on January 26, 2011
"The Great Stagnation" offers a very concise and well thought-out essay on the relationship between innovation and prosperity. The first chapter, which shows how median incomes have stagnated in recent years as the economy's "low hanging fruit" has gotten scarce is especially well done. The parts on health care and education are also very good.
Cowen's central idea is that the pace of innovation has slowed, and that we are now on a "technological plateau" that makes further growth challenging. If you consider technology in the broad sense (energy, transportation, home, etc), this makes sense as things have not changed a lot in recent decades. However, I think it is also true that progress has been highly concentrated in information technology and communications, and that things continue to advance rapidly in this area. Cowen notes this but seems to feel that the Internet is the only really major innovation.
Cowen argues that what we need is a new burst of innovation that will propel economic growth. Here is the problem I see with that: Cowen writes that "a lot of our major innovations are springing up in sectors where a lot of work is done by machines, not by human beings." In fact if you look at companies like Google or Facebook, or entire industries like semiconductors, computers, Internet or biotech, there are really not a lot of jobs in total and certainly not a lot for middle skill people. If there is manufacturing it is either heavily automated or offshore.
The question is: if today's innovations are already creating industries that are not labor-intensive and rely instead on technology, why would the future be different? Won't the new burst of innovation that Cowen calls for create even more technology-intensive industries...and few jobs?
on October 30, 2011
Some reviewers have done a good job here, but some have utterly missed major points, if they have read the essay at all, which I doubt, so I will give potential readers an outline.
I. The low-hanging fruit we ate
..A. Examples in the United States
....1. Free land (Homestead Act, etc.)
....2. Technological breakthroughs (electricity, motor vehicles, telephone, radio, television, computers etc.)
....3. Smart, uneducated kids (who were made productive through excellent public education).
....4. This is a partial list; clearly other candidates can be proposed, e.g. cheap fossil fuels.
..B. Examples in other countries ("catch-up growth")
....1. Leveraging the technological breakthroughs of the West (e.g. China, India)
....2. Smart, uneducated kids (e.g. China, India)
..C. MEDIAN income growth in the U.S. has slowed notably since 1973.
....1. Decline in household size is not the cause.
....2. Unmeasured quality improvements (think electronic gadgetry) are not a counter (because there is
...... also unmeasured quality degradation, think traffic jams and AIDS)
..D. Rate of technical innovation has declined notably since 1873 and even more since 1955
....1. Innovation is getting harder; the low fruit has been picked.
....2. Recent innovations have slight marginal benefits
..E. Recent and current innovation is more geared to PRIVATE goods than to PUBLIC goods.
....**This is the driver of the Great Stagnation.
....1. Extracting resources from the government (subsidies for solar power, farm products, other junk;
.....useless construction; useless government employees; legal services, etc.) by lobbying.
....2. Extreme protections of intellectual property (e.g. by ridiculous patent laws that grant monopolies for
...... incandescently obvious ideas, enabled by our retarded judiciary)
....3. Recent financial innovations (CDO's, derivatives, etc.) that benefit Wall Street at public expense.
....4. THESE ALL RESULT IN INCREASED INCOME INEQUALITY.
II. Our New (not so productive) Economy
..A. Most recent productivity gains in the private sector have been achieved by cutting out dead wood
....("discovering who isn't doing much and firing them").
..B. GDP statistics are flawed because they value expenditure at cost; actual value of the expenditure is
.... unknown in sectors where market forces do not operate.
..C. Underperforming sectors where valuation at cost is a big problem:
......a. The marginal value of government, even if positive, falls as government grows larger.
........(1) Basic expenditures deliver high value. e.g. police, basic infrastructure, national security)
........(2) Ancillary expenditures deliver less value (e.g. bridges to nowhere, urban renewal boondoggles,
......... salaries for school administrators and federal drones
......b. Because government contribution to GDP is valued at cost, the larger the government grows,
........ the more GDP growth and living standards are overstated.
....2. Health care
......a. No bloody clue what things are actually worth; they are valued at cost.
......b. America currently spends 17% of GDP on health care, with outcomes worse than countries
....... that spend far less.
......c. Disproportionate spending on end care for the elderly.
......d. David Cutler's study: health care productivity growth 1995-2005 was negative.
......a. 6% of GDP at present.
......b. No improvements in student reading or math performance since mid 70's.
......c. But we are spending (constant dollars) twice a much now per student as we did then.
......d. High school graduation rate peaked at 80% in late 60's.
......e. Government claims of 88% graduation rate are nonsense.
......f. 20% of all new high school credentials each year come from passing equivalency tests.
..D. INNOVATION MUST OCCUR IN THESE UNDER-PERFORMING SECTORS
... This is where Cowan fails to state solutions clearly, which may disappoint readers, but his point is that
... these are areas where innovative thinking is required and good solutions need to be developed. My summary
... and suggestions:
....1. "If you can't measure it, you can't manage it." Use market approaches, intelligently ascertain value by
..... other means, and if measurement fails, arbitrarily force cuts in low-performing sectors (as a last resort).
....2. Government: 10% staff cuts. Strict spending limits pegged to per-capita government spending during a
.... benchmark period.
....3. Education: Standardized tests, charter schools, e-learning, vouchers (all of course resisted by the
..... education lobby).
....4. Health care: determine what works and pay only for that. Extending the life of an 90-year-old terminally
..... ill person for one month at a cost of $200,000 is not something that works.
III. Does the Internet Change Everything?
..A. Similar to early years of industrial revolution (advances made by amateurs)
..B. Hard to measure its productivity because its value lies largely in the mental dimension; most stuff on the
... internet is free.
....1. Traditional activity does occur (advertising, sale of goods). eBay, Amazon, Craigslist, ads on Google.
....2. While a public good, benefits of the Internet skewed to the intellectually curious.
....3. GDP is understated to extent it does not include the value of free internet pleasures.
..C. As an innovation, the internet has generated few jobs and revenue, compared to earlier innovations.
... (Example: Google employs 20,000, Twitter 300)
..D. Internet has also destroyed jobs in the music industry, book stores, and other forms of entertainment.
..E. So we're getting away from materialism, but it really hurts and people are yelping about it.
IV. The Government of Low-hanging Fruit
..A. Days of government largess are past; we can't slop the public trough like we used to.
..B. We won't be getting real income growth of 2% to 3%. We'll be lucky with 1%.
..C. Tax cuts without spending cuts (right wing approach) are untenable in the long term.
..D. Taking from the rich is also untenable in the long term; top 5% already pays for 43% of the federal
... government; top 1% for 27%.
..E. As real growth stagnates, demands from interest groups (corporations for tax breaks, K-12 teachers for job
... security, medical device makers for Medicare payments, public employees for pensions) will grow more
... strident. Expect more vociferous arguments about how to divide up the stagnant pie.
..F. Because government cannot continue to grow under current conditions, Liberals have become the new
... conservatives, supporting the status quo of handouts, bribes, and squandering.
V. Why did we have such a big financial crisis?
..A. Eight words: "WE THOUGHT WE WERE RICHER THAN WE WERE".
....1. We made plans expecting continued 3% productivity growth and the asset prices such growth would bring.
....2. We were lulled by successful handling of prior crises (e.g. the S&L bust and real estate bubble in the
..... 80's) into believing all risk could be managed effectively.
....3. Overconfidence was the problem. For everyone. Borrowers, investors, bankers, politicians, regulators.
..B. Markets and government failed miserably in estimating risk.
..C. Government encouraged risk by taking by overlooking accounting scandals (Freddie and Fannie) and promoting
... home ownership for everybody.
..D. Short-term response to stagnant incomes was to borrow against appreciated assets (home equity loans,
... mortgage refis), foolishly expecting continued asset appreciation. From 1993 through 2005,
... homeowners extracted equity equal to 11.5% of GDP.
..E. Fiscal stimulus in 2009 was inadequate, but a larger stimulus would not have helped. Problem is not lack of
... aggregate demand, but lack of revenue-generating innovation.
..F. Replacing private debt with public debt solves nothing. Sooner or later you have to pay the piper.
..G. The internet, by giving people much to do for free, may be exacerbating the current stagnation.
VI. Can we fix things?
..A. Promote favorable trends
....1. India and China
......a. Science and engineering interest in India and China: should yield innovations we can exploit.
......b. Offloading unskilled labor abroad gives us more time to pursue innovation (if we are smart enough).
......c. Consumers in China and India can offer a market for our innovations.
....2. Internet may do more for revenue generation in the future
......a. Promotes scientific learning and makes science more of a meritocracy; ideas rapidly shared and improved.
........ (Archaic intellectual property laws will need to change if we are to take advantage of this)
......b. Promotes self-education; a lot better than watching TV.
......c. These should all yield productivity gains.
....3. Improvements in K-12 education
......a. Majority of electorate no longer sides with education lobby.
......b. School choice, charter schools, incentives, better monitoring are now in favor.
....4. Raise the social status of scientists
......a. Science is what fuels economic growth, yet we reward law, medicine, and finance.
......b. [Aside: this is not the case in China and India, where engineers and scientists are more highly
....... esteemed, and occupy the highest offices in government. Here, we have poli sci graduates running things.]
......c. Culture of science is what drove the industrial revolution.
......d. We should not trust individual scientists uncritically, but we should respect science at the higher
....... level (a lot more than law or finance)
..B. Avoid unfavorable trends
....1. Cool the rhetoric, avoid useless strife.
....2. Stick to facts. Educate yourself. Don't demonize those you disagree with.
....3. A prolonged period of slow growth need not be bad -- Japan has tolerated it very well.
..C. Final Word
....1. The next low-hanging fruit may pose dangers. Be vigilant and quick to respond.
....2. Axis and Communist powers turned new technologies to destructive and oppressive ends.
....3. Balance of power can be upset.
on June 8, 2011
Tyler Cowen: The Great Stagnation
This nice little book is worth reading. Tyler Cohen has correctly identified several almost unique circumstances that helped America become great and powerful. Some low hanging fruit like free land, innovation, millions of immigrants seeking work (and ready to work for pennies), millions of young people wanting to get education; scientific progress and technical innovation.
The book contains very sharp observations. For instance, the author notices that innovation has moved lately in the wrong direction:
"If one sentence were to sum up the mechanism driving the Great Stagnation, it is this: Recent and current innovation is more geared to private goods that to public goods. That simple observation ties together the three major macroeconomic events of our time: growing income inequality, stagnant median income, and, as we will see in chapter five, the financial crisis.:
Not only this. Cowen points out that "Top American earners are increasingly concentrated in the financial sector of the economy."
The booklet is easy to read, the style is lively and intellectually entertaining. When I reached the end, however, I said: Oops, was that all? Too many blank spots left!
Here is a major blank spot: The dollar. Talking about low hanging fruit, the author somehow missed the dollar. By becoming the world reserve currency after WW2, the dollar gave this country an enormous financial advantage. It became not only a low hanging fruit, but a ready fruit on the table. The benefits of this fruit only increased when it was freed from gold in 1971 and when OPEC agreed to trade oil only in dollars in 1974. What is the future of the dollar? What are the perspectives to enjoy it free on the table? The author should have addressed these questions.
Tyler Cowen understands very well the importance of technical innovation as the engine of general prosperity. Close to the end he says something good about science and scientists - raise the social status of scientists!
This is very nice, indeed, but seems to be just wishful thinking. The decline of science has a long history. Hollywood movies and popular media have generated and confirmed a very negative image of the man of science. He is usually weird, a loner, with grey standing up hair, and very often with mental of physical problems. The scientist is definitely not a role model. How can one change this? May be by government financing?
Remember the Texas Superconducting Supercollider? In 1993, after investing more then $2 billion into this project, President Clinton and Congress cancelled it entirely. The Supercollider would have been a great boost for science. This 1993 decision reveals something important about the priorities of the establishment.
Tyler Cowen's comments and suggestions for fighting the recession, unfortunately, are almost naïve. There is nothing written in the book about the problems and expenses of health care, social security and defense spending. Talking about scientific and technological innovation, one should consider the general industrial picture. A country cannot successfully develop scientific innovation without the underlying foundation of industry and manufacturing. When manufacturing is outsourced, science follows too. Toyota's hybrid car Prius, for instance, was not born in an ivory tower; it was the culmination of a long sequence of engineering efforts. Such innovation can only be born in the womb of a vibrant manufacturing industry. But manufacturing is not vibrant now in America. Vibrant is the financial industry, attracting the best and the brightest, and producing derivatives, credit swaps and speculative bubbles. All this is very profitable for a small group of people, but detrimental for the whole society.
I still recommend the book. The good points are many and the omissions have the potential to provoke a healthy dialog with the author.
on February 1, 2011
This is a wonderful mini-book reflecting on the slowing pace of technological process, how US economic growth has changed as a result, and what that means for the next 30 years. Cowen's thesis--that much of the growth from 1940-'75 came from "low-hanging fruit" and will not easily be duplicated--makes a lot of sense to me, as does his assertion that further improving educational attainment will be worthwhile but very hard. As usual, Cowen is at his best not at developing revolutionary ideas but in putting ideas together in a new, interesting, thought-provoking, and meaningful ways, that make you think about old issues differently.
He raises interesting points about the productivity growth of the last 30 years: that, really, neither labor nor capital has gotten much richer, so maybe productivity didn't improve that much after all?; and that much of the productivity gains in recent years have come from producing the same amount (or close to it) with fewer people, rather than doing more with the same workforce.
And his thesis about economic growth being perhaps overstated...due to fast growth in sectors--education, health care, government--where expenditures are valued at cost rather than reflecting a market price...rings very true to me. He points out that schools today have MUCH better facilities than they did 40 years ago, and all of that shows up in published GDP numbers--but what is the true benefit of such? Or of highways, unnecessary doctor visits, etc.
His writing about the Internet, and its effect on GDP, also is insightful and important. That is, quality of life has improved in meaningful ways that are destructive to GDP: using wikipedia instead of buying a dictionary, posting on Internet bulletin boards rather than paying to go to the dance hall, etc. Certainly I would spend more than $20/month on movie theaters/rentals if Netflix weren't available. But it is, so I almost never go to the theater, and spend less on rentals than I would have 10 years ago. The immense value--if unmeasured--of the Internet means that GDP/income may be less relevant to quality of life than they used to be. However, our fiscal obligations can't be funded with improved quality of life, so reconciling a slower pace of economic growth with liabilities will be very difficult--especially given that, at present, we don't even really acknowledge the underlying problem. Cowen raises an interesting contrast with Europe, which--perhaps due to WWII--doesn't have the same experience with all their wants being fulfilled.
on January 25, 2011
Who's to blame for the low-growth state of the U.S. economy? In a country filled with partisan finger-pointing and China-bashing, Tyler Cowen attempts to bring the theory of a technological plateau to the forefront. This is not a new idea -- every Econ 101 student learns that there was a productivity slowdown in the 1970s -- but Cowen provides an accessible synthesis of the latest statistics and academic research on the subject. He addresses several counterviews, such as whether inflation is mismeasured and why the technological change wrought by the Internet is distinct from what his grandmother experienced. Today's leading innovators, Google and Facebook, employ smaller numbers of people than General Motors because now the machines and users do most of the work.
Cowen's primary policy prescription is to raise the social status of scientists, who aren't as respected as doctors, lawyers, and bankers. I'm surprised he chose the word scientists rather than entrepreneurs: gifted children are spoon-fed that public service, non-profits, and academic status are noble ambitions, rather than really being encouraged to pursue good ideas. Yet I'd argue society is moving in the right direction in honoring innovators. Mark Zuckerberg initially disliked "The Social Network" movie for its fabrications, but he was pleased to discover that it was inspiring entrepreneurs. Larry Page will achieve higher status now that he is once again CEO of Google in addition to co-founder.
Overall I'm not sure I learned much new from this book, but it framed much of what I did know clearly. The topics addressed by Cowen are too vast to present definitive and convincing answers, but I appreciate the book for asking the right questions.
(edit: corrected errors mentioned in first comment)
on October 17, 2014
Cowen's discussion of the technological plateau and move away from innovation in the productive economy is insightful at first. He is right that the 30 year cycle we saw with major innovations in most fields seemed to stop in the 1960s, and these cycles have shifted. He does mention as a off-hand aside that this was partly because of stolen land, and he does seem to talk about educational plateaus. He mentions India and China, and then things start to slide. For example, he seems to think marketizing schools would make them more proficient. I realize this is gospel in most George Mason economics circles, but there is actually no evidence for and plenty of evidence against it. See the competition in the for-profit (not merely private) sector of higher ed in the states--it is basically consists of things that are barely above diploma mills. Cowen might reply that this is due to the distorting factor of loans: then he should actually study China, Korea, and Latin America. There is a glut of for-profit private education there as well, and it exists without the government loan system in the US, so the market failures cannot be explained by rent-seeking behavior alone.
His answers are standard center-right economist answers even if he is much better at spotting the problems. He does not deny the centralization of wealth, nor is dishonest about tax breaks. It is sad that conservatism in the United States has come to those two talking points alone because otherwise it would be clear where Cowen's ideological presumptions lie. For example, he briefly says that the Reagan (or Volker) revolution set the US right, but he has already proved economic stagnation continued unabated since the 1960s forward. Both statements can't be truth. He is right about Keynesian retribution schemes being very limited in time frame (something that even Keynes's himself pointed out), and generally are only affective after massive destruction of capital (after World War 2), but doesn't seem to have an answer for why the austerity in Europe has not cleared out the "rot" and let to renewal in GDP in the EU outside of Germany and Nordic countries (who he makes a swipe at).
He is right that America is beyond the lowing hanging fruit, but does not seem to see that India and China's rapid industrialization is also in a similar pattern of development. It is easy to grow massively when you are establishing yourself and opening up new markets: declines in the rates of profits per unit don't kind in as quickly in those states and the need for extreme intellectual property to try to artificially force prices up through removal of competition isn't a problem at that stage either. This, however, is rooted in historical economics which is something the synchronic thinkers in the neo-classical school of economic do not admit. Cowen is not different here.
So while Cowen's diagnosis is in some ways dead-on: his prescription is more cliche from the Tom Friedman-style center-right school, and his optimism at the end may be a false note.
on May 30, 2011
This is a very thought provoking essay. It is concise and well written. Its brevity is refreshing given how many books these days stretch 50 pages of information across 500 pages (e.g., T. Friedman.) The central thesis of the piece is simply that technological progress has slowed down so economic growth will slow as well. That thesis is rock solid but whether technological progress has slowed to the extent argued here is debatable. That question requires the expertise of an engineer or scientist but they don't seem to write books like this.
I would have rated this higher but there are a couple of big gaffs that I couldn't let go. First, Cowen argues that big government requires modern technology and that government by "ox-cart" can't work on a large scale. Given the fact that the Roman Empire lasted as long as it did and that it was as extensive, centralized and powerful as it was this supposed dependence of big government on technology is obviously false. Second, Cowen compares modern Singapore with Periclean Athens which is just absurd. The classical Athenian democracy (even in Pericles time) was remarkable for its dysfunction. The Athenians made so many bad decisions that they drove their brightest citizens to become very anti-democratic (e.g., Plato among many others.) How this remarkably dysfunctional democracy that repeatedly made disastrous decisions has anything to do with modern day Singapore is just beyond me. These two faults don't distract from Cowen's main point at all but that really makes them worse: Why are they in the essay at all? It demonstrates some sloppiness on Cowen's part and a complete ignorance of classical history (a period that should be of some interest to scholars of technology's effect on economic growth.)
Tyler Cowen's `The Great Stagnation' is less a full-length book than an extended essay which attempts to explain current economic and median-income stagnation in the USA, and what might happen in the future. The author's basic idea is that between 1880 and 1970 the USA benefited from an abundance of `low-hanging fruit': almost limitless land resources relative to population; technological breakthroughs like electricity, indoor plumbing, railroads, automobiles, radio, telephones, tape recorders, mass production and the availability of reliably tested pharmaceuticals; and a continuous supply of first-generation immigrant labor to do all the hard jobs at low rates of pay. This party is now over, and the hangover has set in.
Cowen's analysis of historical trends in technological innovation reveals a plateau since the 1970s in the adoption and wide dissemination of useful new technologies: i.e. like in the 1970s we still drive cars powered by gasoline, and use refrigerators and TVs; they're just incrementally improved but not radically different in concept. Now they're made elsewhere in the world by newly industrialised economies which have imitated the industrial practices of the US and Europe, and are imported rather than home-produced. The newer technologies like the internet and cell phones are for communications, and don't need a lot of workers to run them.
The author goes on to analyse the incremental value of increasing spend on education, which he sees as offering diminishing economic returns, and writes an excellent section analysing healthcare spending - again, beyond a certain point doubling spending offers smaller and smaller incremental returns in health benefits. Cowen uses a graph to demonstrate that although every major European country has a total healthcare expenditure per capita of less than half that of the USA, they all have longer life-expectancy and lower infant mortality - so it's not to do with money per se, but how things are done and how the money is used.
The author's fix-it ideas include raising the social esteem in which scientists are held: well, amen to that, but is that really going to make a big difference? The biggest earners in the USA are now in the financial sector. Trading credit default swaps, derivatives and securitised financial products may enrich the tiny part of the workforce concerned with such chimera, but they tend to relatively impoverish everyone else and do not spread wealth around as in the industrial age, when millions of people were employed in designing and making real, useful things which improved people's lives and which everybody wanted. Cowen predicts we might be in for a longer and deeper economic recession before new scientific innovations can renew society again, and that the rate of progress will remain uneven and people might "look back to the current era with a gloss of nostalgia" - hardly an optimistic prognosis.
The text of this hardcover was originally an e-book, printed to take in new audiences and offer a more permanent artefact than an online blog. Despite its shortcomings its 89 pages present punchy, lucid arguments and make for an easy read of a few hours, brevity and clarity among its chief recommendations.
on January 3, 2014
In September 2008 I taught a graduate social policy course at Arizona State University West. The economy was going into a crazy spiral and I felt obligated to explain why to my students. They sat back in total disbelief as I predicted massive unemployment, a rapid decline in the stock market, a serious decline in public revenues resulting in a loss of public sector jobs, and very high rates of foreclosures. For them, America had always been a great horn of plenty and now, suddenly, it wasn't. They were mystified. This being Arizona, many were beginning to go into foreclosure as payments on sub-prime mortgages were increasing beyond their means. Like so many Americans, their homes were now under water and unaffordable and the public sector jobs they had anticipated getting, had all but disappeared..
For anyone who feels mystified by what's happened to America's economy, Taylor Cowen's "The Great Stagnation: How America Ate All The Low-Hanging Fruit of Modern History, Got Sick, and Will (Eventually) Feel Better" is a good place to start. It's a short book and, certainly, there are books that go into greater detail about the recession, but for the underlying causes, this is a good place to start. It's Cowen's contention that America has prospered without much effort through cheap labor, plentiful resources, and the positive impact of immigration, to name several. He sees an America where all the indicators point to a steady decline including the dumbing down of education so that our increasingly smart children are receiving educations that fail to prepare them for the responsibilities of democracy let alone a job market that heavily relies on technology. He also sees in both parties a political class unwilling to take on the challenges of turning things around. You'll have to decide whether his optimism that we will ultimately elect leaders who don't kick our many national challenges down the road is realistic, but as a basic primer in the social and economic reasons for our decline, this is a short, easy to read book which will help you understand why, without major changes in the way we resolve problems in America, the recession of 2008 will continue on indefinitely.
on November 1, 2012
Cowen makes a number of points in a surprisingly short essay. (Shorter is better, I'm paying for points made, not pages used to make them.)
First is that economic progress depends on (among other factors) technological innovation. So far so good; this is nearly a truism. Cowen goes on to say that technological innovation is lumpy (yes) and that the period 1980-2010 is actually a period of low, rather than high, innovation. That last point got my attention. I agree. However, the argument needs more evidence here -- how do you measure worldwide technological innovation over, say, a decade, and then compare that with other decades? On the surface, one can say: electric light + automobile + telegraph + radio (inventions from 1880 - 1920) beat all the inventions from 1970 - 2010 (Internet, and, well, what else?)
Cowen also says: it's difficult to measure increases in human satisfaction ("welfare" is the economic term but some readers may take that to mean something else, so I'll say "human satisfaction" instead). Government outputs that increase human satisfaction are difficult to measure, so economists fall back to measuring the cost of the inputs instead. That leads to self-justified government programs: a 20-person department must be better than a 10-person department because it costs twice as much.
The Internet, the great invention of the past 30 years, poses a similar problem. The internet has taken out so many costs that it's hard to measure human satisfaction from nearly cost-free goods! For example, I bought a copy of "Up from Slavery" for $0.00 from amazon.com. I enjoyed reading it and it inspired me. But how can an economist measure how much better off I am? The Internet has created a mountain of unquantifiable consumer surplus.
If stagnation comes from low innovation, then how does one increase innovation? Cowen offers one proposal: offer more respect to scientists and engineers. Give less of your adoration to entertainers of various types and more of it to people actually improving the world. By itself, this isn't very actionable. However, Cowen points out that some cultures respect engineers more than other cultures, and he predicts that societies with such cultures are going to do better in the future.