Anthony Giddens is a world famous theoretical sociologist. This book is an outline of his mature thought, which he terms structuration theory. Giddens is intelligent, thoughtful, and does not confuse social analysis with social pleading. He is typical, though, of the modern sociological `guru' in developing a theory that (a) stands alone rather than building on and complementing previous sociological theories; (b) embraces inductive, high-level interpretive generalizing about contemporary society with no analytical or microsocial foundations; (c) ignores all the other behavioral sciences, including biology, economics, anthropology, and political science; and hence (d) presupposes that one can understand modern human society without the slightest knowledge of premodern social formations and non-human societies.
Human society is a complex dynamical system, and as such cannot be fully or deeply understood in terms of purely analytical models with axiomatic mathematical bases. It is for this reason that broad, synthetic investigations into human society are absolutely indispensable for fully understanding its structure and dynamics. In the hands of some Sociological Guru types, this stance leads to interesting sociopolitical commentary that is about as close to science as it is to humanist studies, but in the hands of a Freud, a Foucault, or a Habermas offers insights and dimensions of thought inaccessible in traditional behavioral science models. Giddens is of a different sort. He does not have any earth shattering insights to offer, but rather synthesizes the incompatible insights of other Sociological Gurus into a harmonious blend of fundamental compromises.
In particular, he takes the two major strands of Marxism, nomological and structural on the one hand, and praxeological and action-oriented on the other, and blends them into a reasonable system in which, following the Karl Marx of the Eighteenth Brumaire, "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language." I will not go through the basic argument, which is spottily developed and merely alluded to in the book, but it is a strong argument. Basically, there is a social structure that coordinates the activities of individuals and determines the macrosocial rules of distribution, allocation, and system evolution (the nomological) and there is the active, reflexive, conscious individual and the resulting network of minds that acts to staff and reproduce the structure, as well as to transform the rules of the game (the praxiological).
This of course is tremendously interesting, but nothing new. Moreover, Giddens routinely falls in the Continental Ruse of criticizing a theory he does not like by using tons of big words that at first appear impenetrable, but upon investigation turn out to be trivial. Here is his critique of the rational actor model of economic and decision theory: "This approach can draw only sparingly upon the analytical philosophy of action, as `action' is ordinarily portrayed by most contemporary Anglo-American writers. `Action' is not a combination of `acts': `acts' are constituted only by a discursive movement of attention to the durée of lived-through experience. Nor can `action' be discussed in separation from the body, its mediations with the surrounding world and the coherence of an acting self. What I call a stratification model of the acting self involves treating the reflective monitoring, rationalizing and motivation of action as embedded sets of processes." (p. 3) Now, I have nothing against the discursive movement of attention, but that hardly justifies abandoning the analytical models that have been so successful in economics, decision theory, and other parts of the behavioral sciences.
The simple fact is that Giddens and the other Sociological Guru simply take human society as given and philosophize on a few far-flung aspects of modern society as though they could be understood without any fundamental understanding of the basic forces that foster the coherence of society and the nature of the forces that impel social change. For these aspects of social theory we need gene-culture coevolution as developed in biology and anthropology, a strong understanding of the varieties of sociality as developed in sociobiology and behavioral ecology, a psychological theory based on modern cognitive science and neuroscience and not the speculations of century-old psychoanalysts.
Theoretically, modern sociology is dead. But like the phoenix, it has the capacity to rise from its ashes, born anew, and wrapped in its many insights from its illustrious past. For now, read this book and weep.