This volume examines the implication of global fertility decline, and offers some solutions to turn things around.
Longman begins by laying out the data. Today global fertility rates are half what they were in 1972.
Europe of course leads the way, with precariously low levels. Italy for example has just 1.2 children per woman. Spain is doing even worse, with 1.15 children. These two nations are experiencing the lowest fertility rates ever seen in recorded history.
All together, 59 nations making up 44 per cent of the world's population, are not producing enough children to avoid population decline.
What are the implications of such a demographic time bomb? Simply stated, we are rapidly becoming an aging society, with ever shrinking pools of young people. This has very real repercussions on many fronts. But a major worry of governments is how we are going to pay for this growing pool of the elderly, with these declining fertility rates.
As but one example, in Europe today there are 35 people of pensionable age for every 100 people of working age. If present trends continue, by 2050 there will be 75 pensioners for every 100 workers.
Longman asks why this demographic trend is unfolding before our eyes. One major factor is that it simply costs a huge amount of money to raise a child today. The increasing number of working women, and women in higher education, is another factor. So too are such reasons as declining male wages, fear of divorce, rising taxes, the absence of grandparents as child carers, contraception use and abortion.
The economic component is certainly a leading cause of childlessness. Human capital in general, and people in particular, are dwindling because the economy demands more of its workers to be well-educated, while it does not provide the time or the money for that education. In the past the best nurturing and education of future workers came from parents themselves. They were best placed to raise well-developed children who in turn would become productive members of the workplace.
But governments today are simply not compensating parents for this vital role. It simply is not economically worthwhile for parents to pour themselves into their children, when governments do not acknowledge and reward this valuable service.
Parents provide quality future members of the workforce, and they curtail an aging population. The returns to society are huge, but the returns to parents continue to shrink. And taxation is a major means by which parents are penalised today.
In the past governments paid men a family wage to adequately account for dependent wives and children, Today we have nearly the opposite situation, with families amongst the most heavily taxed groupings in society. Parents currently face huge tax burdens which most other individuals do not. Thus it just does not pay to have children.
So how do we turn things around? Removing economic disincentives is obviously key. Substantial tax relief for parents is a first vital step. Longman also proposes the encouragement of home-based employment and family business.
Other options are canvassed. While they may not serve as a panacea, the truth is that currents trends are unsustainable. The increasing growth of the number of elderly people, coupled by a decline in our birthrates, is a recipe for disaster. Any volume that alerts us to the dangers and offers some alternatives, as this book does, provides a useful service indeed.