Ian Kershaw needs no introduction to readers of WW-II history. His latest installment, "The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944-1945 claims to tread new ground by investigating the cause(s) of continued German fighting to the point of complete destruction of the state; a rare occurrence, according to the author. This book explores the reasons behind ongoing resistance, despite the obvious consequences of this self-destructive course of action. To accomplish this, Kershaw focuses on the attitudes and actions of the 4 primary Nazi leaders of the closing era (Goebbels, Bormann, Speer and Himmler) and secondarily on the senior military leaderships' posture. The story is amplified by extensive information culled from primary sources on the general population and it concludes with a summary chapter on "the anatomy of self-destruction". This is a good book, well-written and it provides a convenient one-volume synthesis of the topic; yet, it is not the unique effort asserted by the author in the preface.
It is quite apparent that Hitler enjoyed certain insights into the political nature of his potential opponents and cunningly implemented them initially to great success both domestically and internationally. So, given the barrage of pandering to the "volk" consciousness (in the form of German "master race" propaganda) and the overwhelming victories of the early years, it is hardly surprising that he successfully penetrated the core beliefs of the vast majority of his countrymen, imbuing them (and him) with a mutually reinforcing sensation of a shared and manifest destiny, this as destined rulers of the European continent. As has been written many times, Hitler was Germany's destiny and that destiny was war. As noted in 1935 by the British historian H.A.L. Fisher, `A country which is determined to have a war can always have it'. Hitler made no secret whatsoever of his intent (e.g., "It will be the duty of German foreign policy to get large spaces to feed and house the growing population of Germany. Destiny points us towards Russia." Mein Kampf, 1924). Thus, the German Reich knew exactly what the future under the Leader had in store both for ethnic Germans and those in the unfortunate and diverse groups of regime-designated "enemies".
According to conventional wisdom, the proximate cause for the military defeat of Hitler's war machine was the 22 June, 1941 invasion of the USSR. This event launched the dreaded two-front war, a feared development for Germany based on historical experience. Not only was this a blunder of titanic dimensions, it revealed the lack of strategic insight displayed by Hitler as military supremo. It should have provided resounding confirmation of the Leader's penchant for over-reach, reliance on overarching dares and the limitless conceit regarding his own "genius" embodied in the "Leader Principal". Additionally, deliberate, ideologically-motivated actions against civilians alienated potential allies and galvanized fanatical resistance, along with an intent to repay in kind.
With the failure to capture Moscow followed by the resounding defeat at Stalingrad, the auguries for the Reich were uniformly inauspicious. By 1944, the end was apparent to any rational thinker. Yet, Germany fought through to the end with horrific consequences for civilians and military personnel alike. The reasons for this are legion, but include regime-implemented terror, total "investment" by the Gaulieters and other figures whose future was inextricably linked to the fate of the Reich, relentless propaganda, nationalism, fear of occupation by the (justifiably angered) Red Army, inertia, confused concepts of loyalty...in other words, the entire (and expected) gamut of emotions, pragmatism, fear of the future and personal gain that motivates everybody everywhere. Monumental exertion on behalf of the Party by Speer and Goebbels are probably unique features of this event. One feature that deserves particular emphasis is the "will to self-delusion": "Blame attached to the Party for the war was to be countered by emphasizing that war had been declared on Germany, not the other way round, and that the enemy aimed to destroy not just the leadership but the very existence of Germany; that it would be far worse than after 1918. A rejoinder to the widespread view that the 'air terror' was the most unbearable burden of all and the accompanying expressions about the unfulfilled premisses was that hardships had temporarily to be endured to allow time to produce better weapons. Pessimistic remarks that Germany had been unable to do this with its industry intact and could therefore hardly hope to do sow with so much of it destroyed were to be turned round by saying that the loss of territories meant a smaller industrial output sufficed. Finally, dejection at enemy was necessary to hold out to allow time for military and political decisions to ripen." Amazingly, this general approach used by Goebbels was successfully used to influence the general population through the closing days of the conflict; more amazingly, it seemed to work on the military and Party leadership as well.
It comes as no surprise that actions undertaken in Eastern Europe would have later ramifications for Germany. Fear of Red Army retribution was a significant motivator for ongoing resistance. This isn't terribly surprising, since (as Max Hastings wrote in "Retribution"), "But in an imperfect world, it seems unrealistic to expect that any combatant in a war will grant adversaries conspicuously better treatment than his own people receive at their hands." Despite the self-evident nature of this observation, retribution on Reich enemies continued unabated. So, while Kershaw details the horrific tole of the war on Germany itself, he spares no gruesome detail of the fate of the regime's enemies in the final months. Eliminationist actions undertaken against Slavs, Poles and others were linchpins of the war in the East from the onset and the pointless, gratuitous, extreme brutality continued to the very end. The massacre at Celle ("Celler Hasenjagd") is but one revolting example. Parenthetically, Celle tellingly demonstrates that barbaric violence was dispensed not only by the SS, but by the Heer, the Volksstrum and by significant elements of the civilian population, a fact that post-war apologists attempt to gloss-over.
A sometimes overlooked fact is the disproportionate degree of casualties incurred in the closing months of the war. Not only were these militarily unjustifiable, they served no rational purpose. They did, however, fulfill Hitler's Wagner-inspired romance with Götterdämmerung. This inane construct seemed to underlie much of Nazi ideology, doctrine and actions...to the detriment of at least 40 million casualties in the East, alone. Another overlooked "fact" (myth is a more accurate noun) is that the Allies' demand for "unconditional surrender" was a major motive force in the continued German resistance: not at all true, according to Kershaw and considerable evidence is mustered in support of that claim.
There have been many other books which explore and elucidate the ongoing support of the Nazi regime. "Nazi Terror" by Eric A. Johnson, "Explaining Hitler" by Ron Rosenbaum and the 3 volume history of the Third Reich by Robert Evans seem to cover much that Kershaw covers in "End". Naturally, much of the history of Speer and other prominent Nazis has also been covered and the fate of Reich enemies in the final months of the war is not new, either. Yet, Kershaw makes a significant contribution in this synthesis.
It is indeed the case that "Fate is not satisfied with inflicting one calamity" as noted by the Roman-Syrian Publilius Syrus. The multiple calamities derived from Hitler and Nazism resonate to the present day. The wanton and despicable waste of life resulting from the continuation of hostilities past the "point of no return" and the fealty of Germany to the Leader have many explanations, all inextricably tied to human nature. Presumably, the message emerging from the colossal wreckage of WW-II and the fight-to-the-finish is "march of folly", "ship of fools" or simply that while "history never repeats itself, people always do".
