also, i somwehat disagree with other reviewers: i find the story-telling here extremely good, and an ideal mix of fact (military operations) anecdote (like the general staff major depriving the mayor of a glass of beer), and opinion (hollweg supposed blaise resignation to war).

Although this book is a purely academic endeavor, and requires the reader to have some passing knowledge about European (and specifically, military) history in general, I have to say that out of all other academic studies of military history I've read over the years, this one was at least a bit more readable and easier to digest. I'm a little biased since I'm currently working on a personal project that is indirectly assisted by reading this book. But for anyone that wants a thorough tactical and strategic overview of the Eastern Front during the early years of WW1, this is THE book to own.

What impressed me the most in reading this book was the in-depth examination of the composition of the armies that engaged in this pivotal battle, and how command decisions that were made (or not made) greatly affected the outcome of the battle. This book also does a good job in explaining the haphazardous nature of warfare in the days before widespread communication was available...which meant that divisional/army-level commanders had to be tactically intuitive, and even imaginative, in order to carry out their orders to have a positive effect on the battle. For example, there are many points (clearly indicated by the author as well, no guessing is needed by the reader) where lack of battlefield information allowed the Russian's to spread-out their units too far apart, then allowing the more aggressive German commanders to take advantage of the situation and encircle and annihilate whole Russian units before the remaining Russian forces could react fast enough to counter-attack and maintain the momentum.

I would have liked a little more information about the Russian side of this battle...there's definitely a bit lacking there in comparison to the tremendous volumes of data available for the German angles...but a lot of that may boil down to the lack of any primary historic materials available for review on the Russian side. Since Putin came to power, access to Russian archival data (especially military information) has gotten to be a lot more difficult. So this is pet peave of mine, but a minor one given the circumstances...and certainly not enough reason to ignore this work, because it truly is comprehensive in scope and detail.

I tried to read this book. I really did. Unfortunately the author is so long winded it was excruciating. He takes some obvious good source material and research and drowns it in the worst kind of ham handed attempt to display his literary acumen, from the constant use of german words and phrases without even a contextual definition, to following one staement with another, contradictory statement, without apparently realizing it. He also blithely passes off opinion as fact, at times, undermining his credibilty. Worse, though, is the ad nauseum dwelling on the irrelevant minutia of susbidiary subjects that need only a thumbnail portrait to get his point across, thus losing the point entirely.