From Library Journal
This history might be read as a conservative counterpart to Stanley Karnow's Vietnam (LJ 10/1/83). Morrison argues that U.S. defeat in Vietnam was the product of an unrealistic fear of China and the Soviet Union, resulting in a strategy of reaction and attrition. Civilian authorities, especially MacNamara, insisted on "micromanaging" the war. Military commanders were unwilling to back their doubts by resigning. Ill-advised U.S. attempts at nation-building kept South Vietnam from developing its own identity. Morrison is better at articulating positions than supporting them. He never proves his key point that China and Russia were bluffing. His critique of the war's conduct too often depends for support on descriptions of battlefield heroism or sacrifice. Pathos, however, is no substitute for analysis.- Dennis E. Showalter, Colorado Coll., Colorado Springs
Copyright 1990 Reed Business Information, Inc.
About the Author
Wilbur H. Morrison was a radio announcer and news commentator before joining the Army Air Corps and becoming a B-29 bombardier-navigator during WWII. He flew five hundred combat hours during the war, receiving twenty-one awards and decorations, and rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In 1954, he went to work for the Douglas Aircraft Company where he became manager of public relations. Morrison is the author of more than twelve books and is considered to be one of America's leading military historians and authority on military and commercial aviation.
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