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Swinburne views himself as part of the long tradition of Christian evidentialism that seeks to give rational reasons for belief in God. However, unlike, say, Anselm, Aquinas, or Paley, Swinburne thinks that every deductive argument for theism rests on premises that could rationally be rejected by the skeptic. Thus his arguments are inductive; he treats theism as a large-scale explanatory theory on a par with, say, quantum theory or Newton's theory of motion. He takes several classical arguments (the cosmological and teleological arguments, the argument from religious experience, etc.) and recasts them in terms of Bayesian probability theory, arguing that each of them confirms God's existence, i.e. raises the probability that He exists.
This is, I think, a brilliant strategy: it means that Swinburne's case does not rest on the cogency of any one argument and that none of his arguments depends on such controversial grounds as the principle of sufficient reaon or the claim that existence is a "real predicate." Rather, his premises generally reflect obvious features of the world (such as its existence and complexity) together with a set of widely accepted principles of scientific reasoning. Moreover, he establishes a rational framework applicable to any inductive arguments for theism, making it easier for other philosophers of religion to offer their own inductive arguments. (I'm surprised more of them have not done so!)
Of course, the book is open to criticism. Many of Swinburne's claims are idiosyncratic, for instance, his claim that at every moment God chooses to exist at the subsequent moment. But nothing critical rests on these oddities. More vexing is the dreaded "problem of the priors" besetting Bayesian reasoning in general. His assignment of probabilities to certain propositions might be unsatisfying to the skeptic, to say the least. But here Swinburne is aided by the modesty of his goal: he merely aims to show that it is more likely that God exists than that He does not. His assigments of priors, I think, almost always errs on the side of caution.
Presuppositionalists, Wittgensteinians, fundamentalists, and other fideists will hate this book, as will knee-jerk atheists. Thinking atheists and theists who value reason will appreciate it, even when they do not accept its conclusions. All should read it.
I do not, however, find Swinburne's defense of theism to be successful. Swinburne focuses too much on simplicity as what determines the best explanation. If we take into consideration other elements of good explanations, such as explanatory depth, Swinburne may not be able to make many of the arguments he does. Also, many of Swinburne's arguments are based on what God has *reasons* to bring about; a consideration which may simply beg the question against the atheist. Swinburne's main critic, J.L. Mackie, says nothing about explanation in his response, _The Miracle of Theism_, and thus lets Swinburne get away without being challenged at the heart of his defense.
However, despite its flaws, Swinburne's book is the most powerful use to date of the new explanationist methodology applied to the question of God's existence. No one interested in this issue can afford to pass this work up.
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