7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A remarkable book on a terrifying topic -- STRONGLY recommended, March 10, 2009
This review is from: Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Hardcover)
I urge you to read this important book, and then share it with your local and national leaders.
Brian Jenkins, a senior advisor at the RAND Corporation, has been studying the issue of nuclear terrorism since the early 1970s. In fact, he may be the world's leading expert on this terrifying topic. "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" has been endorsed by top intelligence experts on both sides of the political spectrum, as well as a Nobel Prize laureate and retired military leaders.
Warning: This is not a work of sensationalism. Unlike so many "shock authors," Jenkins is even-handed and very careful with his words. He even criticizes his own earlier work, which is a rare thing in this age of reckless self-promotion.
Here's the gist of Jenkins's argument: Nuclear "terror" and nuclear "terrorism" are two VERY different problems. One is emotional. The other is factual. If we base our policies on emotion, our nation will suffer through unnecessary fear and make poor decisions about security. As Jenkins states: "Al Qaeda is the first terrorist group to incite nuclear terror without actually possessing a nuclear weapon."
Make no mistake: The distinction between "terror" and "terrorism" is absolutely critical to our national response, says Jenkins. Nuclear terror is fear based on what MIGHT happen. In contrast, nuclear terrorism is the actual historical record of specific terrorist ACTS involving nuclear materials -- plus an objective estimate of current terrorist capabilities.
Jenkins leaves no stone unturned. He walks us through the history of nuclear terror going back to H.G. Wells' 1913 novel on the subject and continuing to the current day. It's a fascinating -- almost unbelievable -- trip. For example, I didn't know that Robert Oppenheimer (father of the U.S. atomic bomb) actually worked on this issue in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The result was his famous but still classified "Screwdriver Report."
On a parallel track, Jenkins examines the history of actual terrorist acts involving nuclear materials -- everything from a love-triangle murder in Idaho Falls in 1961 to the Chechen radiological bomb planted in a Moscow park just a few years ago. He also reviews the rich history of black marketeering in nuclear materials, particularly in the former Soviet Union.
Along the way, we learn a great deal about the difference between nuclear terror and nuclear terrorism. Topics include:
-- Suitcase nukes
-- The mysterious substance called "red mercury"
-- Security procedures at Russian nuclear facilities
-- Al Qaeda's attempts to secure nuclear and radiological weapons
-- Pakistan's involvement in nuclear smuggling
-- The great technical challenge of building a viable nuclear weapon from scratch
At times, Jenkins' narrative repeats itself, but for the most part he's right on the money. Each major topic is placed within the cultural and historical framework of our times. For example, Jenkins examines the religious "end times" fever of our age in the context of nuclear terror. He shows how specific threats are turned into "facts," through the psychological process of reification. He even explains the use of threatening language in Arab culture, based on linguistic and psychiatric studies.
So what is his conclusion? Are we destined for an act of nuclear terrorism on U.S. soil?
Jenkins seems to think it's possible, but rather unlikely, particularly in terms of an actual nuclear fission explosion (nuclear bomb). Launching such an attack would involve three very difficult steps:
1. Acquiring enriched uranium or plutonium in sufficient quantity.
2. Assembling and maintaining such a weapon.
3. Delivering it to a U.S. target without being detected.
The first two steps seem to be the most difficult. Who knew, for example, that small nuclear weapons become inoperable in about 6 months because of cracks in the core material? They're harder to maintain than an old piano.
It's far more likely, says Jenkins, that terrorists will use a radiological "dirty bomb" on U.S. soil. Such a device uses traditional explosives to disperse radioactive materials across a large area. The ensuing loss of life is much smaller, but the terror it could cause is potentially enormous.
So what can we do to prevent nuclear terrorism? Plenty, says Jenkins. He outlines a long list of specific actions that civilized nations can take to reduce the likelihood of an actual nuclear attack. Most importantly, Jenkins ads, we must base our plans and decisions on actual facts -- not sensationalistic rhetoric.
If you have any interest at all in this topic, I urge you to read this important book and then pass it along to others -- especially your Congressional representatives and elected officials.
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4 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Insight into nuclear counterterrorism thinking, May 25, 2009
This review is from: Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Hardcover)
Mr. Jenkins has written a very interesting book for people knowledgeable of terrorists and terrorism. What he has also done, and done very well, is to open a window into the rationale, gaming, and assumptions used by the experts engaged in protecting us from a terrorist nuclear attack. Something which I found to be fascinating. I especially enjoyed the chapter dealing with "red mercury", which has to be one of the world's greatest scams.
For the uninitiated, this book presents an overwhelming amount of extraneous information--extraneous to the question posed in the context of the 21st century. For those who want to learn about the evolution of counter terrorism thinking, this book is for you. Jenkins begins in the 1970s, and using his personal experiences as the path, brings the reader to 2008.
After completing WILL TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR? my first thought was, how did they all miss the obvious? Jenkins unwittingly provided the answer when he mentioned "elegant design." Let me explain by creating a scenario. You have entered a strange building seeking to acquire the design for a nuclear device. Exiting the stairwell, you proceed down a short hall that dead ends into a long, dark corridor stretching to the left and right. A sign with arrows pointing in both directions provides a clue. The left arrow says Implosion Design, and the right arrow says Gun-type Design. Which type do you steal? Should you steal: (a) the implosion designs; (b) the gun-type designs; or (c) both?
The nuclear weapons scientists cited by Mr. Jenkins have a blind spot. They think about what they know best: very complex implosion nuclear devices. Using the above scenario, all the experts appear to have chosen option (a), and concentrated their scenarios and simulations on terrorists acquiring or fabricating an implosion atomic device--a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. No one appears to have investigated option (b), gun-type nuclear devices.
Allow me to digress for a moment. Having a Ph.D. in nuclear physics does not make one knowledgeable of nuclear weapons. I shared the stage with a nuclear physicist last year at a terrorism conference in Dallas. My topic was nuclear weapons for terrorists. His topic was radiation effects on the human body. Afterward, the physicist told me that I had opened his eyes to the magnitude of the danger; and he now understood how terrorists could attack us with a simple nuclear device. Most readers do not have a Ph.D. in nuclear physics, so explanations must be kept simple.
Plutonium is a dangerous material to handle and is not a suitable terrorist's fissile material for several reasons: it is easier to fission (not the proper technical description but it gives the reader the general idea); it has five phases (solid, solid, solid [which means it changes dimensions and density], liquid, and gas); it emits slightly more radiation (easier to detect); and it is poisonous. Terrorists attempting to make a plutonium device would probably, inadvertently, assemble a critical mass (the equivalent of an operating nuclear reactor), thus creating the equivalent of a reactor accident--a melt down. Another reason is that building an implosion device is beyond the capability of terrorists. Even if you know how to design an implosion explosive lens system, doing so in secret would be a formidable challenge. Without testing, the probability of success would be near zero. Not so if one is building a gun-type device with U-235. The gun-type bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the Little Boy, was not tested. And, U-235 does not present a physical danger to a person handling the components, as long as the components are separated.
Weapons grade highly enriched uranium, U-235 enriched to 90%+ is the ideal terrorist fissile material, and a gun-type device is the ideal terrorist nuclear device. If terrorists acquire, or are given, the fissile components for a gun-type bomb (a projectile or rod, and several washers or rings that form the hollow cylinder) all they need is a small cannon barrel with its breech, at least one fixed round of ammunition, and a neutron source. There is no shortage of such guns in the Middle East. In the 1950s and early 1960s polonium-210 was used as one component of nuclear weapon's neutron source (sometimes called the nuclear trigger), and the small packet of Po-210 had to be replaced every six to nine months. The fissile material does not have to be replaced, because it does not have a very short shelf life as stated on page 174.
Mr. Jenkins does not answer the question posed by his book's title, even though Chapter 19 has a section titled "WHAT CAN BE DONE?" A good analysis of a question with no apparent answer. Perhaps the answer is nothing--until we lose a city or cities.
Mr. Jenkins, like almost all authors of fiction and nonfiction, who tackle the question of how a terrorist could obtain or fabricate a simple nuclear weapon, suffers from a lack of detailed understanding of how nuclear and thermonuclear weapons work. I found only one reference to gun-type nuclear bombs. On page 44, "Young postdocs in the Livermore experiment chose to design a plutonium device because, `designing a mere gun bomb would have been "a pretty crummy showing" while designing a plutonium implosion bomb would have been a "career-enhancing move." ' " Of course the postdocs would go for an elegant design. Terrorists, however, are not postdocs at Livermore, Los Alamos, or Sandia, and they will go for a simple gun-type device they can understand and assemble.
Chapter 15 titled IS DETERRENCE DEAD confirms my fear that our scientists and analysts are concentrating on implosion nuclear devices. Implosion nuclear bombs, in most cases, use plutonium as their fuel. Jenkins cites Dr. Schelling (page 287-8), "Any organization that gets enough fissile material to make a bomb will require highly qualified scientists, technologists, machinists, working in seclusion . . . for months . . ." Not true if they are building a gun-type bomb with U-235 components provided by their sponsor. We are ignoring the simple, basic, gun-type bomb that was used to destroy Hiroshima, Japan--the terrorists nuclear device of choice.
Mr. Jenkins' information on SADMs is correct. Suitcase nukes are a type of SADM, weapons blown out of proportion by authors and the media. The yield of a man portable nuclear device from the 1960s and 1970s will be low sub-kiloton range. Chapter 14 is devoted to terrorist purchased nuclear weapons--tactical, and suitcase (SADM). Tactical nuclear weapons have complex fuzing, designed to prevent premature detonations. The fuze must receive positive signals that a series of events have occured in sequence before the fuze can arm. For example, a missile fuze must verify: acceleration, an altitude above a set number (the missile has passed through a set altitude on its way up), deceleration (reentry), pass through a set altitude on the way down, etc. Converting a tactical warhead to a demolition device, a bomb placed by a terrorist, is not easy.
SADM fuzes do not have any physical events to measure, so al-Qaida or other terrorists can set one off if they have one. So why haven't they? One reason may be the neutron source--Po-210. Po-210 has a half-life of 138 days, which means the small packet of polonium must be replaced on a regular basis, and Po-210 is manmade in a nuclear reactor. Remember Litvenenko? [...]
Mr. Jenkins concentrates his analysis on al-Qaeda, followed by Hezbollah and other Islamic terrorists groups. While they may be the implementers of a nuclear attack, I submit that Iran will be the probable facilitator. Iran is capable of producing weapons grade U-235, providing U-235 components for a gun-type device, producing and providing Po-210, and providing instructions on how to make and/or use a basic gun-type atomic device. Should Pakistan fall to the extremists, then the danger escalates to a regional nuclear war, as Jenkins discusses in Chapter 17.
A gun-type device can disassembled, brought to the detonation location, and then reassembled. An implosion bomb can't. Detecting the U-235 components is very, very, difficult. Oppie (J. Robert Oppenheimer) was correct, as he usually was, when he said (page 173), "The only useful technology would be a screwdriver." Portable neutron detectors, which Oppie didn't have, will find both types of fissile materials, but we do not have enough of them deployed.
I take exception to Mr. Jenkins' conclusion, stated on page 143, that the record of state sponsorship of terrorists lends little support to this [providing a nuclear device or the materials to build one] thesis. Islamic fanatics are not rational, at least not from our perspective. Iran created, funds, trains, and controls Hezbollah. Hezbollah blew up our embassy and the Marine barracks in Lebanon, their first acts of terrorism. How can one doubt that Iran is not capable of providing Hezbollah a nuclear device, or the components to make one, to a terrorist group?
Jenkins nails the deterrence problem in the first sentence of Chapter 15 with a quote from Admiral Mies, "How do you deter or dissuade someone whose reward is in the `afterlife?' " An unknown [to me] Israeli diplomat said much the same, "How do you negotiate with people who take their orders from God? A high ranking Iranian Mullah has said he [meaning Iran] would be willing to trade one Iranian city for one Israeli city.
Chapter 16 discusses statistical risk assessments. Such assessments are based upon assumptions. If the assumptions are wrong, then the assessment has no value. Much the same can be said about public opinion. If the public does not have real facts, how can they assess the risk? The expert that most amused me was Martha Stout (pp 310-11) who...
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3 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Expert strategy but citizens must get involved, December 16, 2008
This review is from: Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Hardcover)
Government officials trying to cope with terrorism's nagging complexity often resort to hiring consultants to soothe their concerns and help them find policies to thwart terrorism while not overreacting. Given the current state of America, terrorism experts like Brian Jenkins have a vital role in helping protect America. But experts can only help to a certain extent -- they're like a crutch, not a cure, because they can't prevent terrorism like citizens can.
This book is an advertisement for Brian Jenkins, terrorism expert. Like any cautious consultant, he wants it both ways: he wants to reassure a fearful public that nuclear terrorism is less likely than they think; but if nuclear terrorism happens, he doesn't want to be blamed for making a poor prediction. The result is a confused advertisement for his professional services. Will terrorists go nuclear? Jenkins won't say. And his failure to take a stand undercuts his argument that Al Qaeda has scared us into believing that it's a nuclear power -- if terrorists nuke Manhattan, then our worries will have been correct. However, if we're over-reacting to a non-existent threat of smuggled nuclear bombs, then a title like "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" ratchets up fear without purpose.
The real audience of this book is not the public but government officials who might hire Mr. Jenkins as well as media gate-keepers seeking a talking head after terrorism erupts. So Mr. Jenkins must appear knowledgeable to these two audiences. Perhaps this is why there are graphs typically found in introductory economics textbooks? There's a dubious reality TV skit tacked on near the end in which the reader is supposed to play president after a city has been nuked. A nuked Manhattan is "game over" (according to military strategists like Graham Allison) so why is this skit in there? An editor should have nuked the skit.
Jenkins, like most people, assume terrorism is only a problem for police, government, military. But I think the problem of terrorism can only be handled by participation from citizens. We're the ones who suffer when it happens. And citizens working together can solve it. We have a power government lacks because we can change the framework in which law enforcement operates. And while experts like Jenkins have a constructive role, as citizens we must think for ourselves.
Cynical readers opposed to substantive reform can read this book for more understanding of the dynamics of nuclear terrorism from an expert's perspective. And this book is helpful in this regard. Mr. Jenkins is one of the good guys helping thwart serious terrorism and deserves our sincere appreciation for his efforts. But I urge readers to own the problem of terrorism and to think through the problem for themselves.
Thomas W. Sulcer
author of "The Second Constitution of the United States"
(free on web -- google title above + sulcer)
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