America's foreign policy, Mr. Schwartz argues, is driven by the view that the pursuit of self-interest is morally tainted--i.e./ that if we wish to do what is right, we must sacrifice our interests for the sake of other nations. This is why we are so appeasingly apologetic when it comes to asserting our right to live free from the threat of force. It is why we are so hesitant in implementing our moral obligation to eliminate all such threats by military means. It is why we are failing in our war against terrorism. In this uncompromising manifesto, the author calls for a radically different foreign policy--one based entirely on self-interest.
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Editorial Reviews
About the Author
Peter Schwartz is the founding editor and publisher of The Intellectual Activist, and the author of Libertarianism: The Perversion of Liberty. He is the editor and contributing author of Ayn Rand's Return of the Primitive: The Anti-Industrial Revolution, and is chairman of ghe board of directors of the Ayn Rand Institute.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful
Although fairly short, this book does a remarkable job of documenting the disastrous path to self-destruction that the US is pursuing, it identifies the underlying causes and motivation for this policy, and it proposes an alternative. Quite a feat given the size.
What this Book Covers
* The nature and purpose of foreign policy
* Moral basis of current and past policy
* The moral foundations of a practical policy
* Why Pragmatism is impractical
* All illustrated with specific examples
This book is a well-written and clearly and forcefully argued. But even if you disagree with Schwartz's analysis, you'll will come away with a deeper and clearer understanding of how morality drives policy, in principle and in day to day events. You'll also gain a vivid insight into just how shockingly suicidal our current policy is, how it undermines our security and actually strengthens and emboldens terrorist-sponsoring states. Be prepared to be depressed, things are worse than you think.
What this Book Covers
* The nature and purpose of foreign policy
* Moral basis of current and past policy
* The moral foundations of a practical policy
* Why Pragmatism is impractical
* All illustrated with specific examples
This book is a well-written and clearly and forcefully argued. But even if you disagree with Schwartz's analysis, you'll will come away with a deeper and clearer understanding of how morality drives policy, in principle and in day to day events. You'll also gain a vivid insight into just how shockingly suicidal our current policy is, how it undermines our security and actually strengthens and emboldens terrorist-sponsoring states. Be prepared to be depressed, things are worse than you think.
4 of 4 people found the following review helpful
The global terrorist network that endangers the civilized world has been threatening for decades. However, it is we ourselves, not the terrorists, that pose the greatest threat to our future security. The contradictory policies, lack of principles and shortsightedness of our leaders is aiding and abetting the terrorists in ways they could have never dreamed of. Worse still, their repeated statements demonstrate that they recognize our absence of principles, moral confidence and determination and perceive it as our greatest weakness and their chance for victory.
In his book, A Foreign Policy of Self-Interest: A Moral Ideal For America, Peter Schwartz identifies the current self-sacrificing trends of American foreign policy and presents an appeal for the adoption of a new kind of foreign policy; the unmitigated pursuit of rational self-interest. In this work, Schwartz challenges the conventional wisdom with an uncompromising and ruthlessly candid assessment of the current state of US foreign policy. Insisting that the only moral purpose of government is the defense of individual liberty, he logically deduces that likewise, the only end of a moral foreign policy is the defense of a nation's freedom, and he contends that the only doctrine that can ensure the preservation of America's freedom is the steadfast dedication to the pursuit of self-interest on the international stage.
However, this book is not a call for America to intervene in any and every conflict in the world, to send troops anywhere we please to achieve any objective we conceive, or even to hasten the democratization of the third world. It is an urgent appeal for American leaders to discontinue the shamefully self-defeating practices currently perpetrated in the guise of diplomacy. It is a combination of potency and temperance, best exemplified in Teddy Roosevelt's words of wisdom, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." It is a plea for the end of self-sacrifice, self-doubt and insecurity in international relations.
In the Iraq war, for instance, instead of admitting with moral confidence that we sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein for the protection of Americans, we pretended that the altruistic liberation of the Iraqi people was the chief motive behind the invasion. We wasted valuable time before the war placating the United Nations, pleading for a moral sanction from an organization consisting of dictators and theocrats. We enacted dangerously constraining rules of engagement over our troops on the battlefield, all in the hope that world opinion would turn favorable for us.
The terrorist threat against Western civilization continues to grow, and can not be defeated with half-measures, compromises or diplomacy. America has nothing to gain by negotiating with dictators and international villains. As Schwartz observes in negotiations with North Korea, "We are offering the North Koreans something that is ours- our wealth; in return, they are offering us something that is also ours- the right to be free from nuclear attack. We lose while the North Koreans gain. If that is a trade, then so is every stick-up, under which the victim `trades' his money for his life."
Using this example, Schwartz demonstrates that diplomacy is an inappropriate means of negotiating with dictatorships, and that the only proper means of dealing with them is with ostracism. We should allow these nations to stand or fall on their own. He continues, "We should stop sanctioning our own destroyers. We should stop helping them pretend they are moral, civilized nations. If they threaten us, the only message they merit is the same one that any domestic criminal ought to receive from the police: drop your weapons or be overwhelmed by force."
Contrary to what the American left would have you believe, Schwartz insists that there is nothing evil about considering only our own interests when acting internationally. On the contrary, the only evil that can and usually is committed in American foreign policy is the sacrifice of American interests for dubious or imaginary benefits, including distributing foreign aid, fearing collateral damage in battle or bowing down before the wishes of the United Nations. We should never be ashamed to admit that we will consistently defend our interests and refuse to sacrifice them. As for the enemies of America, Schwartz warns "They need not like us, only fear us."
Entailed in Schwartz's criticism of such self-sacrificial actions as distributing billions of dollars of foreign aid to Iranians or Egyptians, or apologizing when China forces down and dismantles a US spy plane that was in international air space, is a rejection of the usefulness of what political theorist Joseph Nye identifies as "soft power." This is the benevolent use of political or military power, the motive being the winning of the hearts and minds of the international community. Schwartz attaches no inherent value to world opinion or to multilateralism, and his policy outlook is completely consistent with unilateralism. It is a foreign policy guided by principles, not by the spur of the moment, "seat of the pants" expediency, nor by the number of its adherents.
A foreign policy founded on principles instead of more "practical" considerations is certain to make some readers uncomfortable. Though the alleged dichotomy between principles and pragmatism will quickly be pointed out by political scientists that subscribe to the realpolitik school of thought, Schwartz shows that this argument has no merit by singling out a series of foreign policy decisions that had no principled foundation, no moral justification, nothing but concrete-bound range of the moment expediency- and ended in an inevitable and utter disaster. This prime example of the abject failure of policy without principle is the Vietnam War.
Fifty-five thousand Americans lost their lives in a war that Washington inched into in complete pragmatic fashion. America had no national interests at stake, no commitment to any specific action, no definite objectives. What began with supplies shipments and visits from advisors escalated into air cover and ground troop deployment, followed by yet more air cover and ground troops. Without principles, our soldiers were sent for no real reason, except perhaps self-sacrifice. Not only were they intellectually unarmed without principles to guide them as they bravely entered Southeast Asia, but without a plan or strategy, our leaders deprived them of the ability to win. With our leaders unwilling to declare war or commit to the tactics that would achieve victory for the United States, Schwartz writes:
"Ultimately, finding itself engaged in a real war but unwilling to allow the military to take the steps necessary to win it, Washington had to withdraw ignominiously. This pragmatic pattern of irresolution and ineffectualness characterizes virtually all our military conflicts since World War II. It invites our enemies, long after their hope achieving victory on the battlefield has vanished, to continue their fight- as they are doing now in Afghanistan and Iraq. It tells them that they need not fear us."
Herein lies the urgent necessity for developing a principled foreign policy, founded on the pursuit of self-interest. It is the only means of maintaining America's freedom. It is the only way to defeat the terrorists, physically and in spirit, who wish to destroy us. It is the unwillingness to compromise our objectives or to appease our enemies that we need in order to preserve our nation. America desperately needs a principled foreign policy of self-interest--nothing could be more practical.
In his book, A Foreign Policy of Self-Interest: A Moral Ideal For America, Peter Schwartz identifies the current self-sacrificing trends of American foreign policy and presents an appeal for the adoption of a new kind of foreign policy; the unmitigated pursuit of rational self-interest. In this work, Schwartz challenges the conventional wisdom with an uncompromising and ruthlessly candid assessment of the current state of US foreign policy. Insisting that the only moral purpose of government is the defense of individual liberty, he logically deduces that likewise, the only end of a moral foreign policy is the defense of a nation's freedom, and he contends that the only doctrine that can ensure the preservation of America's freedom is the steadfast dedication to the pursuit of self-interest on the international stage.
However, this book is not a call for America to intervene in any and every conflict in the world, to send troops anywhere we please to achieve any objective we conceive, or even to hasten the democratization of the third world. It is an urgent appeal for American leaders to discontinue the shamefully self-defeating practices currently perpetrated in the guise of diplomacy. It is a combination of potency and temperance, best exemplified in Teddy Roosevelt's words of wisdom, "Speak softly and carry a big stick." It is a plea for the end of self-sacrifice, self-doubt and insecurity in international relations.
In the Iraq war, for instance, instead of admitting with moral confidence that we sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein for the protection of Americans, we pretended that the altruistic liberation of the Iraqi people was the chief motive behind the invasion. We wasted valuable time before the war placating the United Nations, pleading for a moral sanction from an organization consisting of dictators and theocrats. We enacted dangerously constraining rules of engagement over our troops on the battlefield, all in the hope that world opinion would turn favorable for us.
The terrorist threat against Western civilization continues to grow, and can not be defeated with half-measures, compromises or diplomacy. America has nothing to gain by negotiating with dictators and international villains. As Schwartz observes in negotiations with North Korea, "We are offering the North Koreans something that is ours- our wealth; in return, they are offering us something that is also ours- the right to be free from nuclear attack. We lose while the North Koreans gain. If that is a trade, then so is every stick-up, under which the victim `trades' his money for his life."
Using this example, Schwartz demonstrates that diplomacy is an inappropriate means of negotiating with dictatorships, and that the only proper means of dealing with them is with ostracism. We should allow these nations to stand or fall on their own. He continues, "We should stop sanctioning our own destroyers. We should stop helping them pretend they are moral, civilized nations. If they threaten us, the only message they merit is the same one that any domestic criminal ought to receive from the police: drop your weapons or be overwhelmed by force."
Contrary to what the American left would have you believe, Schwartz insists that there is nothing evil about considering only our own interests when acting internationally. On the contrary, the only evil that can and usually is committed in American foreign policy is the sacrifice of American interests for dubious or imaginary benefits, including distributing foreign aid, fearing collateral damage in battle or bowing down before the wishes of the United Nations. We should never be ashamed to admit that we will consistently defend our interests and refuse to sacrifice them. As for the enemies of America, Schwartz warns "They need not like us, only fear us."
Entailed in Schwartz's criticism of such self-sacrificial actions as distributing billions of dollars of foreign aid to Iranians or Egyptians, or apologizing when China forces down and dismantles a US spy plane that was in international air space, is a rejection of the usefulness of what political theorist Joseph Nye identifies as "soft power." This is the benevolent use of political or military power, the motive being the winning of the hearts and minds of the international community. Schwartz attaches no inherent value to world opinion or to multilateralism, and his policy outlook is completely consistent with unilateralism. It is a foreign policy guided by principles, not by the spur of the moment, "seat of the pants" expediency, nor by the number of its adherents.
A foreign policy founded on principles instead of more "practical" considerations is certain to make some readers uncomfortable. Though the alleged dichotomy between principles and pragmatism will quickly be pointed out by political scientists that subscribe to the realpolitik school of thought, Schwartz shows that this argument has no merit by singling out a series of foreign policy decisions that had no principled foundation, no moral justification, nothing but concrete-bound range of the moment expediency- and ended in an inevitable and utter disaster. This prime example of the abject failure of policy without principle is the Vietnam War.
Fifty-five thousand Americans lost their lives in a war that Washington inched into in complete pragmatic fashion. America had no national interests at stake, no commitment to any specific action, no definite objectives. What began with supplies shipments and visits from advisors escalated into air cover and ground troop deployment, followed by yet more air cover and ground troops. Without principles, our soldiers were sent for no real reason, except perhaps self-sacrifice. Not only were they intellectually unarmed without principles to guide them as they bravely entered Southeast Asia, but without a plan or strategy, our leaders deprived them of the ability to win. With our leaders unwilling to declare war or commit to the tactics that would achieve victory for the United States, Schwartz writes:
"Ultimately, finding itself engaged in a real war but unwilling to allow the military to take the steps necessary to win it, Washington had to withdraw ignominiously. This pragmatic pattern of irresolution and ineffectualness characterizes virtually all our military conflicts since World War II. It invites our enemies, long after their hope achieving victory on the battlefield has vanished, to continue their fight- as they are doing now in Afghanistan and Iraq. It tells them that they need not fear us."
Herein lies the urgent necessity for developing a principled foreign policy, founded on the pursuit of self-interest. It is the only means of maintaining America's freedom. It is the only way to defeat the terrorists, physically and in spirit, who wish to destroy us. It is the unwillingness to compromise our objectives or to appease our enemies that we need in order to preserve our nation. America desperately needs a principled foreign policy of self-interest--nothing could be more practical.
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful
A very rational, indisputable outlook on American foreign policy, with a philosophical approach that is based on reason and rational self-interest. Our founding fathers would have been proud of this book--and it would behoove this country to read Schwartz's words.
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