Hooman's access to the inner circle of the regime provides what many crave; what do the key players really think in private? His analysis is what is needed in this belligerent climate of uncertainty and ambiguity. But I don't agree with some of his analysis.
He fails to mention, and he may not be aware of this, that despite the "devotion" of many key players to the Islamic regime, after the crimes committed in the aftermath of election of 2009, many of these very people involved with the '79 revolution and spent time in Shah's prisons, in private, also stated that the revolution put the country on the wrong path. One former very high ranking and inner circle official said, in private, that "they should have made a deal with the Shah to prevent Khomeini from returning to Iran." Many high level officials, including one of my closest relatives who for years had a photo of Ayatollah Khomeini in his private library, have since removed the photos from private homes or any reminder of the revolution. So, perhaps, Hooman's analysis of the devotion of people or the officials to this revolution or regime is not as solid as he states it.
But the missing key in his analysis is China. I completely disagree that the revolution in general, and this regime in particular, brought independence to Iran. Instead of being the devoted proxy of the West under the Shah, Iran has become the lackey and the slave of the Chinese. One hears the disgust with the Chinese everywhere in Iran, in taxis, in bazzars, and at homes.
The agricultural sector has been destroyed due to favorable tariffs given to the Chinese products. Garlic, eggs, and most of fruits in the markets come from China. While subsidies have been removed from the industrial sector in Iran, iron bars from China pay no tariffs, which makes them cheaper than the bars produced in Iran. Many iron factories have shut down with the resulting unemployment. Iranian TV is flooded with Chinese produced serials, heavily edited, with multiple documentaries praising the Chinese culture. Amazingly, the uprising of the Uighurs's Muslims in China last year was completely ignored by the Iranian press and the supreme leader. It seems, according to Iranians, the Chinese can do no wrong. Hooman's lack of coverage of the importance of the Chinese in Iranian politics and economy is the main weakness of this book.
I think Hooman makes a mistake by thinking that the Ayatollahs are the masters of their own fate. This government will not likely have stayed in power had it not been for the Iran-Iraq war 30 years ago. Although I think in case of a foreign invasion or military attack people will rally to protect Iran's border, the Ayatollah's would make a mistake by thinking that Iranians will once again sacrifice their children to support them or this regime. The seed of destruction of this theocracy will not come from the US or Israel, but from the inside, from its own people, its own youth, its economy and lack of opportunity. What will destroy it,as it did the Roman,the Greek, and the Persian empires is hubris.
This book is a must read for all interested in Iran and Iranian politics.