The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics: Lessons from Japan's Great Recession [Hardcover]

Richard C. Koo (Author)

Book Description

Publication Date: May 4, 2009 | ISBN-10: 0470823879 | ISBN-13: 978-0470823873 | Edition: 1st

Japan's "Great Recession" lasted from approximately 1992 - 2007 and finally provided the economics profession with the necessary background to understand what actually happened during the US recession of the 1930s. The discoveries made, however, are so far-reaching that a large portion of economics literature will have to be modified to accommodate another half to the macro economic spectrum of possibilities that conventional theorists have overlooked.

In particular, Japan's Great Recession showed that when faced with a massive fall in asset prices, companies typically jettison the conventional goal of profit maximization and move to minimize debt in order to restore their credit ratings. This shift in corporate priority, however, has huge theoretical as well as practical implications and opens up a whole new field of study. For example, the new insight can explain fully the precise mechanism of prolonged depression and liquidity trap which conventional economics - based on corporate profit maximization - has so far failed to offer as a convincing explanation.

The author developed the idea of yin and yang business cycles where the conventional world of profit maximization is the yang and the world of balance sheet recession, where companies are minimizing debt, is the yin. Once so divided, many varied theories developed in macro economics since the 1930s can be nicely categorized into a single comprehensive theory, i.e., the Holy Grail of macro economics

The policy implication of this new discovery is immense in that the conventional aversion to fiscal policy in favor of monetary policy will have to be completely reversed when the economy is in the yin phase.

The theoretical implications are also immense in the sense that the economics profession will no longer have to rely so much on various rigidities to explain recessions that have become the standard practice within the so-called New Keynesian economics of the last twenty years.

Editorial Reviews

Review

"As I have noted before, the best analysis of what happened to Japan is by Richard Koo" (Financial Times, February 18th 2009)

From the Inside Flap

How did the great Depression of the 1930s get to be so bad for so long? That question has baffled economists for decades. Ben S. Bernanke, the current Fed Chairman, even called understanding the great Depression the as yet-unattained "holy Grail of Macroeconomics." Japan's Great recession of 1990-2005 finally gave us some vital clues as to how a post-bubble economy can plunge into prolonged recession while leaving conventional policy responses largely ineffective.

Building on the author's earlier work Balance Sheet Recession: Japan's Struggle with Uncharted Economics and its Global Implications (John Wiley, Singapore, 2003), The Holy Grail of Macroenomics: Lessons from Japan's Great Recession argues that there are actually two phases to an economy, the ordinary (or yang) phase, in which the private sector is maximizing profits, and the post-bubble (or yin) phase, in which private sector is minimizing debt, or repairing damaged balance sheets. Although conventional economics is useful in analyzing economies in the yang phase, it is less useful in explaining phenomena such as the "liquidity trap" that is typical of an economy in the yin phase. The distinction between the yin and yang phases also explains why some policies work well in some situations but not in others. Indeed, it offers the crucial foundation to macroeconomics that has been missing since the days of Keynes.

This groundbreaking book not only explains what happened to the U.S. during the Great Depression and to Japan during the Great recession, it also offers important policy recommendations for fighting post-bubble economic downturns in any country, including the current subprime crisis in the U.S.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 320 pages
• Publisher: Wiley; 1st edition (May 4, 2009)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0470823879
• ISBN-13: 978-0470823873
• Product Dimensions: 6.4 x 1.3 x 9.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (25 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #244,492 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

45 of 47 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Brilliant attack on conventional policies September 14, 2009

By William Podmore

Format:Paperback

Richard Koo, chief economist of Tokyo's Nomura Research Institute, has written a fascinating and important book. He claims that capitalist economies have two phases: the ordinary phase, in which firms aim to maximise profits, and the post-bubble phase, when they aim to pay off their debts. He believes that he has found the missing link of economics: "corporate debt minimisation, therefore, is the long-overlooked micro-foundation of Keynesian macro-economics."

It's still boom and bust. Koo claims that in the boom phase, monetary policy works, but not fiscal; in the bust phase, only fiscal policy works, not monetary. He shows how monetary policy cannot fight a slump. He contends that only huge fiscal stimuli, government actions to boost domestic demand, can prevent slumps.

Koo claims that, in the 1930s depression, in Japan's recession since 1990, and in the present crisis, the problem was the private sector's lack of demand for loans, not a lack of funds from the central banks. Contrary to the consensus, these depressions were not caused by the wrong monetary policy.

How to fight a slump? Cutting spending to reduce government debt is the road to disaster. In the 1930s, both President Hoover and Chancellor Bruning insisted on balancing the budget, which crashed the US and German economies. In 1945 the British government's debt was 250% of GDP, but the country survived. Between 1933 and 1936, President Roosevelt raised government spending by 125%, so GDP rose by 48% and tax revenues rose by 100%. But in 1937 he changed tack and cut spending: industrial output fell by 33%.

Japan's recession (caused by falls in the value of its assets - land and loans) destroyed 1500 trillion yens' worth of wealth - three years of Japan's GDP. (The USA's depression lost it one year's GDP.) In Japan, monetary stimuli failed, so the Japanese government proposed irrelevant Thatcherite supply-side changes, like privatising the post office.

In 1997 the Hashimoto government, under IMF pressure, cut spending and raised taxes to balance the budget. As a result, output fell for five quarters, Japan's worst post-war meltdown, and the budget deficit rose from 22 trillion yen in 1996 to 38 trillion in 1999. In 2001, the Koizumi government did the same - with the same result. It also tried the monetary policy of quantitative easing. But this did not increase lending or the money supply. It was irrelevant.

Subsequently, the Japanese government adopted a policy of no fiscal consolidation without growth, i.e. no spending cuts or tax rises before private-sector demand recovered. This fiscal stimulus prevented a 1930s-style depression; by 2005, firms had started to borrow again.

Again, in Germany's balance sheet recession of 2000-05, "the Maastricht Treaty prevented it from applying the fiscal stimulus it needed. This deepened the recession", as Koo observes.

Finally, he notes the harmful effects of the free movement of capital: "in view of the explosion of cross-border capital flows during the past two decades contributing to adverse currency movements and the widening of global imbalances, some restrictions on those flows may be desirable." He also notes the damage done by free trade: "that market forces have not only failed to rectify trade imbalances but actually made them worse suggests that some kind of government action may be necessary."

14 of 15 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Every page and paragraph a gem of information August 31, 2009

By Roger

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

I am a neophyte in economics, I should have put my attention hear years ago -- being a "do gooder" at heart. The past three months I have delved into the dismal science. I never anticipated such divergence of opinions and theories. The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics is simply a gem of knowledge. Of the many books/texts I have aquired, this one is the best in gaining the meat. I mean by this, it is written in a dense style, reminisent of college texts years gone by -- yet each paragraph holds my attention and interest, unlike so many others. The author's analysis and view points are clearly stated with ample examples and "evidence." This fine writting is simply not of the "dismal science" but a wonder of clear analysis and clarity of writting.

9 of 9 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars important work on debt aversion October 22, 2009

By A. Menon

Format:Paperback|Amazon Verified Purchase

This book is a good account of the phenomenon of debt aversion. The thesis of the book is pretty straightforward and is that, after asset bubbles burst and businesses are technically insolvent through liquidation analysis, they are likely to pay down debt irrespective of monetary policy. The fact that the businesses are technically insolvent despite market prices is described as being a function of information asymmetry and bank incentives.

This realization is deemed to be the missing link to complete economist's understanding of how to bridge fiscal macroeconomic thought and monetary economic thought and the solutions required in the aftermath of a burst asset bubble. Discussing the shortfalls of Friedman's positions on the demand function for money to be a function of nominal interest rates, it is argued that when one is in the position of being insolvent yet operational, the focus shifts from using lending lines to maximise ROE to using free cashflow to minimize the debt that is causing this insolvency. When this market regime is upon us, it is the need of the government to use fiscal policy to fund the output gap.

I think this is pretty accurate as an analysis of the problems that arise in monetary policy when the world is in fear of the phenomenon that hurt them (being burdened with debt that is greater relative to the asset base one had assumed would back it) and this aversion has macroeconomic repurcussions. My only criticism is, I dont think this is as obscure a result as is described. Most ecnomists realize how output gaps can arise, how debt aversion can form. Richard Posner, who is a judge, talks about debt aversion off-hand as though its well known. So all in all i think its a god perscriptive piece on a very real phenomenon we deal with but its not revolutionary and this phenomenon is discussed by others (though few have gone in to as much detail about it).