Customer Reviews

Terrorism and America

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Phillip Heymann offers a clear-minded, if somewhat cursory, appraisal of the difficulties terrorist activity presents democratic and "open" societies. He manages in just a little over 150 pages to clearly identify the dangers over-reaction to either terrorist threats or actions can pose to a society, as well the risks posed when a terrorist incident involves more than one country, without burdening the reader with too much detail.

This is not, however, an intellectual treatise or theoretical work. Heymann very clearly illustrates his points by examining specific incidents and their consequences involving not merely the US, but Italy, the UK, Germany, Israel, Columbia, and others. Perhaps most illustrative is his examination of the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking, which drives home the complications arising when multiple governments and competing policies become involved, and Chapter 7 on the criminal just system, which touches on everything from the difficulties of investigation to witness intimidation to the use (and possible abuse) of deadly force to the issue of civil rights.

By the end, Heymann delivers on his promise of a "common sense" strategy for dealing with both domestic and international terrorism. Pragmatically admitting the danger of terrorism can never be completely eliminated, it can at least be minimized by a combination of steps, including more targetted intelligence gathering, greater sharing of information with our allies, resisting giving into terrorist demands, and better training of law enforcement in dealing with terrorism.

The book has two small failings however. First, it provides only a cursory examination of what terrorism itself involves. While he devotes an entire chapter to the phenomenon of political violence, Heymann gives only passing mention to the motives and actions that could be involved and almost no examinaiton of the differences between them. This leaves the reader with little appreciation of the differences, both in motive and method, between the decades of bombings committed by Basque Sepratists in Spain and the more sinister activities of the Aum Shinrikyo cult between 1994 and 1995. An in-depth analysis would have actually detracted from Heymann's intent, but a few pages on these distinctions wouldn't have hurt the text.

Secondly, he concentrates almost exclusively on conventional forms of terrorism. He mentions the threats of nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) terrorism, but does so in context of conflicts between states, stating the prospect of NBC terrorism is "unlikely". While this is certainly true now, this may well change in coming years. And the specter of an incident like that of the Tokyo subway gassing done by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 can significantly change a government's options in terms of response. This is actually a minor point given the number of excellent books on the subject already out there, but even a short examination of the dangers NBC presents would have helped here.

In summary, Terrorism and America makes an excellent starting point for readers interested in either terrorism or government's response against it. It should not be mistaken for any ground-breaking analysis on the subjects or a grand strategy for making society impervious to terrorism; the former would take a book easily three times its size, and the latter is quite simply impossible. This is as clear-headed and pragmatic an work on the subject you're likely to find. I highly recommend it.

Unfortunately, Philip Heymann's Terrorism & America was published a year before 9/11. Accordingly, two terrorists he focuses on at the beginning are Timothy McVeigh and Mahmoud Abouhalima (of the 1993 World Trade Center garage bombing notoriety), and much of the book seems dated because of the omission of the more severe 9/11 attack.

But my problems with this book run deeper. It's this type of analysis which I discarded long ago because it REALLY DOESN'T SOLVE THE PROBLEM. The author admits some terrorist attacks are unpreventable and has an unsettling take on whether terrorists will ever get or use weapons of mass destruction which he calls "NBC weapons" -- nuclear, biological, chemical -- to the probable dismay of the TV broadcasting firm with the same initials? Note: a recent "World At Risk" report suggests chemical weapons are much less of a danger than biological ones. Whether NBC or NB weapons might ever be used is a huge, looming question mark hanging over the analysis. His strategy is somewhat sensible IF they're never used, but how can we presume we'll be spared? I think the smart assumption is to assume they will be used, and figure out how to prevent such occurrences.

The author calls for common sense, keeping one's cool, not over-reacting if terrorism strikes. His solutions? Spend more money; gather more intelligence; prosecute terrorists swiftly; share information with allies; give a proportionate response when dealing with state-supported terrorists. He grasps pieces of the puzzle. It's well written, suitable for non-academics.

My problem with his analysis is that Professor Heymann doesn't follow through with the logic. He fails to see terrorism as a larger problem in which government, itself, can become the terrorist. As a result, he misses the big picture. And this prevents him from crawling out of the box of conventional wisdom. He assumes the existing political structure is fixed. Perhaps government can listen to some of his thinking and perhaps do a better job of thwarting terrorism? But, I ask, will it prevent a smuggled nuclear bomb? Or thwart an anthrax-spewing truck attack? We're going to find out.

I argue terrorism is a citizens' problem -- a much larger issue of violence against individual rights. Only by seeing terrorism this way is a solution possible based on a common theme of exposure. And I argue that the only way for the United States to prevent terrorism is to restore our democratic and republican structure, and this requires a Second Constitutional Convention. I realize this is a highly unlikely possibility, unfortunately, so I'm cynical that an adequate strategy to prevent terrorism will ever happen.

Still, I challenge Philip Heymann to debate the merits of my proposed terrorism prevention strategy.

Thomas W. Sulcer
author of "Common Sense II: How to Prevent the Three Types of Terrorism"
(google title + Sulcer)

Phillip Heymann offers a clear-minded, if somewhat cursory, appraisal of the difficulties terrorist activity presents democratic and "open" societies. He manages in just a little over 150 pages to clearly identify the dangers over-reaction to either terrorist threats or actions can pose to a society, as well the risks posed when a terrorist incident involves more than one country, without burdening the reader with too much detail.

This is not, however, an intellectual treatise or theoretical work. Heymann very clearly illustrates his points by examining specific incidents and their consequences involving not merely the US, but Italy, the UK, Germany, Israel, Columbia, and others. Perhaps most illustrative is his examination of the 1985 Achille Lauro hijacking, which drives home the complications arising when multiple governments and competing policies become involved, and Chapter 7 on the criminal just system, which touches on everything from the difficulties of investigation to witness intimidation to the use (and possible abuse) of deadly force to the issue of civil rights.

By the end, Heymann delivers on his promise of a "common sense" strategy for dealing with both domestic and international terrorism. Pragmatically admitting the danger of terrorism can never be completely eliminated, it can at least be minimized by a combination of steps, including more targetted intelligence gathering, greater sharing of information with our allies, resisting giving into terrorist demands, and better training of law enforcement in dealing with terrorism.

The book has two small failings however. First, it provides only a cursory examination of what terrorism itself involves. While he devotes an entire chapter to the phenomenon of political violence, Heymann gives only passing mention to the motives and actions that could be involved and almost no examinaiton of the differences between them. This leaves the reader with little appreciation of the differences, both in motive and method, between the decades of bombings committed by Basque Sepratists in Spain and the more sinister activities of the Aum Shinrikyo cult between 1994 and 1995. An in-depth analysis would have actually detracted from Heymann's intent, but a few pages on these distinctions wouldn't have hurt the text.

Secondly, he concentrates almost exclusively on conventional forms of terrorism. He mentions the threats of nuclear, chemical, and biological (NBC) terrorism, but does so in context of conflicts between states, stating the prospect of NBC terrorism is "unlikely". While this is certainly true now, this may well change in coming years. And the specter of an incident like that of the Tokyo subway gassing done by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 can significantly change a government's options in terms of response. This is actually a minor point given the number of excellent books on the subject already out there, but even a short examination of the dangers NBC presents would have helped here.

In summary, Terrorism and America makes an excellent starting point for readers interested in either terrorism or government's response against it. It should not be mistaken for any ground-breaking analysis on the subjects or a grand strategy for making society impervious to terrorism; the former would take a book easily three times its size, and the latter is quite simply impossible. This is as clear-headed and pragmatic an work on the subject you're likely to find. I highly recommend it.