A great deal has been written on the subject of human consciousness. Historically philosophers have debated the question from almost every conceivable perspective. Many philosophers still today refer to issues of consciousness and free will as `the hard problem.' In recent years though more and more substantive and weighty work has been written that supports the growing evidence: "Consciousness is a biological phenomenon. The concept of a dualistic, spiritual, separate plane of reality is a myth." The most successful work on the problem in my own view has been coming from the field of neurology and not from contemporary philosophy (although I do enjoy Dennett's books on the subject). Torey's book, The Crucible of Consciousness, falls into this progressive category alongside the work of scientists such as Damasio and Le Doux.
In this intense and well researched book Torey presents a unique and testable theory of consciousness. His thesis is that consciousness originates in the asymmetry between the right and left hemispheres of the human brain, which is the result of language acquisition. This theory is both interesting and plausible and should help to guide further research. At the same time, as one would expect, it raises a number of observations and questions. Perhaps mentioning just a few here will offer some insight into the challenges that the book raises. First and foremost Torey suggests that language is essential to consciousness. He therefore draws a distinction between animal awareness and conscious thought, but also between problem solving or even primitive tool use and reflective thinking. In some degree this view is consistent with scientific consensus, but not entirely so. Second, the acquisition of language by children and the process termed cross-lateralization of the brain by psycholinguists (which takes place during puberty) afford opportunities to test Torey's theory. He includes a chapter on child acquisition of language but not on cross lateralization. According to Torey language evolution began with a protolanguage of a few nouns and verbs. However, consciousness requires the full package of language with qualifying words, abstract concepts and syntax in order to complete the structural asymmetry characteristic of human brains. As he explains the secondary evolution of language, though, it appears as a rather simple, almost automatic response. Yet archaeology suggests that the process took thousands of years (perhaps more than a million).
There is one further area of interest that I feel is worth mentioning. Torey details a critique of those champions of artificial intelligence who wish to draw parallels between AI and human consciousness. Personally I side with Torey on this matter and not with Dennett (who has written a brief introduction for the book). As I describe in The Bridge, human thinking and computer operations are qualitatively different. A `conscious computer' would need to reconcile a rather large gap. For computers to demonstrate consciousness would require a link between computing and a sense of self awareness. The computer would also need to acquire an instinct for survival and a capacity for thought via metaphor. Humans acquired these characteristics through millions of years of evolution. While I wouldn't rule out the possibility of AI, it remains clear to me that these three characteristics are essential ingredients. And enhancing computers with these traits seems still to present quite a challenge.
Although the author says at the outset that most of the book is accessible to the general reader, the text throughout is demanding. It is however richly rewarding and well worth the effort. I might quibble with some details, such as Torey's use of the term `instinctual' in discussing animal behaviour, but no comments would detract from the book's unique perspective and valuable insights.
David Hillstrom
Author