The Dictator's Handbook and over one million other books are available for Amazon Kindle. Learn more



or
Sign in to turn on 1-Click ordering
Sell Us Your Item
For a $1.00 Gift Card
Trade in
More Buying Choices
Have one to sell? Sell yours here
Start reading The Dictator's Handbook on your Kindle in under a minute.

Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App.
Sorry, this item is not available in
Image not available for
Color:
Image not available

To view this video download Flash Player

 

The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics [Hardcover]

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita , Alastair Smith
4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (48 customer reviews)

List Price: $27.99
Price: $18.84 & FREE Shipping on orders over $25. Details
You Save: $9.15 (33%)
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
Only 3 left in stock (more on the way).
Ships from and sold by Amazon.com. Gift-wrap available.
Want it Tuesday, May 21? Choose One-Day Shipping at checkout. Details

Formats

Amazon Price New from Used from
Kindle Edition $9.89  
Hardcover $18.84  
Paperback $13.45  
Audio, CD, Audiobook, MP3 Audio, Unabridged $27.48  
Audible Audio Edition, Unabridged $29.95 or Free with Audible 30-day free trial
Image
Save on Popular Books This Summer
Browse our Bookshelf Favorites store for big savings on popular fiction, nonfiction, children's books, and more.

Book Description

September 27, 2011
For eighteen years, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith have been part of a team revolutionizing the study of politics by turning conventional wisdom on its head. They start from a single assertion: Leaders do whatever keeps them in power. They don’t care about the “national interest”—or even their subjects—unless they have to.

This clever and accessible book shows that the difference between tyrants and democrats is just a convenient fiction. Governments do not differ in kind but only in the number of essential supporters, or backs that need scratching. The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with, and the quality of life or misery under them. The picture the authors paint is not pretty. But it just may be the truth, which is a good starting point for anyone seeking to improve human governance.


Frequently Bought Together

The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics + The Predictioneer's Game: Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future + The Logic of Political Survival
Price for all three: $52.38

Buy the selected items together


Editorial Reviews

Review

Enlightenment Economics, July 14, 2011
“Machiavelli’s The Prince has a new rival. It’s THE DICTATOR’S HANDBOOK by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith.… This is a fantastically thought-provoking read. I found myself not wanting to agree but actually, for the most part, being convinced that the cynical analysis is the true one.”

R. James Woolsey Director of Central Intelligence, 1993-1995, and Chairman, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, July, 2011
"In this fascinating book Bueno de Mesquita and Smith spin out their view of governance: that all successful leaders, dictators and democrats, can best be understood as almost entirely driven by their own political survival—a view they characterize as 'cynical, but we fear accurate.'  Yet as we follow the authors through their brilliant historical assessments of leaders' choices—from Caesar to Tammany Hall and the Green Bay Packers—we gradually realize that their brand of cynicism yields extremely realistic guidance about spreading the rule of law, decent government, and democracy.  James Madison would have loved this book."
 
Roger Myerson, Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, July, 2011
"In this book, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith teach us to see dictatorship as just another form of politics, and from this perspective they deepen our understanding of all political systems."
 
Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2011
“A lucidly written, shrewdly argued meditation on how democrats and dictators preserve political authority…. In a style reminiscent of Freakonomics, Messrs. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith present dozens of clever examples… The most fascinating chapter in The Dictator's Handbook concerns the rewards that governments provide other governments. The authors make the obvious, but nevertheless controversial, argument that almost all aid money is dispersed not to alleviate poverty but to purchase loyalty and influence…. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith are polymathic, drawing on economics, history and political science to make their points…. In other words, the reader will be hard-pressed to find a single government that doesn't largely operate according to Messrs. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's model. So the next time a hand-wringing politician, Democrat or Republican, claims to be taking a position for the ‘good of his country,’ remember to replace the word ‘country’ with ‘career.’”
 
Macleans
“In a brutally forthright work, the authors distill the process by which politicians gain and retain power.”

About the Author

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is the Julius Silver Professor of Politics and director of the Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy at New York University. He is the author of 16 books, including The Predictioneer’s Game.
 
Alastair Smith is professor of politics at New York University. The recipient of three grants from the National Science Foundation and author of three books, he was chosen as the 2005 Karl Deutsch Award winner, given biennially to the best international relations scholar under the age of 40.

Product Details

  • Hardcover: 352 pages
  • Publisher: PublicAffairs (September 27, 2011)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 161039044X
  • ISBN-13: 978-1610390446
  • Product Dimensions: 6.1 x 1.4 x 9.2 inches
  • Shipping Weight: 1.2 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
  • Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (48 customer reviews)
  • Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #58,549 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

More About the Author

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is Professor of Politics at New York University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews
64 of 73 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Advice to Dictators: Take Care of Your Coalition Above All September 24, 2011
Format:Hardcover
Robert Rizzo -- nicknamed "Ratzo Rizzo" by L.A. Times Columnist Steve Lopez -- is featured prominently in a new book that rivals Machiavelli's famous "The Prince" in its scope, while being much more relevant to the 21st Century. Written by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith "The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is Almost Always Good Politics" (PublicAffairs, 352 pages, $27.99) is a good introduction to an academic discipline I'd never heard of, selectorate theory.

Rizzo, the former city manager of Bell, California, a small community south of Los Angeles, stayed in power because he had the support of the city council, which was effectively elected by 473 voters (out of 2,235 who actually voted). The 473 constituted the essential electorate.

The other two legs of this political tripod are the nominal selectorate -- everybody eligible to vote -- and the real selectorate. In the former Soviet Union, the real selectorate -- the winning coalition-- consisted of a few members of the Communist Party who chose the candidates (some would say this has been revived under the regime of Vladimir Putin, who has the power to reject potential candidates for office).

For eighteen years, the authors have been part of a team revolutionizing the study of politics by turning conventional wisdom on its head. They start from a single assertion: Leaders do whatever keeps them in power. They don't care about the "national interest"--or even their subjects--unless they have to.

Selectorate theory posits that the difference between tyrants and democrats is that there is no difference. Governments don't differ in kind but only in the number of essential supporters, or backs that need scratching. The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with, and the quality of life or misery under them. The picture the authors paint is not pretty. But it just may be the truth, which is a good starting point for anyone seeking to improve human governance.

Selectorate theory applies to Wall Street, too, where the authors (Pages 148-149 ff) describe how small coalitions are in play: "The best way to organize a business is exactly the same as the best way to organize a government: rely on a small group of essentials..."

This applies to business in general, as the recent dumping of the CEO of HP, Leo Apotheker, who walked away with a platinum parachute of more than $25 million after 11 months on the job and was replaced by billionaire Meg Whitman, formerly of CEO of eBay and a former Republican candidate for governor of California.

Rizzo was in power for 17 years, starting at $72,000 a year in 1993 and ending up in the summer of 2010 with the munificent salary of $787,000 a year in a poor, mostly Latino city. No parachute for him, he's being investigated for corruption. Rizzo and his assistant spent seven years conspiring to illegally boost their pensions, created fake contracts, secretly increased their benefits and then filed workers' compensation claims in 2010, according to a grand jury indictment unsealed March 31, 2011.
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith's "theory of political survival" provides often surprising, counterintuitive insights on issues ranging from the so-called "Arab Spring" and U.S. foreign policy to corporate governance and tax codes. Among the topics explored:

. Why countries with oil and other natural resources -- the "resource curse" -- are more likely to be autocratic, have less economic growth and more civil wars than countries without readily accessible resources. The authors explain why President Obama should focus on resource poor countries like Syria and Cuba, rather than rich ones like Libya and Venezuela.

. Why foreign aid -- from humanitarian aid and disaster relief to the funding of Pakistan to fight the Taliban and hunt down Bin Ladin -- is so ineffectual, and how -- unless we restructure the way it's given -- both aid and debt forgiveness just encourage countries to let their problems fester. Speaking of Pakistan, on Thursday, Sept. 22, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, saying that the Haqqani "militants" who attack U.S. targets in Afghanistan are a "veritable arm" of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence secret police. Pakistan denied Mullen's charges on Sept. 23.

. Why natural disasters seem to disproportionately strike poorer nations, like Haiti.

. Why the easiest way to encourage political reform is to force a leader to rely on tax revenue.

The authors ask us to consider why it's important to not take a coalition's loyalty for granted -- why it's essential that you don't underpay your coalition.

The advice applies, they say, to Mafia boss "Big" Paul Castellano and an Italian of a different era, Julius Caesar. Both didn't give the coalition that brought them to power their due.

Castellano, who inherited the leadership of the Gambino crime family in 1976, neglected the Mafia's traditional businesses of prostitution, extortion and loan sharking that kept his coalition happy. Instead, he shifted the focus to racketeering and the construction business, which wasn't profitable to members of his coalition, that included John Gotti and Sammy "The Bull" Gravano. This lead to the Dec. 16, 1985 gunning down of Castellano at Sparks Steak House in Midtown Manhattan.

Similarly, Julius Caesar, they write, was not assassinated because he was a despot, as the common view holds, but because he was a reformer! Being a reformer who got ride of the policy of tax farming, which gave the job of tax collecting to persons outside government, instead rationalizing tax collection and reducing the tax bite. This was great for the common people, but not for the coalition that had put him in power -- the powerful "influentials and essentials" -- who ended up cutting him down -- literally.

The takeaway from "The Dictator's Handbook" that Castellano and Caesar both neglected: always attend to the interests of whatever group put them in power and kept them in office. Whether its the Oligarchs of Russia, who found out that crossing Vladimir Putin was a major mistake (see my review of "The Oligarchs" link: [...]) or a small coalition dictator like Egypt's Mubarak who outlived his usefulness to the Egyptian army, this rule applies.

"The Dictator's Handbook" is an important book -- a "must read" -- to anyone who wants to understand how politics really works in the political sphere and the world of business, in democracies and dictatorships alike.
Was this review helpful to you?
80 of 93 people found the following review helpful
3.0 out of 5 stars At times insightful, but also clumsy and US-centred January 15, 2012
By Esn024
Format:Hardcover
"The Dictator's Handbook" is a book of political theory that aims to follow in Machiavelli's footsteps. It is provocative and has a number of useful ideas, some of which are even backed up by convincing evidence in the book (the section on foreign aid was particularly nice). But at other times, I found reading it to be frustrating.

There are a number of things to keep in mind: first of all, it is very much a work of popular fiction, written in common-sense language for the average reader to understand. Many of the assertions made would not hold water in a scholarly discussion because the definitions aren't very carefully defined, and small but vital details are glossed over.

Despite attempting to rise above the fray and present an overall picture of the political world that is more accurate than its predecessors, the book is very much a product of insular American political culture, and often propagates American political myths. For example, its poorly-argued assertion that the more democratic a society, the lower its taxes (pg. 13, "taxes tend to be low when coalitions are large"), which would be quite surprising to the Scandinavian countries, not to mention (at the other extreme) Dubai.

Another example is the assertion on pg.6 that the United States "has one of the world's biggest winning coalitions both in absolute numbers and in proportion of the electorate" (the authors define this as meaning that the American government is beholden to no less than about one-fifth of the American population). This point, which aligns nicely with American popular opinion, underpins many of the book's arguments as the actions of America are contrasted with the actions of other, less democratic countries (with smaller winning coalitions).

The authors don't acknowledge that this point has been seriously challenged, years before the publication of their book, in Martin Gilens' Oxford study from 2005, "Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness". Over a period of 21 years, Gilens analyzed the relationship between opinion polls showing what the American public supported, and the actual policy actions of the government, and came to the conclusion that "when Americans with different income levels differ in their policy preferences, actual policy outcomes strongly reflect the preferences of the most affluent but bear virtually no relationship to the preferences of poor or middle-income Americans."

If Gilens is right, it means that the de facto size of the winning coalition in America is much smaller than Smith and de Mesquita have acknowledged it to be in their book.

If we allow for this possibility that perhaps the winning coalitions of democracies are not nearly as large as advertised, many of the examples that are used in the book have their foundations pulled out from under them.

However, I still think that the authors have probably gotten a lot of things right, even if I find the writing style a bit too patronizing and some of the given evidence built on shaky foundations.
Was this review helpful to you?
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
(I agree with the review by Esn024.)

The authors put forth a theory: A leader spends most of his efforts just to keep his job. If the leader has to please only a few influential people to keep his job (e.g., the generals of the army), the leader is autocratic and many of the actions you associate with dictators becomes the "logical" thing to do if you want to keep your job. If the leader has to please many people, the leader is democratic and tends to do things that are good for the people.

It's a simple theory, but it (may) explain a lot of behavior. And it leads to some interesting consequences (e.g., autocrats want productive (but docile) workers, so they invest in health care and (limited) education.) Most of the examples are political, but the "leader" term applies to CEOs, mob bosses, and others.

This is a "wide-audience" book. It's not supposed to be "bogged down" with definitions and numbers and technical mumbo-jumbo. It's supposed to be a fun-to-read version of the theory. Still, I've read a lot of "wide-audience" books and, while this was fun to read, it wasn't very well crafted.

* It uses awkward terms: "leader" and "winning coalition" are fine, but "interchangables", "influentials" and "essentials" are unclear and too long.
* It does not clearly define these terms.
* It only gives a hazy definition of the theory. (Not much more than I gave above.)
* It does not have separate terms for "good policy" (effective at keeping job) vs. "good policy" (good for the populace).
* It doesn't define "good for the populace" at all.
* It doesn't do a strong job of convincing the reader that the theory is true.
* It has multiple examples where it's doubtful that their theory is the major thing at work.

The authors have the problem that every action by a leader is colored by so many specifics of what was going on and the people involved. It's hard to pull out clear examples that demonstrate a principle clearly. But the authors stick to examples, rather than present graphs, numbers, or any form of generalizations. (E.g., On page 256 is one of the few graphs and it shows why things tend towards autocratic or democratic and there's few in-between. This should have been earlier when they said they would generalize things to autocratic and democratic.)

For all this book's negatives (and there are more), I gave it 5 stars for a reason. This a book worth reading. It's a theory presented with a lot of anecdotal evidence and, by the end, I was convinced that there was at least something to their theory. The anecdotes are clear and the book is a fast read. The insights of the theory are fascinating and I won't interpret foreign affairs the same way again. (Especially the US's interactions with dictators!) If this book sounds at all interesting to you, I'd recommend buying it. But expect pangs of regret that the theory deserved a much better book.
Comment | 
Was this review helpful to you?
Most Recent Customer Reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars Great
The dictator's handbook explains so many things that never made sense. Everyone should read this book. Even if you don't agree with the author, it will give you food for thought.
Published 26 days ago by Arlene DeLeon
5.0 out of 5 stars Selectorate theory
A good intro to selectorate theory as applied to economics. No math and definitely some holes, but it is a very good explanation of most current political history.
Published 27 days ago by Wayne Alan Martin
5.0 out of 5 stars Love the dark humour
These guys are great. We need more people mocking life while writing a well researched and fun book. Read more
Published 1 month ago by Von Papen
5.0 out of 5 stars Outstanding!
I enjoy books that stimulate thought...books that activate a paradigm shift in how one perceives the world, and, importantly, books that help you become a better thinker and... Read more
Published 1 month ago by JLMK
5.0 out of 5 stars A strong case for democracy
This book makes a very strong case for democracy, but not because democratic leaders are good and dictators are bad. Read more
Published 2 months ago by Mathias Sundin
5.0 out of 5 stars the book in a nutshell: Successful leaders put the wants of essential...
This idea: A successful leader always puts the wants of his essental supporters before the needs of highest good for all concerned--explains many current "paradoxes":

-... Read more
Published 3 months ago by Healing Toolbox
5.0 out of 5 stars A new tool for understanding politics
You'll never watch the news the same way again. This book is a bit technical, so you'll need to sit up straight and focus, this isn't an al franken politico-comedy. Read more
Published 4 months ago by Shawn P.
1.0 out of 5 stars Megalomania
How to be a sociopath steps 1..2..3..We thought with was about using game theory as a practical application in everyday life. If so, we decided we don't want that.
Published 5 months ago by Julie Boyette
4.0 out of 5 stars A Good Start
In sum, although The Dictator's Handbook is an interesting read, the book has little value for a political scientist who has already engaged selectorate theory in The Logic of... Read more
Published 5 months ago by Stephen
5.0 out of 5 stars best non fiction i have read in a long time
this book so far has really let me see why people (not parties) do what they in office.
it is written very well with good examples. Read more
Published 6 months ago by Frank Arthur
Search Customer Reviews
Only search this product's reviews


Forums

There are no discussions about this product yet.
Be the first to discuss this product with the community.
Start a new discussion
Topic:
First post:
Prompts for sign-in
 



So You'd Like to...


Create a guide


Look for Similar Items by Category