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Terrorist Trail: Backtracking the Foreign Fighter

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H. John Poole provides yet another volume of hard-hitting information in his quest to reveal the motives and tactics of America's enemies and refocus the efforts of the American military on victory.

In this latest work, Poole begins with a wide-angle focus on the connection between Africa, China, and Islamic terrorists. In his signature style he outlines the history of the current conflict, drawing in threads that are often overlooked by the mainstream of reporting. He closely studies motivations, strategy, and tactics used by America's enemies. But this is no mere work of theory--Poole also takes the next step and makes specific recommendations for how to restructure our own military doctrine and tactics to achieve victory over the terrorists. Though more detail would be helpful here (and Poole lists every reference he has used) the later chapters of this book could almost be applied as a training manual for troops currently engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.

More important still, Poole sheds light on what is wrong with our own military. From his first book Poole has decried the use of the doctrine of overwhelming firepower and called for a return to flexible, small-unit tactics and innovative leadership. Only in this manner can the sons and daughters of America engage the terrorist and win. His words may sound like heresy to commanders who have grown up believing in heavy armament and overwhelming firepower. But as conflicts drag on in Iraq and Afghanistan to no particular resolution, Poole's words take on a hint of prophecy. Poole has been a voice in the wilderness for far too long. It is time for military and intelligence leaders to take a good hard look not only at our enemies but at our own forces and doctrine. Poole's work is perhaps the best place to start.

This book, and indeed all of Poole's previous works, deserve a place of honor on any military leader's bookshelf, and are worth their weight in a deploying soldier's rucksack. I referred to Poole's previous works regularly when I was last deployed to Iraq.

Every military, law enforcement, and national security professional needs to read Poole's Terrorist Trail and his other books. You can bet our enemies are reading and studying them. My personal experiences in Iraq (2 tours)coincides with Poole's writings. The tactics, techniques, procedures and grand strategy of Islamic extremists fighting U.S. and coalition forces continue to improve marked by a distinctive appreciation of fourth generation warfare. John Poole's Terrorist Trail poignantly reminds us how successful Islamic extremists are taking on our conventional modern armed forces with low or no technologies and tactics using IEDs, RPGs, snipers, suicide bombers, and small arms at very close ranges.Poole describes how Islamic extremists using fourth generation warfare thinking and tactics are steadily expanding and creating new battlefronts. This book is a must read to understand the fourth generation threat to Western culture and how our fourth generation enemies use terrorism to undermine and counter conventional forces.

Only a few military thinkers have given us the insight and practical helps that John Poole has over the years. In this work, "Gunny" Poole provides the insight we need to win the war on terror. Poole helps us see that it is not so much a military problem or even a political problem as it is a law enforcement problem. The problems have no quick solutions like bombing and killing as many insurgents as possible. It is a fourth-generation-war (4GW) that requires a 4GW solution. 4GW is marked by non-national networked entities who provide too few targets for bombing to have any effect other than the effect of creating more recruits for their ranks. 4GW forces thrive on devastation and insecurity of the people; increasing the devastation and insecurity, as in with most military approaches, is counterproductive in that they are nothing more than greenhouses for terror. What are needed, according to Poole, are small near-autonomous units of truly light infantry that can play the role of police force rather than occupiers in the greenhouses of terror. It requires a paradigm shift in the military away from centralized control and micromanagement much as the late Col. John Boyd often argued. It requires truly creative thought more than top-down bureaucratic mandates or emphasis on force protection at the expense of population protection. It requires a new way of seeing insurgent recruits as the dispossessed who can be won to our side rather than being martyrs for theirs.

The primary hurdle for such reform is, as so often, money. Light infantry police forces do not require the high-tech gadgets that so enamour the big military establishment and supporting defense corporations. No amount of common sense will likely overcome those pressures on American politics. Yet the John Poole's of the world cannot and hopefully will not remain silent.

Poole is perhaps, one of the most innovative and creative thinkers to have served in the US military. He understands from experience that his observations will not likely create the revolution in military and political thinking required to bring about these changes. Yet, he is one more voice crying in the wilderness, and we can pray that his observations can be heard before long. Get it, recommend it to your congressman, share it with military people on your gift lists. Help spread the word any way you can; it is a serious matter that needs to be addressed and only with the clamour of a great crowd will it be heard.

I just returned from leading an infantry platoon in one of the worst regions in Iraq. Despite my platoon's best efforts, I cannot say we did much to make the overall situation any better. Instead, things seem to be getting worse and worse.

Politicians and leaders seem to be having trouble coming up with a new plan or strategy to turn the tide in Iraq. This is unfortunate considering people like John Poole have already come up with very intelligent, practical solutions to the problems we are facing over there. When you read Terrorist Trail and other books by John Poole, you realize that there are ways to solve the problems that seem to have no solution. If only decision-makers and planners would listen to John Poole, we might be able to take the initiative in the war on terror. I am quite sure that my unit could have made much greater progress had we operated according to John Poole's doctrine.

Aside from offering practical solutions to the challenges of counterinsurgency, John Poole also answers some questions that were constantly on my mind when I was in Iraq... Who are these "insurgents" or "foreign fighters" or "jihadists" and where do they come from? What are their goals, their loyalties and mentalities? I could not answer these kind of questions about most of the people I fought in Iraq. If knowing your enemy is an essential part of victory, I was way behind the curve. Coming back and reading Terrorist Trail, a lot of the patterns and experiences I ran into over there start to make a lot more sense. I wish I had read Terrorist Trail before I deployed.

Terrorist Trail, Backtracking the Foreign Fighter

Without realizing it, J.Poole is a Cultural anthropologist of warfare. He provides the reader with the historical cultural perspective of war, and how it applies to today's battlefields. Few can really do this, but J.Poole does.

This is historical -culture- warfare product of an individual, group or society of human beings. It includes their religion, technology, science, as well as their moral systems and the characteristic behaviors and warfare habits. In particular, the specific more detailed warcraft, meanings, and tactics in different domains of human activities, through out the world. J.Poole portrays this evolution of warcraft; he then contrasts this with the war with terrorism and their state sponsors. Or simply put, know your enemy, his ground, his tactics, and capabilities on all levels.

In addition what J.Poole is trying to build a flexible -fluid and dynamic approach on today's battlefield, no matter where that maybe. Today's soldiers need to be more thoroughly schooled in small unit tactics. Training conducted is not just going up to a static firing line and shooting at targets, but learning how to fight - shoot in a 3 dimensional sphere, 360 degrees, and more. J.Poole is for warfare at the Spartan level, each soldier a carefully crafted-educated weapon.

Clearly his book, "Terrorist Trail" belongs in every Soldier- Statesman library.

By Stephen E Hughes

Terrorist Trail: Backtracking the Foreign Fighter offers small unit leaders additional options for their mental toolbox. Poole's latest work goes through history to identify some the most rare and influential finds in the realm of small unit warfare used in Africa and the Middle East. Techniques like man tracking, egalitarian leadership in small units, infiltration and many more provide leaders insights into how to successfully employ each of these measures to achieve success against technologically superior forces as well as guerilla or insurgent forces. It goes without saying that this book is another must read.

The book magnificiently accomplishes the following goals: 1. providing a comprehensive outline of terrorism in the last 100 years; 2. defining the current situation in Iraq; and 3. providing winning tactics and strategies to implement against terrorists.

The book provides a rare discussion of winning tactics successfully employed against terrorists in Africa.

The material is consistent with the previous books of John Poole discussing small unit tactics. One area reflecting enhanced appreciation is the discussion of 4 person tracking teams. From a small series of footprints, it may be possible to discern whether an individual being tracked is a male or female, height, weight, whether he is wounded, whether he is carrying a pack or not, the level of alertness, whether the person is in a hurry. When a 4 -5 person tracking team concept is used, all members of the unit are continuously backed up by the others and the unit has the flexibility to change direction quickly.

In this volume H. John Poole attempts, once again, to explain how the Middle Eastern-inspired terror movements are attempting to work their will on the collective West. This book is divided into three parts.

Under the first part, Poole explains the terrorists' concern with Africa: a large, under-developed continent with myriad socio-economic problems and fertile recruiting among an extensive Muslim population. He outlines infiltration routes from Africa to Iraq and the Middle East. The author also notes the involvement of this pipeline from Africa with Iran.

The next section is an examination of African tactical adaptations to European armies' methods and technologies. Particularly noted are the Boers and Zulus of southern Africa. He introduces modern-day tricks and techniques such as those of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, a special 1970s era unit whose mission wasa to serve as a pseudo-terrorist element in the hunt for enemy guerillas.

Poole brings together the history and the examples, in the last section, to indicate the way to defeat the current Middle Eastern version of terrorism.

He notes these following:

-the need for Western development aid to deal with Africa's problems, which, in turn could avert problems for the West;

-urban tracking - tracing the terrorist adversary through urban streets - as a means of coming to grips with the individual terrorist in his preferred sanctuary;

-U.S. forces learning to replace massive firepopwer with technique at the small unit level, focussing on the short-range fire fight and de-centralize tactical control;

-enhancing local security by preparing local troops with first-class light infantry skills;

-understanding Hezbollah destabilization; and

- how U.S. forces must learn to evolve tactically.

Poole makes some interesting proposals in this work, most of which he has discussed in his other books, among these being:

* the over-reliance by U.S. forces on technology;

* the need for more extensive training to build a tactically-refined light infantry;

* the need for more tactical finesse - and less force - in 4th Generation warfare;

* disparities of an over-armored, over-regulated and over-centralized U.S. force opposing a quick-moving, decentralized, initiative-wielding adversary;

* how Western tactical development has been equipment-driven; and

* that U.S. small unit techniques are 90 years behind state-of-the-art developments.

One would hoope that Poole's works would spark controversy as a precedent for tactical change. Such change is vital if the West expects to come out on top in the "War Against Terror".

Awesome Book! I read it in Iraq and tells the truth as to what is really going on. Highlly recommended... China is behind this war

Future historians will identify John Poole as one of those clairvoyant savants of military art who told us of the threat long before it happened, exactly what we should expect, and how to train to fight it. He will also be remembered as a perceptive author whose books were read and studied by the Soldiers and Marines who fought the wars of the 21st Century but, unfortunately, not read and studied by the generals who led them. In Terrorist Trail, he has again identified the threat, their modus operandi, and where to find them. He has identified why we haven't done very well at finding and eliminating the insurgents because of the lack understanding the threat, the absence of true soldier skills, and the burden of a very heavily laden attrition mind set on the part of most of the senior officer set.

Terrorist Trail is a well researched volume based on keen insights into the Arab mind and culture. Moreover, the Trail follows the flow of foreign fighters right through the valley of the Euphrates and across the borders of Iran. This is more than just insight, it is information - nay, intelligence - from what is happening on the ground based on first hand accounts and observations. It is a detailed account which could be used as a continuity document for units in Iraq to read and understand as they rotate into these areas.

Poole takes us on a tour d' force through successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operations throughout history and in the third world - pointing out lessons that should be learned if we are to ever master COIN ops. It doesn't take a mental giant to understand that this is a primer on "how to", but if unread, the lessons have no chance of being learned. If read, the lessons have to be implemented at a level to be effectively applied. Some of Poole's recommendations might be discerned in the new Army/Marine COIN Manual, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006, but these similarities exist in too few areas to think they are more than serendipitous. It would take an entirely different leadership, cultural mind-set, force organization, and training to implement Poole's recommendations, and there is no significant evidence of that in the conventional U.S. Army or Marine Corps.

There is some flavor of Poole's prescriptions in Special Forces, but they too suffer from conventional generals with 2d generation thinking. Poole makes the case for decentralization of training in order to be able to create the type of army that can successfully combat the terrorists. He goes so far as to suggest: "If America's brigade commanders can't figure out how to fight more effectively at short range, they should defer to the collective wisdom of those who do it for a living - their rifle squad leaders." Such an outrageous statement, no matter how true, will provoke more of a defensive reaction by the hierarchy than the more appropriate determination to improve. One suspects that just such a thing is happening as there is now a shortage of his books in the Post and Base Exchanges. As the world situation continues to deteriorate, being good has become far more important than looking good. Poole has developed and tested a new "bottom-up" squad training method. Until more U.S. infantry units adopt it, they will continue to have problems at short range in either conventional or unconventional warfare.

Thank you, John Poole, for doing some serious research and thinking on tactics, operations, and strategy and translating that into this newest great book, Terrorist Trail.