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Target Is Destroyed (2870)

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Hersh's book is an excellent primer on the U.S. intelligence community. (In fact, I recently read it for an intelligence class at American University taught by the genial and wise Professor John Macartney.) Hersh, through hundreds of interviews with people involved with the U.S. response to the KAL007 shootdown, pieces together a workable theory about why the Soviets would shoot down the plane. And most of his thesis was redeemed when the Russians finally handed over the black box from the plane after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The book presents complex ideas clearly, and no matter what else you think of Hersh's writing or his politics, you will find this book valuable.

This is a book about the selective use - and misuse - of intelligence information.

On Sept. 1 1983, a Soviet fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down Korean Airlines Flight 007, even though the pilot argued with his superiors and repeatedly identified the plane as a civilian plane. Breaking with usual intelligence policies, the Reagan administration released the recorded conversation between the fighter pilot and ground control to news media and the world.

This breach was made for political reasons. The impression this was intended to create was that it was standard Soviet policy to shoot down civilian airliners. This jeopardized our future intelligence-gathering capabilities, because it gave away to the Soviets just how sophisticated our intelligence-gathering was, and the extent to which Norway was providing us with info.

Many U.S. intelligence officers were dismayed by the way this was done, because the Reagan administration also withheld all information about the intense U.S. military activity that was being conducted in the area with reconfigured civilian aircraft. For the past several years, the U.S. had been routinely flying specially-configured Boeing 707s equipped with electronic communications surveillance equipment over the Barents sea and other areas that KAL flew over. In fact, a Cobra Ball surveillance plane was in the air to the south of the KAL flight path the same day. George Schultz made sure Cobra Ball was safely in its hangar before they made any announcements about the shootdown of a civilian plane.

The U.S. had also performed massive military maneuvers with three carriers and 23,000 personnell just off Soviet Far Eastern waters six months earlier (in March of 1983), and six U.S. fighter jets overflew Soviet airspace during these exercises. While officially the U.S. claimed the overflight by the six fighters was a mistake, this was widely believed among the U.S. intelligence community to be a deliberate provocation by the U.S. military.

Soviets often put civilian markings on military transports, and given all the increased U.S. military and surveillance activity just off Soviet territorial waters in 1981-83, it becomes far more plausible that the commanding Soviet officers on the ground suspected that Americans had done the same thing with one of our electronic surveillance planes.

The U.S. and Canada shared intelligence information, and the Reagan administration was very unhappy with Canada because Prime Minister Trudeau (based on the same intelligence information provided to the U.S.) said he was sure the Soviets made a tragic mistake, and believed they were shooting down a U.S. intelligence plane that, like the six fighters earlier that year, was testing their defenses and their response times.

Want to know more? You'll have to read the book.

This is a book about the selective use - and misuse - of intelligence information.

On Sept. 1 1983, a Soviet fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down Korean Airlines Flight 007, even though the pilot argued with his superiors and repeatedly identified the plane as a civilian plane. Breaking with usual intelligence policies, the Reagan administration released the recorded conversation between the fighter pilot and ground control to news media and the world.

This breach was made for political reasons. The impression this was intended to create was that it was standard Soviet policy to shoot down civilian airliners. This jeopardized our future intelligence-gathering capabilities, because it gave away to the Soviets just how sophisticated our intelligence-gathering was, and the extent to which Norway was providing us with info.

Many U.S. intelligence officers were dismayed by the way this was done, because the Reagan administration also withheld all information about the intense U.S. military activity that was being conducted in the area with reconfigured civilian aircraft. For the past several years, the U.S. had been routinely flying specially-configured Boeing 707s equipped with electronic communications surveillance equipment over the Barents sea and other areas that KAL flew over. In fact, a Cobra Ball surveillance plane was in the air to the south of the KAL flight path the same day. George Schultz made sure Cobra Ball was safely in its hangar before they made any announcements about the shootdown of a civilian plane.

The U.S. had also performed massive military maneuvers with three carriers and 23,000 personnell just off Soviet Far Eastern waters six months earlier (in March of 1983), and six U.S. fighter jets overflew Soviet airspace during these exercises. While officially the U.S. claimed the overflight by the six fighters was a mistake, this was widely believed among the U.S. intelligence community to be a deliberate provocation by the U.S. military.

Soviets often put civilian markings on military transports, and given all the increased U.S. military and surveillance activity just off Soviet territorial waters in 1981-83, it becomes far more plausible that the commanding Soviet officers on the ground suspected that Americans had done the same thing with one of our electronic surveillance planes.

The U.S. and Canada shared intelligence information, and the Reagan administration was very unhappy with Canada because Prime Minister Trudeau (based on the same intelligence information provided to the U.S.) said he was sure the Soviets made a tragic mistake, and believed they were shooting down a U.S. intelligence plane that, like the six fighters earlier that year, was testing their defenses and their response times.

Want to know more? You'll have to read the book.

Wow, some of the things that took place in the cold war were catastrophes. The difference between this incident and the American shoot down of the Iranian plane is that this was done on purpose it would seam. I think if you would read more about this era you would find that the USSR did finally discipline the Commanders that made this mistake, but in typical Soviet style they did it in secret thus eliminating any public good will they may have gained. I think the biggest error made by the Regan administration is that they did not immediately release the tape, which one could argue that the gathering of the information may have lead to the 007 shoot down. The book is an enjoyable read that moves fast.

Seymour Hersh did an excellent job investigating, down to the Air Force
people sitting at their racks and their "nicknames". Can't wait to read another one of his books.

We know a lot more about the KAL 007 tragedy than we did when this book was written. Perhaps the most important thing we know is that, when the fighter pilot shot it down, KAL 007 was already outside Soviet airspace.

The fact that all the other reviewers don't see fit to mention that is very interesting.

If Hersh were to go back to this story, comparing what he thought then with what we know now, the result might be an interesting, important book. As it is, this book and the others like it aren't worth much of your time.

Book reads like another one of the thousands that try to convince the public that our Intel services and military are complete buffoons and are always dropping the ball. My thoughts on what happened : Congressman Larry McDonald slams Pat Buchanan and a CIA Shill on Buchanan's TV talk show about future Globalist intentions. Two months later, Congressman McDonald dies in 007. False intel leaked to the soviets about a SPY plane flying over their sub base during a secret exercise resulted in the soviets being on the prowl. Voila, problem gone and the Reds have mud on their face. If you think this is far fetched, read up on the flight 800 cover up.

Seymour Hersh's Target Is Destroyed is: 1.) one-third usable early-1980s history, 2.) one-third irrelevent conjecture, 3.) one-third calculated falsehood. Worth reading only if accompanied by other, more recent, books on the same subject.

What a disaster. The plane is shot down by the Soviets, and some write spectacular stories. This is an interesting story, but readers should review other sources.

This book brings it all home. Those disbelievers have their necks screwed on backwards. Wake up! This is how WAR is fought! This is WHY wars are fought! This is WHAT really happens in the light of day! and the darkness of moonless nights. Errors are made, therefore tragedy. Those who are educated must see that our countries are groomed towards certain destinies controlled by those who are evil and those who are not so evil, but trained to respond in the best way possible. Very well written.