The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End [Hardcover]

Peter W. Galbraith (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: July 11, 2006

The United States invaded Iraq with grand ambitions to bring it democracy and thereby transform the Middle East. Instead, Iraq has disintegrated into three constituent components: a pro-western Kurdistan in the north, an Iran-dominated Shiite entity in the south, and a chaotic Sunni Arab region in the center. The country is plagued by insurgency and is in the opening phases of a potentially catastrophic civil war.George W. Bush broke up Iraq when he ordered its invasion in 2003. The United States not only removed Saddam Hussein, it also smashed and later dissolved the institutions by which Iraq's Sunni Arab minority ruled the country: its army, its security services, and the Baath Party. With these institutions gone and irreplaceable, the basis of an Iraqi state has disappeared.The End of Iraq describes the administration's strategic miscalculations behind the war as well as the blunders of the American occupation. There was the failure to understand the intensity of the ethnic and religious divisions in Iraq. This was followed by incoherent and inconsistent strategies for governing, the failure to spend money for reconstruction, the misguided effort to create a national army and police, and then the turning over of the country's management to Republican political loyalists rather than qualified professionals. As a matter of morality, Peter W. Galbraith writes, the Kurds of Iraq are no less entitled to independence than are Lithuanians, Croatians, or Palestinians. And if the country's majority Shiites want to run their own affairs, or even have their own state, on what democratic principle should they be denied?If the price of a unified Iraq is another dictatorship, Galbraith writes, it is too high a price to pay. The United States must now focus not on preserving or forging a unified Iraq but on avoiding a spreading and increasingly dangerous and deadly civil war. It must accept the reality of Iraq's breakup and work with Iraq's Shiites, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs to strengthen the already semi-independent regions. If they are properly constituted, these regions can provide security, though not all will be democratic. There is no easy exit from Iraq for America. We have to relinquish our present strategy-trying to build national institutions when there is, in fact, no nation. That effort is doomed, Galbraith argues, and it will only leave the United States with an open-ended commitment in circumstances of uncontrollable turmoil. Galbraith has been in Iraq many times over the last twenty-one years during historic turning points for the country: the Iran-Iraq War, the Kurdish genocide, the 1991 uprising, the immediate aftermath of the 2003 war, and the writing of Iraq's constitutions. In The End of Iraq, he offers many firsthand observations of the men who are now Iraq's leaders. He draws on his nearly two decades of involvement in Iraq policy working for the U.S. government to appraise what has occurred and what will happen. The End of Iraq is the definitive account of this war and its ramifications.

--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Starred Review. Galbraith, a leading commentator on Iraq thanks to his recent articles in the New York Review of Books, presents a clear-eyed and persuasive case against the Bush administration's nation-building project there. As a former U.S. diplomat with long experience in Iraq, he offers an insider's view of the American occupation's failures—the poor preparation for post-invasion chaos, the cluelessness about Iraqi politics, the incompetence and corruption of the occupation authority—while advancing a deeper critique. With Saddam's dictatorship and the Baathist party and army that supported it gone, he contends that Iraq is irrevocably splitting into a pro-American Kurdistan in the north, a pro-Iranian Shiite south and an ungovernable Sunni center. America "cannot put the country back together again and it cannot stop the civil war," he insists. Deeply skeptical of attempts to reunify the Iraqi state, he proposes that the U.S. withdraw from Arab Iraq and "facilitate an amicable divorce" between the fractious sections. Galbraith advised the Iraqi Kurds during recent constitutional negotiations and is palpably sympathetic to their national aspirations; his argument sometimes feels like a brief for Kurdish separatism. Still, Galbraith's authoritative grasp of the issues and his cogent, forthright call for disengagement ensure that the book will move into the center of the debate over American policy in Iraq. (July 17)
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Review

"Peter Galbraith's The End of Iraq is a fascinating tale in its own right as well as a vital contribution to the autopsy on the worst of American wars."

-- Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

"Peter Galbraith has seen, with balance and clarity, the whole arc of America's tragic and mismanaged relationship with Iraq. This is an essential book as the debate on what to do in Iraq continues to grow in the United States."

-- Richard Holbrooke, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

"The perceptive and well-informed Galbraith has it just about right in his litany of miscalculations and mismanagements.... Fast paced."

-- Foreign Affairs

"Excellent and indispensable.... Peter Galbraith's learned and insightful book is literally a must-read for those who wish to place the Iraq war in historical context and to understand the forces at play in what may well be the dissolution of Iraq."

-- Phillip G. Henderson, National Catholic Reporter

"Galbraith's book is important because, as much as any American, he has lived the Iraq tragedy up close and personal."

-- David Ignatius, The Washington Post Book World

"Galbraith, a leading commentator on Iraq...presents a clear-eyed and persuasive case against the Bush administration's nation-building project there."

-- Publishers Weekly (starred)

"[Galbraith's] account of the blunders and the missed opportunities is by a very long way the best one published so far.... Here at last is a book written by someone who both knows about Iraq and cares about it.... How one wishes that its author had been listened to in the first place."

-- Christopher Hitchens, The Washington Times --This text refers to the Paperback edition.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 272 pages
• Publisher: Simon & Schuster; First Edition edition (July 11, 2006)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0743294238
• ISBN-13: 978-0743294232
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.3 x 1.2 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (64 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #1,210,781 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

151 of 173 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Lack of Balance,Good Detail, First-Rate Personal Perspective July 20, 2006

By Robert David STEELE Vivas HALL OF FAMETOP 500 REVIEWER

Format:Hardcover

I recommend the other reviews, including the negative ones, for they accurately depict a lack of balance that might normally cause me to give this book one less star. However, because it has first-rate personal perspective including extraordinary travel that most US officials and journalists cannot claim, it gets the full five stars. I especially liked the "cast of characters" at the end, with names and titles and dates. A fine review.

The book can be quickly summed up by a quote from page 7: "Insurgency, civil war, Iranian strategic triumph, the breakup of Iraq, an independent Kurdistan, military quagmire."

As the Administration continues to deny that Iraq is in a civil war, the author is compelling in citing the Iraqis themselves saying that they are--and that America lost it when it turned from liberator to occupying power. Two people come out of this book looking colossally ignorant: George Bush, who never heard of the Sunni-Shiite split before the war, and Paul "Jerry" Bremer. The author's basic proposition is that the American Republic has been undone by extraordinary arrogance, ignorance, and political cowardice.

The author is a good writer with a gift for clear phrases. He concludes that the White House and the Pentagon's politically-appointed leaders consistently "ignored inconvenient facts." He concludes that Iraq may actually be better off in the long run, but the US is clearly not--we have gored ourselves near fatally.

I agree with the critics that suggest the author is in love with Kurdistan and overlooking some of their less rosy realities. The book is a clearly partisan document that admires the Kurds and makes the case for a free Kurdish state within Iraq (three states, one nation, not a division of Iraq as some critics loosely interpret). He is considerate of Turkish concerns and how a Kurdistan inside of Iraq but independent within Iraq, can meet their needs for a secular buffer.

There are some gems in this book that I have not found elsewhere, including a detailed accounting of the atrocities committed by Hussein against the Kurds, the Kurds rebuilding including English-speaking universities and doctors certified by the British Medical Board.

I was shocked to learn that the White House employs a CANADIAN speech-writer (who may well be one of the new Canadian clandestine case officers they are starting to field), and that this CANADIAN inserted the "axis of evil" line (which the author points out is ignorant both geographically and historically).

Overall the author could help inspire the impeachment of the Vice President. His book complements that of Ron Susskind, "The One-Percent Doctrine" and is replete with lines like "logic and facts did not stop the Bush Administration..." (page 80), "wishful thinking substituted for knowledge" (page 88, describing Undersecretary Feith), "contrary views were not just rejected, they were banned" (page 89), and "the ignorant are always surprised" (page 101).

In terms of historical documentation, the author is strongest in his detailing the incompetence of the Bush Administration in failing to plan for the war, and he lays much of the blame on Cheney for falling prey to Ahmad Chalabi's lies. The author says on page 86 that Chalabi's role cannot be overstated.

He trumps that with detail on the idiocy and arrogance of Paul "Jerry" Bremer who decided to run Iraq as his own fiefdom, and in his first two decisions, banned all Baaths from leadership positions, and dismembered the army and all security services. If there is one man to blame for all the American dead and disabled since the war "ended," it is this well-intentioned but contextually inept person, who acted against the specific advice of the senior Army generals then serving in the field.

From an intelligence perspective, the author is credible when he points out that in the aftermath of the war and before the break-down of all order in Iraq, neither the Pentagon nor the CIA seemed to be aware of, nor interested in, the treasure trove of intelligence materials scattered in various locations throughout Iraq. This tracks with my own intimate knowledge of civilian and military intelligence, both preferring to stay in the Green Zone and not miss their evening cocktails, Robert Bauer and a few others excepted.

On page 118 the author absolutely floors me by pointing out that the Department of State spent an entire year creating a blueprint for securing the peace in Iraq, but the Department of Defense, which insisted on controlling "diplomacy" in Iraq, did not tell Bremer the detailed plan existed until a year after he arrived on the job. On page 117, the author details how the US inter-agency bureaucracy was and is out of control, with rival US factions pursuing policies that are diametrically opposed. He is particularly caustic in slamming the grotesquely incompetent manner in which the Administration threw together the nation-building team, including six young people from the Heritage Foundation who ended up running a $13 billion a year budget.

The author condems Bremer's gratuitous humiliation as having broken Iraq apart and spawned the insurgency. In the author's view, Bremer blew it in that he was a naked Emperor hiding in the Green Zone, and neither the Shiites in the south nor the Kurds in the north ever gave up their militaries or their power over their own terrain.

The book ends by stating that the US needs a strategy based on reality, not wishful thinking or ideological fantasy, and he concludes that three states comprising one nation, is the fastest way out of Iraq. I agree.

This is a solid professional account. I disagree with those critics who consider the author to be self-serving, embellishing, or otherwise deceiving the public. While he emphasizes some things more than others, and would clearly like an independent Kurdistan, on balance I consider this to one of the better first-person stories, right up there with "Squandered Victory."

21 of 23 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Real Insight Won on the Ground in Iraq/5 Stars August 13, 2006

By Mike Tucker

Format:Hardcover

Having spent twenty-one months on the ground in Iraq with

Kurdish peshmerga, Kurdish artists, human rights activists,

teachers, lawyers, poets and businessmen, US Army Special Forces,

Delta Force, US Army paratroopers and light infantry,

US Marine infantry, US Marine scout/snipers, and

the Iraqi Army, I can do nothing but praise Peter Galbraith

for his extraordinary grasp of detail in this great book,

and his success at keeping his attention fully focused

on insights that he has gained on the ground in Iraq

and the Near East over two decades.

This is a magnificent and very timely book which will prove to be timeless.

This is a landmark book on the Iraq War. Peter Galbraith

does not hesitate to stand and deliver a radical and well-needed

plan for America's last best hope at victory in Iraq.

His criticism of Bush, Cheney and Paul Bremer echoes

that I recently heard in the field on a second

combat deployment, for seven months with

Marine scout/snipers, Marine infantry, and the Iraqi Army,

in Fallujah and Western Iraq---reading this book was like

being back inside the wire after a mission and talking about

the war with Americans and Iraqis. The symmetry between what

Galbraith writes and what men on the tip of the spear are

saying themselves in Iraq is eerie.

He is accurate on the Kurds. I have far, far less time with

the Kurds than Peter Galbraith does, but there is one huge

truth about the Kurds of Iraq: they are committed to a free,

democratic and independent Kurdistan and they are the only

people in Iraq who well and truly love democracy. Galbraith

gets that, completely, and is not shy about expounding

on that truth.

Bush doesn't get that, nor does Rice and so many other people in Bush's administration,

but the entire cabinet in the Bush administration has proven by their failure

to win the guerrilla war in Iraq that they all need to chain and leash seeing eye dogs, regardless.

Read Peter Galbraith's winning book for its unique insights

and instructive commentary. Read it if you want to understand

why the Kurds are the only true ally we have in Iraq. Read it

if you want to discover a bold, radical and well-needed road

to peace, an exit strategy rooted in what US Special Forces

define as "ground truth," what has gone down in Iraq, and

the cultural and historical truth of the terrain we are still

fighting on. Bravo, Peter Galbraith, and very well-done.

Mike Tucker

Author: THE LONG PATROL,

HELL IS OVER, & AMONG WARRIORS IN IRAQ

83 of 102 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Insightful - Documents our Arrogance and Ignorance! July 8, 2006

By Loyd E. Eskildson HALL OF FAME

Format:Hardcover

The U.S. invaded Iraq with grand ambitions to bring it democracy, achieve good relations with Israel, and thereby transform the Middle East (eg. Syria and Iran would be the next market-oriented democracies). Instead the country is plagued by insurgency and is in the opening phases of a civil war. The difficulty in getting the factions to work together is underlined by the facts that fewer than one in ten voted for parties that crossed ethnic or religious lines, and after the election it took more than four months to choose the government's top officials.

Meanwhile, North Korea expelled the U.N. nuclear inspectors, withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and reprocessed previously monitored plutonium into material for 6-8 nuclear weapons. This occurred after Bush II accused North Korea in '02 of violating the '94 agreement to freeze all nuclear activity (no uranium enrichment facility was operational at that time) and cut off fuel oil shipments. As for Iran, it had been coooperating with the U.S. in Afghanistan by sharing intelligence on al-Qaeda, preventing their entry into Iran, and allowing search-rescue efforts to use their territory - all that ended after Bush's "Axis of Evil" speech.

Two months prior to invading Iraq, Bush II met with three Iraqi-Americans. They reported he didn't even know about the Sunni and Shiite sects, or their strong hostility. Ignorance was further encouraged by prohibiting General Franks from contacting General Zinni for his ideas on post-war planning, and General Garner's staff was carefully vetted to ensure that only "right thinkers" were utilized.

Problems began immediately after Baghdad fell - despite administration officials being warned, the National Museum (its collections went back to the beginning of human civilization) was looted while U.S. forces watched; later Wolfowitz claimed all but 38 artifacts were recovered, ignoring thousands smashed and taken from storerooms. Similarly, the National Library - a repository of Iraq's recent history was burned. Elsewhere almost two tons of Iraqi yellowcake was looted post invasion, again while U.S. troops were nearby; Saddam's supposed recent yellowcake acquisitions were part of the justification for the invasion. Looters also took high explosives used to initiate nuclear explosions. Personnel files with names/addresses of Saddam Fedayeen (those attacking U.S. forces) were found and reported to Wolfowitz - again no action. The U.S. had simply assumed that Iraq's police and bureaucrats would report for work the day after Baghdad fell - despite the warnings of experts.

General Garner's arrival was delayed about two weeks by General Franks - regardless, upon arrival Garner quickly began efforts to turn over Iraq to Iraqis and hold elections. However, he was quickly replaced by Paul Bremer - one of his first actions was to cancel meetings on Iraqi elections, and most knowledgeable Iraq leaders cite that point as when Iraqis began to see the U.S. as occupiers instead of liberators.

Galbraith ultimately asks "What would an Iraqi government govern?" Answering his own question, he contends that it would not include the Kurdish area (Baghdad ministries are not even allowed to open offices there), the Shiite south (now run by clerics, militias, and religious parties as an Islamic state), nor Baghdad or the Sunni Arab heartland (will continue to be battlegrounds).

Galbraith's Recommendations: Help the Kurds rule on their own, pull out of southern Iraq (would also give us more military strength vs. Iran), and put Sunni army/police in charge of Sunni areas while maintaining U.S. emergency reaction forces in the Kurdish areas.