In the midst of the most serious financial upheaval since the Great Depression, legendary financier George Soros explores the origins of the crisis and its implications for the future. Soros, whose breadth of experience in financial markets is unrivaled, places the current crisis in the context of decades of study of how individuals and institutions handle the boom and bust cycles that now dominate global economic activity. “This is the worst financial crisis since the 1930s,” writes Soros in characterizing the scale of financial distress spreading across Wall Street and other financial centers around the world. In a concise essay that combines practical insight with philosophical depth, Soros makes an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the great credit crisis and its implications for our nation and the world.
The New Paradigm for Financial Markets
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"The London Times" "They're wrong about oil, by George: In short, the standard economic assumption that supply and demand drive prices is only a starting point for understanding financial markets. In boom-bust cycles, the textbook theory is not just slightly inaccurate but totally wrong. This is the main argument made by George Soros in his fascinating book on the credit crunch, "The New Paradigm for Financial Markets," launched at an LSE lecture last night."
About the Author
George Soros is chairman of Soros Fund Management and is the founder of a global network of foundations dedicated to supporting open societies. He is the author of several best-selling books including The Bubble of American Supremacy, Underwriting Democracy, and The Age of Fallibility. He was born in Budapest and lives in New York City.
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George Soros was born in Budapest, Hungary on August 12, 1930. He survived the occupation of Budapest and left communist Hungary in 1947 for England, where he graduated from the London School of Economics. While a student at LSE, Mr. Soros became familiar with the work of the philosopher Karl Popper, who had a profound influence on his thinking and later on his professional and philanthropic activities. The financier. In 1956 Mr. Soros moved to the United States, where he began to accumulate a large fortune through an international investment fund he founded and managed. Today he is Chairman of Soros Fund Management LLC.
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Most Helpful Customer Reviews
168 of 185 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover|Amazon Verified Purchase
In August 2006 the risk manager of the home equity division of one of the largest banks in the United States collected his staff together and told them that the portfolio they manage had begun to exhibit dramatic losses. All the other banking institutions were beginning to exhibit similar losses he said, but that policies to be put in place will mitigate these losses and therefore "not to worry." He resigned his position only six months later, and at the time the mortgage losses throughout the nation were accelerating dramatically, forcing layoffs, resignations, panic in the financial markets, and aggressive action from the Federal Reserve.
Theories abound on why this turmoil is occurring, one of these being discussed in this book, which is written by one of most well-known financial speculators of all time. The tone of the book is general and philosophical, and the author refrains from indulging in mathematical considerations, but there are many concepts in the book that are interesting and merit further investigation. The author's intellectual honesty is refreshing, in that he admits the job he has taken on is a formidable one. Describing the workings of the financial markets is challenging, and has occupied the time of countless researchers and financial analysts.
The author wants to get rid of the "market equilibrium" paradigm in traditional economics and replace it with one that he has called "reflexivity". This concept is similar to a few that have been discussed in recent months, one holding that investor analysis and modeling activities actually serve to change the markets, rather than just "mirror" them. The author's idea is that humans have both a cognitive function and a "manipulative" one when they approach the financial markets. This has the implication that social phenomena cannot be described or studied in the same way as natural phenomena. They are separate areas of study, he argues, and he attempts to justify their separation on the pages of this very short book.
His analysis is interesting and provocative, and certainly worthy of attention, but to put it on a firm quantitative foundation would require a large amount of work. The theory of reflexivity is not the only proposal to be put forward that differs from the classical one. There have been many in recent years due to the increasing importance of financial engineering, the latter of which has been applied on a massive scale. But the author proposed this theory almost two decades ago, when derivatives trading and financial modeling were beginning to ramp up. He therefore foresaw the need for alternative points of view when dealing with financial instruments and market activities that cannot be captured by the classical paradigm.
The book is part autobiographical and could probably be better appreciated if the reader was familiar with the author's earlier works. But anyone interested in making sense out of the current news reports will find an interesting read here, even though at times the author's political affiliation comes out a bit heavy-handed. In addition, his attitude about free markets and "laissez faire" is somewhat puzzling since a purely "laissez faire" economy has not been realized historically. Any arguments against its efficacy are therefore misplaced. Those who still believe in "laissez faire" may therefore object strongly to many of the author's assertions and his recommendations at the end of the book for fixing the current "credit crisis." Whatever your world view though it is perhaps fair to say that the increasing complexity of the financial markets demands new ideas and approaches.If anything a good understanding of financial dynamics is a matter of survival. The financial markets of the twenty-first century take no prisoners.
Theories abound on why this turmoil is occurring, one of these being discussed in this book, which is written by one of most well-known financial speculators of all time. The tone of the book is general and philosophical, and the author refrains from indulging in mathematical considerations, but there are many concepts in the book that are interesting and merit further investigation. The author's intellectual honesty is refreshing, in that he admits the job he has taken on is a formidable one. Describing the workings of the financial markets is challenging, and has occupied the time of countless researchers and financial analysts.
The author wants to get rid of the "market equilibrium" paradigm in traditional economics and replace it with one that he has called "reflexivity". This concept is similar to a few that have been discussed in recent months, one holding that investor analysis and modeling activities actually serve to change the markets, rather than just "mirror" them. The author's idea is that humans have both a cognitive function and a "manipulative" one when they approach the financial markets. This has the implication that social phenomena cannot be described or studied in the same way as natural phenomena. They are separate areas of study, he argues, and he attempts to justify their separation on the pages of this very short book.
His analysis is interesting and provocative, and certainly worthy of attention, but to put it on a firm quantitative foundation would require a large amount of work. The theory of reflexivity is not the only proposal to be put forward that differs from the classical one. There have been many in recent years due to the increasing importance of financial engineering, the latter of which has been applied on a massive scale. But the author proposed this theory almost two decades ago, when derivatives trading and financial modeling were beginning to ramp up. He therefore foresaw the need for alternative points of view when dealing with financial instruments and market activities that cannot be captured by the classical paradigm.
The book is part autobiographical and could probably be better appreciated if the reader was familiar with the author's earlier works. But anyone interested in making sense out of the current news reports will find an interesting read here, even though at times the author's political affiliation comes out a bit heavy-handed. In addition, his attitude about free markets and "laissez faire" is somewhat puzzling since a purely "laissez faire" economy has not been realized historically. Any arguments against its efficacy are therefore misplaced. Those who still believe in "laissez faire" may therefore object strongly to many of the author's assertions and his recommendations at the end of the book for fixing the current "credit crisis." Whatever your world view though it is perhaps fair to say that the increasing complexity of the financial markets demands new ideas and approaches.If anything a good understanding of financial dynamics is a matter of survival. The financial markets of the twenty-first century take no prisoners.
97 of 112 people found the following review helpful
By G. D. Geiss
Format:Hardcover
I saw Mr. Soros testify before Washington State (home state of my favorite soccer goal keeper) Sen. Maria Cantwell's committee the other day (on TV, of course) concerning possible oil futures speculation. I was impressed with Senator Cantwell (although we'd agree on little, policy-wise) and with Mr. Soros (despite myself). So I picked up this book to see what he had to say on the central economic issue of the day.
I won't bash the book, exactly, but it was pretty rambling, pretty repetitive, and spent a considerably longer time trying to defend/explain his theory of "reflectivity" and bashing Republican politics than discussing the credit crisis. Still it offered some useful points and observations. It's personal account of worlwide historical financial events that Mr. Soros himself not only lived through but participated in as well as a concise account of the events that comprise the subprime mortgage meltdown were themselves worth, in my view, the price of admission.
In the end, though, the central theme of the book, it's overarching structure, is Mr. Soro's longstanding theorem about "reflectivity" in financial markets. He maintains that both the factual "reality" and the participants' resort to emotional facilities as a result of imperfect informational access interact with each other in a kind of feedback loop. As a result of this "reflectivity" serious degrees of uncertainty are injected into the marketplace that are not predicted by "classical" economic theories of "rationality" or "equilibrium". This, he says, invalidates market models based on those classic concepts. What to do about that, of course, he's not quite so clear about, except, perhaps, you should vote Democratic (his advice, not mine).
Unfortunately by his own analysis, this theorem is unsatisfactory as anything other than a cautionary alarm bell. By it's own definition and assertion it is untestable and (in the terms of one of Mr. Soros's own favorite philosophers, Karl Popper) incapable of falsification. Since it's prime tenent is that it's unpredictable and not even of consistent relevance in any given situation, it is roughly akin to the statement of Cretan philosopher, Epimenides, (quoted by Soros himself) that "all Cretans always lie". If, claiming unpredictablility, "reflectivity" yields accurate predictions, it is false.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb has called these same kind of events as said to be caused by "reflectivity" black swans. Inductive reasoning in financial markets has led to some frightening financial meltdowns. Having seen only white swans (even in their hundred thousands) and therefore betting the ranch there ARE only white ones is a sound foundation for disaster. Mr. Taleb helpfully also points out that somewhere downunder there are, in fact, black swans.
Benoit Mandelbrot has suggested that his fractile geometry, rather than bell curves, is a better financial model and, in fact, perhaps allows for better predictability. Don't know about that. The intersection between regulators and markets that Mr. Soros rather convincingly argues must be, at least in part, responsible for the subprime mortgage meltdown, doesn't strike me as a geometric intersection, fractile or otherwise. And besides, Herr Doktor Mandelbrot's math is WAY beyond my (or I'd postulate any other non genius math brain's) comprehension.
For me though, the persuasiveness of Mr. Soros's point about unpredictablity and odd shaped (non bell) curves can be found in the seminal work of William James, who demonstrated 100 years ago what every good salesman has always known (at least by instinct, if not overtly): that human beings ACT on feelings and use their intellectual reasoning to rationalize the result. I would accept, a priori, that no single individual actor in today's complex financial markets in our globally interwoven world can possibly know all the relevant facts about any one proposed action therein. Thus he must have imperfect information. And even as among the myriad of facts he does "know", he will use his experience, his intuition based on it and on the recounted experiences of those he has learned to trust, to value those various factual inputs.
I would submit (and I don't think Mr. Soros would raise too strenous an objection) that gernerally speaking, in a broad enough marketplace, all those individual "emotional" decisions ought to cancel each other out to a degree that would render them indistinguishable for practical purposes from randomness. Perhaps not perfect bell curves (some fat tails and modified kurtosis), but within acceptable (and perhaps hedgeable) limits.
But humans are also herd animals (we, however, call them tribes), and that instinct is a survival trait and still strong. One need only contemplate the blowing of a single car horn on a gridlocked highway that is inevitably followed in nanoseconds by hundreds more, to understand it's continued pervasive presence. When that happens in financial affairs, when smart guys get afraid of being left behind the "easy" money, when they can't stand the other tribe harvesting all that golden fleese or bear the thought of some young ambitious upstart taking over their hard won desk by merely following sombody else's playbook (what have you done for me lately says the boss), then homework vanishes. Smart guy follows smart guy in a kind of stampede. Risk of loss no longer matters or is outweighed by the risk of being stranded alone. Each of us (no I'm not a trader, but empathy demands the collective pronoun) falls all over ourselves to steal candy from the blind confectioner, never mind that we know that the poison pill is there in one of those jars on one of those shelves. It won't happen to me, we say. I'm too smart, I'll see it coming, I'll get away. This time it'll be different. We rationalize the emotional decision to chase after the leaders, to blow our horn, too.
This is far too long, let me try to wind up. In this crisis surely whole truckloads of the "smartest guys in the room" demonstrated levels of greed, arrogance, and impaired judgment that, despite being all too human (to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche, who seems particularly apt in this context) are still, in retrospect, shocking. Still, "free markets" provide efficiencies and multiplicities of choice that cannot be duplicated (or even approached) by any central planner or micromanaging regulator. But when these herd markets fail as spectacularly as they have here, the individualist free marketer along with the "reflectivist" (if I may be so bold as to lable Mr. Soros) are both left wanting a better way, a better regulatory system, for keeping these rampaging smart guys from trampling in their passing our own hard won little (in my case) or not so little (in Mr. Soros's) net eggs. This is a thoughtful book. Even just trying to "deconstruct" it may lead you down interesting thoughtways.
I won't bash the book, exactly, but it was pretty rambling, pretty repetitive, and spent a considerably longer time trying to defend/explain his theory of "reflectivity" and bashing Republican politics than discussing the credit crisis. Still it offered some useful points and observations. It's personal account of worlwide historical financial events that Mr. Soros himself not only lived through but participated in as well as a concise account of the events that comprise the subprime mortgage meltdown were themselves worth, in my view, the price of admission.
In the end, though, the central theme of the book, it's overarching structure, is Mr. Soro's longstanding theorem about "reflectivity" in financial markets. He maintains that both the factual "reality" and the participants' resort to emotional facilities as a result of imperfect informational access interact with each other in a kind of feedback loop. As a result of this "reflectivity" serious degrees of uncertainty are injected into the marketplace that are not predicted by "classical" economic theories of "rationality" or "equilibrium". This, he says, invalidates market models based on those classic concepts. What to do about that, of course, he's not quite so clear about, except, perhaps, you should vote Democratic (his advice, not mine).
Unfortunately by his own analysis, this theorem is unsatisfactory as anything other than a cautionary alarm bell. By it's own definition and assertion it is untestable and (in the terms of one of Mr. Soros's own favorite philosophers, Karl Popper) incapable of falsification. Since it's prime tenent is that it's unpredictable and not even of consistent relevance in any given situation, it is roughly akin to the statement of Cretan philosopher, Epimenides, (quoted by Soros himself) that "all Cretans always lie". If, claiming unpredictablility, "reflectivity" yields accurate predictions, it is false.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb has called these same kind of events as said to be caused by "reflectivity" black swans. Inductive reasoning in financial markets has led to some frightening financial meltdowns. Having seen only white swans (even in their hundred thousands) and therefore betting the ranch there ARE only white ones is a sound foundation for disaster. Mr. Taleb helpfully also points out that somewhere downunder there are, in fact, black swans.
Benoit Mandelbrot has suggested that his fractile geometry, rather than bell curves, is a better financial model and, in fact, perhaps allows for better predictability. Don't know about that. The intersection between regulators and markets that Mr. Soros rather convincingly argues must be, at least in part, responsible for the subprime mortgage meltdown, doesn't strike me as a geometric intersection, fractile or otherwise. And besides, Herr Doktor Mandelbrot's math is WAY beyond my (or I'd postulate any other non genius math brain's) comprehension.
For me though, the persuasiveness of Mr. Soros's point about unpredictablity and odd shaped (non bell) curves can be found in the seminal work of William James, who demonstrated 100 years ago what every good salesman has always known (at least by instinct, if not overtly): that human beings ACT on feelings and use their intellectual reasoning to rationalize the result. I would accept, a priori, that no single individual actor in today's complex financial markets in our globally interwoven world can possibly know all the relevant facts about any one proposed action therein. Thus he must have imperfect information. And even as among the myriad of facts he does "know", he will use his experience, his intuition based on it and on the recounted experiences of those he has learned to trust, to value those various factual inputs.
I would submit (and I don't think Mr. Soros would raise too strenous an objection) that gernerally speaking, in a broad enough marketplace, all those individual "emotional" decisions ought to cancel each other out to a degree that would render them indistinguishable for practical purposes from randomness. Perhaps not perfect bell curves (some fat tails and modified kurtosis), but within acceptable (and perhaps hedgeable) limits.
But humans are also herd animals (we, however, call them tribes), and that instinct is a survival trait and still strong. One need only contemplate the blowing of a single car horn on a gridlocked highway that is inevitably followed in nanoseconds by hundreds more, to understand it's continued pervasive presence. When that happens in financial affairs, when smart guys get afraid of being left behind the "easy" money, when they can't stand the other tribe harvesting all that golden fleese or bear the thought of some young ambitious upstart taking over their hard won desk by merely following sombody else's playbook (what have you done for me lately says the boss), then homework vanishes. Smart guy follows smart guy in a kind of stampede. Risk of loss no longer matters or is outweighed by the risk of being stranded alone. Each of us (no I'm not a trader, but empathy demands the collective pronoun) falls all over ourselves to steal candy from the blind confectioner, never mind that we know that the poison pill is there in one of those jars on one of those shelves. It won't happen to me, we say. I'm too smart, I'll see it coming, I'll get away. This time it'll be different. We rationalize the emotional decision to chase after the leaders, to blow our horn, too.
This is far too long, let me try to wind up. In this crisis surely whole truckloads of the "smartest guys in the room" demonstrated levels of greed, arrogance, and impaired judgment that, despite being all too human (to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche, who seems particularly apt in this context) are still, in retrospect, shocking. Still, "free markets" provide efficiencies and multiplicities of choice that cannot be duplicated (or even approached) by any central planner or micromanaging regulator. But when these herd markets fail as spectacularly as they have here, the individualist free marketer along with the "reflectivist" (if I may be so bold as to lable Mr. Soros) are both left wanting a better way, a better regulatory system, for keeping these rampaging smart guys from trampling in their passing our own hard won little (in my case) or not so little (in Mr. Soros's) net eggs. This is a thoughtful book. Even just trying to "deconstruct" it may lead you down interesting thoughtways.
63 of 72 people found the following review helpful
Format:Hardcover
George Soros thinks that the current credit crunch is the most severe financial crisis since the 1930s and that it marks the end of an era of credit expansion based on the dollar. In this book he argues that a new paradigm is urgently needed to better understand what is going on. The paradigm used until now by most economists was based on false premises.
The existing paradigm, often referred to as free-market fundamentalism, holds that markets are self-correcting, that they naturally tend toward equilibrium. Economists as far back as Adam Smith have argued against regulation or government intervention of any kind since it would interfere with the natural forces of the market.
Soros correctly argues the contrary. In fact government intervention has repeatedly saved the market. A few examples are the bankruptcy of Continental Illinois in 1984, or the failure of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, or the current bolstering of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (my example). The notion that the market deviates from an orderly path is the rule rather than the exception.
The new paradigm that is needed, according to Soros, must incorporate the theory of reflexity. Developed in previous works by himself and his mentor Karl Popper, reflexivity examines the relationship between thinking and reality, between the cognitive function and the manipulative function. In the investment world, this means that when investors are bullish on, say, housing or mortgage backed securities their values go up, not because they become intrinsically more valuable, but because everyone else is thinking they are more valuable. This is basically old-fashioned market psychology dressed-up in theory. The mechanism that allows the market to go up is self-reinforcing but ultimately self-defeating. The market goes from euphoria to despair overshooting the top, and ultimately the bottom too. Witness today's housing market.
We are currently experiencing the consequences of unregulated credit markets and Soros argues that if more is not done the crisis could get much worse. He points out that moneterist doctrine in inadequate. Controlling the money supply is only half of the picture. The internet bubble, the housing bubble, and the current commodities bubble were created through excessive use of leverage. The amount of debt currently outstanding is unprecedented. Any new financial regulations will need to temper the use of credit to avoid future bubbles.
Soros argues that the US must come to grips with the new realities if it is to maintain its preeminent position in the world. If we are not careful the dollar will lose its standing as the reserve currency of choice. The task of regulating credit will now became even more precarious since the credit market is already tightening. Soros, as a former hedge fund manager, realizes that credit is the lifeblood of capitalism and any overregulation will also damage the economy. Reflexivity theory aside, this book is an excellent discussion of the challenges we are facing today.
The existing paradigm, often referred to as free-market fundamentalism, holds that markets are self-correcting, that they naturally tend toward equilibrium. Economists as far back as Adam Smith have argued against regulation or government intervention of any kind since it would interfere with the natural forces of the market.
Soros correctly argues the contrary. In fact government intervention has repeatedly saved the market. A few examples are the bankruptcy of Continental Illinois in 1984, or the failure of Long Term Capital Management in 1998, or the current bolstering of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (my example). The notion that the market deviates from an orderly path is the rule rather than the exception.
The new paradigm that is needed, according to Soros, must incorporate the theory of reflexity. Developed in previous works by himself and his mentor Karl Popper, reflexivity examines the relationship between thinking and reality, between the cognitive function and the manipulative function. In the investment world, this means that when investors are bullish on, say, housing or mortgage backed securities their values go up, not because they become intrinsically more valuable, but because everyone else is thinking they are more valuable. This is basically old-fashioned market psychology dressed-up in theory. The mechanism that allows the market to go up is self-reinforcing but ultimately self-defeating. The market goes from euphoria to despair overshooting the top, and ultimately the bottom too. Witness today's housing market.
We are currently experiencing the consequences of unregulated credit markets and Soros argues that if more is not done the crisis could get much worse. He points out that moneterist doctrine in inadequate. Controlling the money supply is only half of the picture. The internet bubble, the housing bubble, and the current commodities bubble were created through excessive use of leverage. The amount of debt currently outstanding is unprecedented. Any new financial regulations will need to temper the use of credit to avoid future bubbles.
Soros argues that the US must come to grips with the new realities if it is to maintain its preeminent position in the world. If we are not careful the dollar will lose its standing as the reserve currency of choice. The task of regulating credit will now became even more precarious since the credit market is already tightening. Soros, as a former hedge fund manager, realizes that credit is the lifeblood of capitalism and any overregulation will also damage the economy. Reflexivity theory aside, this book is an excellent discussion of the challenges we are facing today.
Most Recent Customer Reviews
3.0 out of 5 stars
Yah its ok! but boring in the middle
Soros is a hardcore investor, the man broke uk's central bank (or so they say) and his words & advices are always good to read. His problem? Read more
Published 3 months ago by emmh
4.0 out of 5 stars
Reflexivity, a work in progress
Soros attempts to explain what he calls 'reflexivity', loosely based on the philosophy of Karl Popper. Read more
Published 7 months ago by Gderf
4.0 out of 5 stars
Too short
The theory of reflexivity is intesresting but the explnation is too short. I'd also like some sort of mathematical work to back it up, so far there's none. Read more
Published 8 months ago by Anthony H. Bastiand
2.0 out of 5 stars
We all make mistakes
Let me start my review of George Soros's "The New Paradigm for Financial Markets" by stating that there is much I like in this book, however there is also much that I don't like. Read more
Published 13 months ago by Bruce Caithness
5.0 out of 5 stars
Soros's Big Idea
I wanted to find out something about how Soros thought after reading one of the chain emails my father-in-law loves to send me that could have been written by Glenn Beck describing... Read more
Published on February 14, 2011 by Kurt Larkin
1.0 out of 5 stars
Short (162 pages) and lousy.
George Soros has been fined by the Hungarian and French governments for stock market manipulation.
Yet, he bought his way into the U.S. and is now a U.S. citizen. Read more
Yet, he bought his way into the U.S. and is now a U.S. citizen. Read more
Published on December 2, 2010 by The Evaluator
4.0 out of 5 stars
It is Soros' paradigm after all
The book is divided into two parts- conceptual framework and application of Soros theory on current financial crisis. Read more
Published on December 15, 2009 by Hosan Jeon
4.0 out of 5 stars
If Soros likes mathematics
I do not know if Mr. Soros would present his theory of reflexivity in a different way if he likes mathematics a little more. Read more
Published on September 22, 2009 by Kwong Chung Ping
4.0 out of 5 stars
Equiligrium Theory is Linear, Soros makes it Calculus
By focusing on the living economy in which we are always returning to the equilibrium - never at equilibrium - this book details two bubbles (housing and global credit) that the... Read more
Published on July 12, 2009 by J. T. Schultz
2.0 out of 5 stars
Soros' Theory of Reflexivity Isn't a Theory At All
Book Summary - One Good Point
Save your money and I summarize the one valuable nugget to be mined from this book: It's impossible to predict financial markets using... Read more
Save your money and I summarize the one valuable nugget to be mined from this book: It's impossible to predict financial markets using... Read more
Published on June 7, 2009 by B. Nielson
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