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Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?

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I urge you to read this important book, and then share it with your local and national leaders.

Brian Jenkins, a senior advisor at the RAND Corporation, has been studying the issue of nuclear terrorism since the early 1970s. In fact, he may be the world's leading expert on this terrifying topic. "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" has been endorsed by top intelligence experts on both sides of the political spectrum, as well as a Nobel Prize laureate and retired military leaders.

Warning: This is not a work of sensationalism. Unlike so many "shock authors," Jenkins is even-handed and very careful with his words. He even criticizes his own earlier work, which is a rare thing in this age of reckless self-promotion.

Here's the gist of Jenkins's argument: Nuclear "terror" and nuclear "terrorism" are two VERY different problems. One is emotional. The other is factual. If we base our policies on emotion, our nation will suffer through unnecessary fear and make poor decisions about security. As Jenkins states: "Al Qaeda is the first terrorist group to incite nuclear terror without actually possessing a nuclear weapon."

Make no mistake: The distinction between "terror" and "terrorism" is absolutely critical to our national response, says Jenkins. Nuclear terror is fear based on what MIGHT happen. In contrast, nuclear terrorism is the actual historical record of specific terrorist ACTS involving nuclear materials -- plus an objective estimate of current terrorist capabilities.

Jenkins leaves no stone unturned. He walks us through the history of nuclear terror going back to H.G. Wells' 1913 novel on the subject and continuing to the current day. It's a fascinating -- almost unbelievable -- trip. For example, I didn't know that Robert Oppenheimer (father of the U.S. atomic bomb) actually worked on this issue in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The result was his famous but still classified "Screwdriver Report."

On a parallel track, Jenkins examines the history of actual terrorist acts involving nuclear materials -- everything from a love-triangle murder in Idaho Falls in 1961 to the Chechen radiological bomb planted in a Moscow park just a few years ago. He also reviews the rich history of black marketeering in nuclear materials, particularly in the former Soviet Union.

Along the way, we learn a great deal about the difference between nuclear terror and nuclear terrorism. Topics include:

-- Suitcase nukes
-- The mysterious substance called "red mercury"
-- Security procedures at Russian nuclear facilities
-- Al Qaeda's attempts to secure nuclear and radiological weapons
-- Pakistan's involvement in nuclear smuggling
-- The great technical challenge of building a viable nuclear weapon from scratch

At times, Jenkins' narrative repeats itself, but for the most part he's right on the money. Each major topic is placed within the cultural and historical framework of our times. For example, Jenkins examines the religious "end times" fever of our age in the context of nuclear terror. He shows how specific threats are turned into "facts," through the psychological process of reification. He even explains the use of threatening language in Arab culture, based on linguistic and psychiatric studies.

So what is his conclusion? Are we destined for an act of nuclear terrorism on U.S. soil?

Jenkins seems to think it's possible, but rather unlikely, particularly in terms of an actual nuclear fission explosion (nuclear bomb). Launching such an attack would involve three very difficult steps:

1. Acquiring enriched uranium or plutonium in sufficient quantity.
2. Assembling and maintaining such a weapon.
3. Delivering it to a U.S. target without being detected.

The first two steps seem to be the most difficult. Who knew, for example, that small nuclear weapons become inoperable in about 6 months because of cracks in the core material? They're harder to maintain than an old piano.

It's far more likely, says Jenkins, that terrorists will use a radiological "dirty bomb" on U.S. soil. Such a device uses traditional explosives to disperse radioactive materials across a large area. The ensuing loss of life is much smaller, but the terror it could cause is potentially enormous.

So what can we do to prevent nuclear terrorism? Plenty, says Jenkins. He outlines a long list of specific actions that civilized nations can take to reduce the likelihood of an actual nuclear attack. Most importantly, Jenkins ads, we must base our plans and decisions on actual facts -- not sensationalistic rhetoric.

If you have any interest at all in this topic, I urge you to read this important book and then pass it along to others -- especially your Congressional representatives and elected officials.

Mr. Jenkins has written a very interesting book for people knowledgeable of terrorists and terrorism. What he has also done, and done very well, is to open a window into the rationale, gaming, and assumptions used by the experts engaged in protecting us from a terrorist nuclear attack. Something which I found to be fascinating. I especially enjoyed the chapter dealing with "red mercury", which has to be one of the world's greatest scams.

For the uninitiated, this book presents an overwhelming amount of extraneous information--extraneous to the question posed in the context of the 21st century. For those who want to learn about the evolution of counter terrorism thinking, this book is for you. Jenkins begins in the 1970s, and using his personal experiences as the path, brings the reader to 2008.

After completing WILL TERRORISTS GO NUCLEAR? my first thought was, how did they all miss the obvious? Jenkins unwittingly provided the answer when he mentioned "elegant design." Let me explain by creating a scenario. You have entered a strange building seeking to acquire the design for a nuclear device. Exiting the stairwell, you proceed down a short hall that dead ends into a long, dark corridor stretching to the left and right. A sign with arrows pointing in both directions provides a clue. The left arrow says Implosion Design, and the right arrow says Gun-type Design. Which type do you steal? Should you steal: (a) the implosion designs; (b) the gun-type designs; or (c) both?

The nuclear weapons scientists cited by Mr. Jenkins have a blind spot. They think about what they know best: very complex implosion nuclear devices. Using the above scenario, all the experts appear to have chosen option (a), and concentrated their scenarios and simulations on terrorists acquiring or fabricating an implosion atomic device--a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. No one appears to have investigated option (b), gun-type nuclear devices.

Allow me to digress for a moment. Having a Ph.D. in nuclear physics does not make one knowledgeable of nuclear weapons. I shared the stage with a nuclear physicist last year at a terrorism conference in Dallas. My topic was nuclear weapons for terrorists. His topic was radiation effects on the human body. Afterward, the physicist told me that I had opened his eyes to the magnitude of the danger; and he now understood how terrorists could attack us with a simple nuclear device. Most readers do not have a Ph.D. in nuclear physics, so explanations must be kept simple.

Plutonium is a dangerous material to handle and is not a suitable terrorist's fissile material for several reasons: it is easier to fission (not the proper technical description but it gives the reader the general idea); it has five phases (solid, solid, solid [which means it changes dimensions and density], liquid, and gas); it emits slightly more radiation (easier to detect); and it is poisonous. Terrorists attempting to make a plutonium device would probably, inadvertently, assemble a critical mass (the equivalent of an operating nuclear reactor), thus creating the equivalent of a reactor accident--a melt down. Another reason is that building an implosion device is beyond the capability of terrorists. Even if you know how to design an implosion explosive lens system, doing so in secret would be a formidable challenge. Without testing, the probability of success would be near zero. Not so if one is building a gun-type device with U-235. The gun-type bomb dropped on Hiroshima, the Little Boy, was not tested. And, U-235 does not present a physical danger to a person handling the components, as long as the components are separated.

Weapons grade highly enriched uranium, U-235 enriched to 90%+ is the ideal terrorist fissile material, and a gun-type device is the ideal terrorist nuclear device. If terrorists acquire, or are given, the fissile components for a gun-type bomb (a projectile or rod, and several washers or rings that form the hollow cylinder) all they need is a small cannon barrel with its breech, at least one fixed round of ammunition, and a neutron source. There is no shortage of such guns in the Middle East. In the 1950s and early 1960s polonium-210 was used as one component of nuclear weapon's neutron source (sometimes called the nuclear trigger), and the small packet of Po-210 had to be replaced every six to nine months. The fissile material does not have to be replaced, because it does not have a very short shelf life as stated on page 174.

Mr. Jenkins does not answer the question posed by his book's title, even though Chapter 19 has a section titled "WHAT CAN BE DONE?" A good analysis of a question with no apparent answer. Perhaps the answer is nothing--until we lose a city or cities.

Mr. Jenkins, like almost all authors of fiction and nonfiction, who tackle the question of how a terrorist could obtain or fabricate a simple nuclear weapon, suffers from a lack of detailed understanding of how nuclear and thermonuclear weapons work. I found only one reference to gun-type nuclear bombs. On page 44, "Young postdocs in the Livermore experiment chose to design a plutonium device because, `designing a mere gun bomb would have been "a pretty crummy showing" while designing a plutonium implosion bomb would have been a "career-enhancing move." ' " Of course the postdocs would go for an elegant design. Terrorists, however, are not postdocs at Livermore, Los Alamos, or Sandia, and they will go for a simple gun-type device they can understand and assemble.

Chapter 15 titled IS DETERRENCE DEAD confirms my fear that our scientists and analysts are concentrating on implosion nuclear devices. Implosion nuclear bombs, in most cases, use plutonium as their fuel. Jenkins cites Dr. Schelling (page 287-8), "Any organization that gets enough fissile material to make a bomb will require highly qualified scientists, technologists, machinists, working in seclusion . . . for months . . ." Not true if they are building a gun-type bomb with U-235 components provided by their sponsor. We are ignoring the simple, basic, gun-type bomb that was used to destroy Hiroshima, Japan--the terrorists nuclear device of choice.

Mr. Jenkins' information on SADMs is correct. Suitcase nukes are a type of SADM, weapons blown out of proportion by authors and the media. The yield of a man portable nuclear device from the 1960s and 1970s will be low sub-kiloton range. Chapter 14 is devoted to terrorist purchased nuclear weapons--tactical, and suitcase (SADM). Tactical nuclear weapons have complex fuzing, designed to prevent premature detonations. The fuze must receive positive signals that a series of events have occured in sequence before the fuze can arm. For example, a missile fuze must verify: acceleration, an altitude above a set number (the missile has passed through a set altitude on its way up), deceleration (reentry), pass through a set altitude on the way down, etc. Converting a tactical warhead to a demolition device, a bomb placed by a terrorist, is not easy.

SADM fuzes do not have any physical events to measure, so al-Qaida or other terrorists can set one off if they have one. So why haven't they? One reason may be the neutron source--Po-210. Po-210 has a half-life of 138 days, which means the small packet of polonium must be replaced on a regular basis, and Po-210 is manmade in a nuclear reactor. Remember Litvenenko? [...]

Mr. Jenkins concentrates his analysis on al-Qaeda, followed by Hezbollah and other Islamic terrorists groups. While they may be the implementers of a nuclear attack, I submit that Iran will be the probable facilitator. Iran is capable of producing weapons grade U-235, providing U-235 components for a gun-type device, producing and providing Po-210, and providing instructions on how to make and/or use a basic gun-type atomic device. Should Pakistan fall to the extremists, then the danger escalates to a regional nuclear war, as Jenkins discusses in Chapter 17.

A gun-type device can disassembled, brought to the detonation location, and then reassembled. An implosion bomb can't. Detecting the U-235 components is very, very, difficult. Oppie (J. Robert Oppenheimer) was correct, as he usually was, when he said (page 173), "The only useful technology would be a screwdriver." Portable neutron detectors, which Oppie didn't have, will find both types of fissile materials, but we do not have enough of them deployed.

I take exception to Mr. Jenkins' conclusion, stated on page 143, that the record of state sponsorship of terrorists lends little support to this [providing a nuclear device or the materials to build one] thesis. Islamic fanatics are not rational, at least not from our perspective. Iran created, funds, trains, and controls Hezbollah. Hezbollah blew up our embassy and the Marine barracks in Lebanon, their first acts of terrorism. How can one doubt that Iran is not capable of providing Hezbollah a nuclear device, or the components to make one, to a terrorist group?

Jenkins nails the deterrence problem in the first sentence of Chapter 15 with a quote from Admiral Mies, "How do you deter or dissuade someone whose reward is in the `afterlife?' " An unknown [to me] Israeli diplomat said much the same, "How do you negotiate with people who take their orders from God? A high ranking Iranian Mullah has said he [meaning Iran] would be willing to trade one Iranian city for one Israeli city.

Chapter 16 discusses statistical risk assessments. Such assessments are based upon assumptions. If the assumptions are wrong, then the assessment has no value. Much the same can be said about public opinion. If the public does not have real facts, how can they assess the risk? The expert that most amused me was Martha Stout (pp 310-11) who argues that the trauma of 9/11 overwhelmed our brain's capacity to process information . . . . Unfortunately, just the opposite is true--we have forgotten the lesson of 9/11. Certainly al-Qaeda blusters about an American Hiroshima, but that doesn't mean they aren't trying to create one.

Jenkins includes a discussion of America's reaction to a nuclear attack. Would we react as we did when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor? Or will we react as we did after 9/11? The answer will only be found after the fact, but I will place my bet on the Pearl Harbor reaction.

Mr. Jenkins' book contains one glaring omission: Islam's fanatical components who believe it is their religious duty to convert the world to Islam. The ideology of these components, driven by religions zeal, and believing that dying doing God's work is a direct pass to Paradise, is missing from the expert's scenarios. An omission that cast doubt on all of their simulations and scenarios. Iran's leaders and the majority of Iran's population are Twelvers: Shia who believe a catastrophic war in which Islam is losing will cause the 12th Imam, the Mahdi, to return and lead Islam to victory over the world.

Chapters 17 is a fictional account of a terrorist nuclear attack. Jenkins' fictional president and his advisors struggle to cope with the attack. The scenario depicts confusion and disagreement among the advisors: something that probably would happen with our current president. What I believe is required in such a situation is a Commander-in-Chief who issues orders, demonstrates he is in charge, and knows what to do. Calling up the reserves can come later. What should be done is: set DEFCON 2 worldwide; order the detainment of all known and suspected terrorists; seal all border crossings and ports of entry and exit; and mobilize forces to treat the refugees and causalities. Next, the president should make a national announcement and tell the people around the detonation point what to do. Retribution can wait until more details are known, then an example should be made.

Chapter 18 is a summary and analysis of the scenario presented in Chapter 17. Buried in this chapter is the author's statement that makes my case, and should chill the blood of all readers, "None of the simulations of nuclear terrorism I know about have addressed an attack of unknown origin, nor is there any firm policy for dealing with such an event." If a city disappears under a mushroom cloud, who do we hold responsible? If Mr. Jenkins is correct, we have no plans to deal with the most obvious threat.

The final chapter, Chapter 19 COUNTERING OUR OWN FEAR, starts with a quote from Ted Taylor, "You have to make the risks credible, or people will find ways not to believe you." Well said. Unfortunately, too many of our leaders don't appear to believe the threat is credible. Further into the chapter Jenkins asks, "What is to be done?" I do not agree with much of the answer. Our stockpile of nuclear warheads is the best deterrent to all but religious fanatics. Removing highly enriched uranium from unguarded reactors may help, but few reactors have weapons grade uranium. And, even if weapons grade uranium is obtained, it must be formed into components of a bomb. Not an easy thing to do.

Once highly motivated, intelligent, terrorists obtain a functional nuclear device, it will be almost impossible to prevent them from getting the device into the U.S. Political correctness is the main obstacle to security. Freedom versus security is a problem that vexes us, and has no ready answer. Preventing terrorist from obtaining fissile material for a nuclear device is the best answer. Short of an act of war, how do we prevent Iran from being the supplier? Iran's leaders are Twelvers, thus mutually assured destruction appears to have no meaning to them.

So, in my opinion the answer to Mr. Jenkins' title's question is: Yes. Terrorists can build and then detonate a simple nuclear device in the U.S. This alone is sufficient reason to shut down Iran's nuclear program. At the risk of being accused of self promotion, my two novels tell a realistic, and technically accurate, story of one way we can be attacked, and what the results could be. My stories provide the readers a basic understanding of nuclear weapons, providing enough information so that they can realistically evaluate the threat. I think Ted Taylor would approve.

Government officials trying to cope with terrorism's nagging complexity often resort to hiring consultants to soothe their concerns and help them find policies to thwart terrorism while not overreacting. Given the current state of America, terrorism experts like Brian Jenkins have a vital role in helping protect America. But experts can only help to a certain extent -- they're like a crutch, not a cure, because they can't prevent terrorism like citizens can.

This book is an advertisement for Brian Jenkins, terrorism expert. Like any cautious consultant, he wants it both ways: he wants to reassure a fearful public that nuclear terrorism is less likely than they think; but if nuclear terrorism happens, he doesn't want to be blamed for making a poor prediction. The result is a confused advertisement for his professional services. Will terrorists go nuclear? Jenkins won't say. And his failure to take a stand undercuts his argument that Al Qaeda has scared us into believing that it's a nuclear power -- if terrorists nuke Manhattan, then our worries will have been correct. However, if we're over-reacting to a non-existent threat of smuggled nuclear bombs, then a title like "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" ratchets up fear without purpose.

The real audience of this book is not the public but government officials who might hire Mr. Jenkins as well as media gate-keepers seeking a talking head after terrorism erupts. So Mr. Jenkins must appear knowledgeable to these two audiences. Perhaps this is why there are graphs typically found in introductory economics textbooks? There's a dubious reality TV skit tacked on near the end in which the reader is supposed to play president after a city has been nuked. A nuked Manhattan is "game over" (according to military strategists like Graham Allison) so why is this skit in there? An editor should have nuked the skit.

Jenkins, like most people, assume terrorism is only a problem for police, government, military. But I think the problem of terrorism can only be handled by participation from citizens. We're the ones who suffer when it happens. And citizens working together can solve it. We have a power government lacks because we can change the framework in which law enforcement operates. And while experts like Jenkins have a constructive role, as citizens we must think for ourselves.

Cynical readers opposed to substantive reform can read this book for more understanding of the dynamics of nuclear terrorism from an expert's perspective. And this book is helpful in this regard. Mr. Jenkins is one of the good guys helping thwart serious terrorism and deserves our sincere appreciation for his efforts. But I urge readers to own the problem of terrorism and to think through the problem for themselves.

Thomas W. Sulcer
author of "The Second Constitution of the United States"
(free on web -- google title above + sulcer)

For several presidential elections the candidates have all said the greatest danger facing America is nuclear terrorism. Even now. But somehow, it isn't part of the discussion, perhaps because they don't know how to talk about it. This book by Brian Jenkins is not only comprehendive, compelling, and a great read, it provides a realistic analysis of the history of nuclear terror and nuclear terrosim, pointing out that the latter -- the threat of a nuclear attack -- has all terrorists have ever been able to accomplish. That threat, however, has a higher probability of doing danger to our values, our commitment to civil liberty, and all the important things America stands for in the world than the risk of an attack.

Jenkins, who is an acknowledged expert in the field, provides a chapter that is as compelling as an episode of "24," running the scenario of what you would do if you were president and "A Brilliant Yellow Light" was seen over New York City.

The book is a must for anyone seriously concerned about the danger of a nuclear attack, or the danger to our civil liberties of living in ignorance and fear. It should be part of the presidential debate, but won't be unless someone asks the candidates directly what they think.

I bought this book after seeing Brain Jenkins in one of his many television interviews. I usually like what he has to say, and this book was cited on the program.

The book has very little new information in it. Jenkins just rehashes the obvious throughout. I suppose someone that lived under a rock for the past 20 years might find Will_Terrorists_Go_Nuclear? interesting.

Jenkins doubts there is a immediate threat of a hidden nuclear device in the US. They are too hard to make, too hard to maintain, too hard to make small and maintain. The nuclear threat from terrorists is just rhetoric, causing a pervasive, underlining panic in every American's life. That's about it for the book. It's a tedious read.

He does discuss red mercury, which is why I didn't give it one star.

As usual for Brian Jenkins, this is a thorough book based upon Jenkins' more than 30 years of terrorism research. This particular book is a detailed dissection of the facts and beliefs involved in the discussion of the risk of nuclear terrorism. Martin - writing a textbook on Homeland Security Law.

Will terrorists go nuclear? That is the essential questioned posed by counterterrorism expert Brian Jenkins in a book of the same title.

Jenkins has written a sobering and critical analysis of this question that spans over his decades of research on the topic. In fact, the book shares the title of a research paper Jenkins wrote over 30 years ago and it is that essay he uses as the entrance point for his observations. The issue of nuclear terrorism is one that has haunted policy makers, enriched movie producers, and fevered American apprehension for 30 years and the strength of Jenkins book is his categorical and tempered analysis of how each of these complex areas play into the nuclear terrorism debate.

Playing the role of mythbuster, Jenkins dives deep to determine the seeding point for a large number of nuclear terrorism memes that have propagated over the past decade. Upon examination, Jenkins finds that some of the memes are just that, organic ideas that developed a life of their own or had strategic sponsorship by individuals who were in a position to benefit from the propagation of the meme. Readers should draw some comfort from the thoughtful analysis and debunking of some of our most terrifying concerns.

In his analysis of terrorist motives, operational concepts and evolution Jenkins dissects the core issues in a way that few terrorism analysts can. This book will speak not only to his peers, but is very accessible to the general audience and it is this audience that Jenkins seems obligated to inform with this book.

That assumption brings us to the final and most essential element of the book, which is Jenkins' differentiation between "nuclear terrorism" and "nuclear terror". Nuclear terrorism is the threat that must be addressed by Western democracies through sound counterterrorism and non-proliferation policies. Nuclear terror is the state of perpetual societal fear that is exploited to erode civil liberties and generate apprehension within democracies. Of course, the fundamental question is how much apprehension can we cope with before the fundamental components of our society become unrecognizable.

Jenkins book is a highly recommended read for anyone interested in this essential subject and should be required reading for consumers of popular culture (the TV show 24, for example) that propagate the nuclear terrorism meme, or anyone who finds the concept of nuclear terrorism "terrifying".

British intelligence reports al Qaeda is planning a large-scale nuclear attack - but are they capable of such? Author Brian Michael Jenkins is one of the world's foremost experts on terrorism, has been advising governments on the escalation of terrorist activity around the world, and here analyzes what terrorists care capable of in the nuclear arena. From political to psychological impact, this offers a reasoned analysis based on known facts and will prove key to any military library.