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The Path to Victory: America's Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs Paperback – August 9, 2013
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About the Author
Donald Vandergriff is an active duty army officer currently serving as deputy director of army ROTC at Georgetown University. He is the author of Spirit, Blood and Treasure.
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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29 of 31 people found the following review helpful
By
Ralph H. Peters
on July 16, 2002
Format: Hardcover
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Donald Vandergriff is one of those rare men who live their beliefs. Now, he has written a fine, clear-thinking, heartfelt book detailing the deep flaws in the Army's (and our military's) personnel system. But the book is much broader than that. Although he does not use quite these terms, the text constitutes a demand for a sensible post-modern personnel system that rewards the core military virtues, in place of our current, long-outdated, poorly-performing industrial-age system, a legacy of both Henry Ford's assembly line mentality, in which all parts, even the human ones, are interchangeable, and a bizarre, inchoate conviction within the Army that, really, it's still 1944 and the draft will supply the needed talent to replace that which is squandered. Even now, in 2002, there is a bizarre belief among the Army's hierarchy that every officer (and soldier) is easily replaceable, if not perfectly interchangeable. Well, tell that to corporate America, or the scientific community, or to the arts community. America has achieved its paramount position because we recognize and reward the unique talents of the individual--but our military resists excellence whenever it can (what passes for excellence is a polished conformity to superficial forms). Our broken-down, morally-bankrupt personnel system may be well-suited for the ten-million-man military with which we ended WWII, but it is a travesty when it comes to developing the right Army for the 21st century. Critics may respond that the military is not about individual excellence, but about teamwork--but teamwork based upon excellence is far more impressive than group-think and timid acquiescence based upon lowest-common-denominator professional values.Read more ›
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11 of 12 people found the following review helpful
By
Carl Rehberg, Ph.D.
on June 25, 2002
Format: Hardcover
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If you care about real military reform and transformation-this is an absolute must-read book!!
Although this book is primarily written to an Army audience it has applicability to all the Services. No other book has hit the target like this book. Many other books have alluded to problems, but Vandergriff digs deep to find the underlying reasons and causes of this dysfunctional system. He also provides solutions.
"The responsibility for military planning, direction and execution falls most heavily on the officer corps. The officer corps is critical to combat operations. It is the officer corps that reflects the values and characteristics of the military. If the corps is corrupt or incompetent, the whole army [military] will be also." As the Duke of Wellington supposedly remarked: "There are no bad troops--only bad officers." "Military excellence has always depended upon an officer corps which could think creatively about war--one that understood and practiced the art of war." Many of the deficiencies in our defense must be traced to problems in the officer corps.
Although, one can argue that many of the egregious problems of the officer corps in the Vietnam War have been corrected, many of the systemic problems have not. Several surveys done by the Army and the USAF since 1970 indicate there are still significant problems in the officer corps. Certainly, civilians in the Defense Department, the Congress (DOPMA) and the Executive Branch share the responsibility for our defense inadequacies, but a significant portion of these problems must be traceable to deficiencies in the organizational structure and within culture which officers are created, developed, and promoted.
That does NOT mean that most officers are individually to blame.Read more ›
Although this book is primarily written to an Army audience it has applicability to all the Services. No other book has hit the target like this book. Many other books have alluded to problems, but Vandergriff digs deep to find the underlying reasons and causes of this dysfunctional system. He also provides solutions.
"The responsibility for military planning, direction and execution falls most heavily on the officer corps. The officer corps is critical to combat operations. It is the officer corps that reflects the values and characteristics of the military. If the corps is corrupt or incompetent, the whole army [military] will be also." As the Duke of Wellington supposedly remarked: "There are no bad troops--only bad officers." "Military excellence has always depended upon an officer corps which could think creatively about war--one that understood and practiced the art of war." Many of the deficiencies in our defense must be traced to problems in the officer corps.
Although, one can argue that many of the egregious problems of the officer corps in the Vietnam War have been corrected, many of the systemic problems have not. Several surveys done by the Army and the USAF since 1970 indicate there are still significant problems in the officer corps. Certainly, civilians in the Defense Department, the Congress (DOPMA) and the Executive Branch share the responsibility for our defense inadequacies, but a significant portion of these problems must be traceable to deficiencies in the organizational structure and within culture which officers are created, developed, and promoted.
That does NOT mean that most officers are individually to blame.Read more ›
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10 of 11 people found the following review helpful
By
David A. Appling
on January 10, 2003
Format: Hardcover
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This work is a tour de force, perhaps best shown by Secretary of the Army Tom White's enthusiastic adoption of its ideas. Vandergriff ably identifies the Army's longest-lasting and most serious systemic problem -- human resources mismanagement as it affects training, deployment, cohesion, and effectiveness in battle. Based on extremely extensive research (meticulously documented), he ably describes the evolution of the problem and presents the promised "path to victory."
Despite the effectiveness and timeliness of this book, it does have a couple of significant (and related) weaknesses. First, despite the meticulous endnoting, it is difficult to sort out which ideas are Vandergriff's own and which derive from his multitude of sources. The sorting can be done, but, if done thoroughly, would require the reader actually to construct an "idea matrix" from the endnotes as he goes along.
Second, this is a work with 796 (!) endnotes -- but with no bibliography at all. All in all, Presidio Press has made the book quite difficult -- unnecessarily difficult -- to use as a reference. This does detract somewhat from its value as a synthesis of ideas and guide for follow-on work. Fortunately, these weaknesses detract very little from the overall message.
Highly recommended. (But if there's a second edition, could we please have a good solid bibliography?)
Despite the effectiveness and timeliness of this book, it does have a couple of significant (and related) weaknesses. First, despite the meticulous endnoting, it is difficult to sort out which ideas are Vandergriff's own and which derive from his multitude of sources. The sorting can be done, but, if done thoroughly, would require the reader actually to construct an "idea matrix" from the endnotes as he goes along.
Second, this is a work with 796 (!) endnotes -- but with no bibliography at all. All in all, Presidio Press has made the book quite difficult -- unnecessarily difficult -- to use as a reference. This does detract somewhat from its value as a synthesis of ideas and guide for follow-on work. Fortunately, these weaknesses detract very little from the overall message.
Highly recommended. (But if there's a second edition, could we please have a good solid bibliography?)
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8 of 9 people found the following review helpful
By
Amazon Customer
on January 9, 2005
Format: Hardcover
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While I have a great many disagreements with the author over the specifics of how the personnel management system of the army should be rebuilt, I still recommend this book highly. I have been greatly concerned with the lack of professional developement and professionalism in the US army officer corps ever since I joined the Army in early 1997. This book goes far inexpleining th situation, and then proposes some radical solutions.
The first part of the book, detailing how the army developed its current unprofessional officer corps is insightful and useful, if a tad repetitive. Anyone who wants to understand how the current system developed needs look no further.
Vandergriff's subsequent arguments about fixing it are where I disagree. They are based around building a far more effective "heavy" army designed to defeat other armies in high intensity conflict. For the most part he does an excellent job of this, but he falls into the normal Army trap of assuming that the high-intensity portion of war needs to be the primary focus of the Active Componant (AC), and that the Guard (NG) and Reserve (AR) can carry the burden of the "constabulatory" and peacekeeping missions. Unfortunately, the modern threat environment is composed of mostly low-intensity and transitional intensity conflict potential (a major land war against China is unlikely, and all the other scenarios seem even less plausable).
Additionally, Vandergriff makes the normal Armor officer mistake of trying to keep the heavy forces in the AC and making the NG and AR "light". This has three flaws:
1) it results in the AR and NG bearing the brunt of deployments, since most call for light or medium (at most) forces.Read more ›
The first part of the book, detailing how the army developed its current unprofessional officer corps is insightful and useful, if a tad repetitive. Anyone who wants to understand how the current system developed needs look no further.
Vandergriff's subsequent arguments about fixing it are where I disagree. They are based around building a far more effective "heavy" army designed to defeat other armies in high intensity conflict. For the most part he does an excellent job of this, but he falls into the normal Army trap of assuming that the high-intensity portion of war needs to be the primary focus of the Active Componant (AC), and that the Guard (NG) and Reserve (AR) can carry the burden of the "constabulatory" and peacekeeping missions. Unfortunately, the modern threat environment is composed of mostly low-intensity and transitional intensity conflict potential (a major land war against China is unlikely, and all the other scenarios seem even less plausable).
Additionally, Vandergriff makes the normal Armor officer mistake of trying to keep the heavy forces in the AC and making the NG and AR "light". This has three flaws:
1) it results in the AR and NG bearing the brunt of deployments, since most call for light or medium (at most) forces.Read more ›
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