Customer Reviews

Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War

5 star:		(2)
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Author, Norman Friedman has done an excellent job of telling us about the ways in which our stategy and tactics have been drastically altered to meet new circumstances and conditions. In particular, I was drawn to his ideas concerning a "Pan-Moslem Empire" as envisaged by the leader of the Islamic terrorists. Military historians,in general,feel most at ease in discussing combat conditions, strategical and tactical planning, logistics etc. Mr. Friedman has ventured forward in discussing the motivations of the Islamic terrorists and religious zealots and thus giving us a bit of a macro-picture of the entire Middle East scene. As a Middle East Specialist, I can appreciate this aspect of his book, Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War. My book, JIHAD: The Mahdi Rebellion in the Sudan(2003) goes a step further by showing that Jihad is not a new phenomenon. The same forces of Jihad and Radicalism existed in the Sudan a century ago. In fact, "history is repeating itself throughout the Middle East." Mr. Friedman's book: Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War is an excellent military study within the larger context of Middle East history. First Rate!!! Murray S. Fradin, author of JIHAD: The Mahdi Rebellion in the Sudan

This book does an exceptional job of identifying and tying together several different strands of the war on terrorism: a) the ongoing evolution in American military thought and strategy in the direction of "netwar," which was underway before September 11; b) bin Laden's development of a millenialist Islamic fantasy combined with improvements in terrorist tradecraft, aided considerably by the advent of commonly available internet technology and encryption techniques; and c) the rapid implementation of extremely lethal and effective new tactics in the crucible of Afghanistan, which provided the template for the subsequent erasure of Saddam's power structure in Iraq. He makes a compelling case for the continued importance of substantial naval and naval air power in fighting terrorism and intimidating regimes that might otherwise be inclined to facilitate terrorists.

Friedman provides an understandable and complete narrative of events between September 11 and the start of the Iraq war (the book went to press just as the Iraq war was beginning, and the author made a number of uncannily accurate predictions of how that war would proceed.)

Friedman's account is particularly good in explaining the importance of a secure base to a network of compartmentalized terror cells, and how the destruction of that base will allow traditional methods of counter-terrorism and police work to tackle what is left. All in all, the book is a single source that gives the relatively informed but somewhat confused a much surer sense of the situation in the world today.

I suspect most who are interested in foreign/military affairs will find little new in this book. Except for specific information about certain weapon systems and associated terminology, most of the information here would already be known to readers who follow events like the Afghan war. One exception for me was to learn why our Afghan 'allies' so often seemed to let us down. Friedman points out that it was a coalition, not an alliance, whose partners had different viewpoints and goals. In a society whose three main ethics are honor, revenge, and hospitality it makes more sense to give a defeated enemy mercy and change sides when necessary. Otherwise, you invite unnecessary vengeance. There is little analysis here, mainly just a chronological recitation of events. For those who didn't already know, there is a good summation of the history radical Islam, Osama, et al. This material is better covered elsewhere.

Dr. Norman Friedman is perhaps known in military circles as an authoritive writer. This book tarnishes that reputation.

Terrorism, Afghanistan, and America's New Way of War is presented as a sweeping description of America's Global War On Terrorism that take economic, political, social, and military factors into account. Surprisingly enough Dr. Friedman simplifies the politics and social issues of the Middle East and Afghanistan to the point that it becomes inaccurate. Furthermore, Friedman makes a lot of assumptions and statements about the thinking of Osama bin Laden and other terrorists that he simply cannot prove to be true. That smells of bad journalism, rather than good scholarly work.

However, Dr. Friedman's chapter on the actual combat in Afghanistan is quite good. This saves the book from receiving 1 star rather than 2. If one wishes a somewhat detailed account of the blows and counterblows of Operation Enduring Freedom this book still might be worth it.

Finally, the book is filled with inconsistencies when it comes to the use of abbreviations and name of platforms and units. The book also contains mispelled words, and sometimes words have simply been left out. It seems that little real editing was performed by the Naval Institute before the book when to the press.

All in all, a very disappointing read.