The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy [Paperback]

Russell F. Weigley (Author)

Book Description

Release date: January 22, 1960 | ISBN-10: 025328029X | ISBN-13: 978-0253280299 | Edition: Indiana University Press paperback ed

"... a strong and stimulating book. It has no rival in either scope or quality. For libraries, history buffs, and armchair warriors, it is a must. For political science students, career diplomats, and officers in the armed services, its reading should be required." —History

"A particularly timely account." —Kansas City Times

"It reads easily but is not a popularized history... nor does the book become a history of battles.... Weigley’s analyses and interpretations are searching, competent, and useful." —Perspective

Product Details

• Paperback: 608 pages
• Publisher: Indiana University Press; Indiana University Press paperback ed edition (January 22, 1960)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 025328029X
• ISBN-13: 978-0253280299
• Product Dimensions: 6 x 1.6 x 9.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (21 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #253,862 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

40 of 43 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars How a superpower formed its military world-view March 28, 2002

By Toby Joyce

Format:Paperback

This is an excellent work on the development of American military strategy over the years. It will serve both as a standard work of reference, and an excellent read in its own right.

The book is at its best on the early Republic and the era from the Civil War to WWI. Later chapters are slightly weaker, possibly becase there is a plethora of books on the run-up to WWII, the conflict itself and its aftermath.

What is fascinating is watching the evolution of a nation deeply suspicious of a standing army (something inherited both from the British tradition, and from the experience of the Revolution), and looking for quick and easy solutions ro defend its seaborne commerce. In fact, Thomas Jefferson bleieved in strong coastal defences, and small ships equipped to defend ports. This was a disastrous strategy which misfired in the War of 1812. The British showed that command of the sea was command of the coast -such an invader could pick his spot for a landing, and proceed.
The North itself used this strategy in the Civil War.

For many years, Indian fighting was the main occupation of the army, usually supplemented by local volunteers. However, the foundation of West Point led to a significant improvement in that a cadre of trained officers were now available. In the Civil War, most of the high command (and one of the Presidents) were West-Point trained, and performed well (with exceptions) as tacticians and strategists compared with European contemporaries.

In Weigley's view (and I disagree with him slightly) Grant and Sherman emerge as the two best military strategists of the Civil War period. My only cavil is that he possibly is too hard on Grant, crediting him with a mistaken emphasis on mass and concentration that led to the bloody battles in Virginia (1864 - Wilderness, Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor) which bled the Confederates white but also severely mauled Grant's own army.

True, Sherman had an instinctive grasp of the turning movement and the destruction of enemy resources as a strategy of attrition. But he learned this from Grant, and Grant's own aberrant attacking mode lasted only three months, thereafter he also went back to turning movements. In fact, his crossing of the James after Cold Harbor was probably the boldest and most effective stroke of the war (better even than Vicksburg) but went unrewarded due to poor execution by his subordinates. Some of this was Grant's as his senior generals were exhausted after three month's hard fighting, but one wonders what would have happened if Phil Sheridan had been in command of the lead corps and taken Petersburg in July 1864. Richmond would surely have fallen, leaving the Confederacy facing into a bleak winter without Atlanta or Richmond.

Weigley rightly traces the influcence of Grant in the approach of the Americans to WWII strategy and defends Eisenhower against the charge that he had backed away from this strategy rather than give the British the lead role in the advance on Germany.

The naval counterpart to Grant was Alfred Thayer Mahan, and one of the best chapters in the book is the description of Mahan's influence on naval Pacific strategy before and during WWII.

I am now reaching the end of the book, and it badly needs a revision to take account of post-Cold War events. Hopefully, Weigley might do this - after the Gulf War and Sept 11, there would be a ready market for such a work.

Weigley is a great writer on military history - his 'Age of Battles' is about Pre-napoleonic warfare, and is possibly a better book this one. I recommedn both books.

22 of 23 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Heck, I Would Read This Book for Fun! December 10, 2002

By B. J Wilson

Format:Paperback

There is nothing more boring than a badly written book of military history, especially when it is required reading. I have plowed through several in command & staff college, and this one is a delight. It is easy to read without being simple. I actually enjoyed the reading. After chapters of Clausewitz and Jomini and more battle diagrams than is humane, I got to this book. What a relief! Heck, I would read this book just for fun!

I have never enjoyed reading an academic war history, before. I will probably give copies of this book to selected friends. It is on my "top ten of the genre" list. Americana at its best.

18 of 19 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars The evolution of the American military December 12, 2003

By bixodoido

Format:Paperback

This book is essentially an exploration of the way America has conducted war, from the Revolutionary War to Vietnam. Weigley attempts to show the development of American military thought, from hit-and-run tactics of the Revolution to global policing and the containment of communism in the mid twentieth-century. Throughout it all Weigley focuses on key figures--Washington, Grant, a couple of Marshalls and a couple of Mahans, among others--who played important roles in the way the military thought and acted.
Overall, this is a very fascinating study. Weigley's knowledge of the subject is commendable. It is a bit unfortunate that about 2/3 of the book is devoted to the twentieth-century, and that there is only a very sparse chapter on the Indian Wars, but it is understandable considering the tremendous expansion of the military in the 1900s. Sometimes Weigley's writing style is a bit difficult to follow--I found myself rereading sentences quite often--but overall the book is well enough written. This is a great book not just for military history buffs but for anyone who enjoys history in general.