The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers [Paperback]

Paul Kennedy (Author)

Book Description

Release date: January 15, 1989

About national and international power in the "modern" or Post Renaissance period. Explains how the various powers have risen and fallen over the 5 centuries since the formation of the "new monarchies" in W. Europe.

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

"Kennedy, a history professor at Yale, here assesses the interaction between economics and strategy over the past five centuries," reported PW , concluding that "the book is a vigorous entry in the debate over the extent to which national wealth should be used for military purposes."
Copyright 1988 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal

Yale historian Kennedy surveys the ebb and flow of power among the major states of Europe from the 16th centurywhen Europe's preeminence first took shapethrough and beyond the present erawhen great power status is devolving again upon the extra-European states. Stressing the interrelationships among economic wealth, technological innovation, and the ability of states efficiently to tap their resources for prolonged military preparedness and warmaking, he notes that those states with the relatively greater ability to maintain a balance of military and economic strength assumed the lead. Kennedy never reduces the analysis to crude materialism or empty tautology. Stimulating, erudite, carefully crafted, and readable; for public and academic libraries. James B. Street, Santa Cruz P.L., Cal.
Copyright 1987 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Paperback: 704 pages
• Publisher: Vintage; 1 edition (January 15, 1989)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0679720197
• ISBN-13: 978-0679720195
• Product Dimensions: 5.2 x 1.3 x 8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.9 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.2 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (93 customer reviews)
• Amazon Best Sellers Rank: #28,460 in Books (See Top 100 in Books)
  • #86 in Books > Business & Investing > Economics > Economic History

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

98 of 102 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars Very important information January 29, 2004

By DAVID-LEONARD WILLIS

Format:Paperback

As the relative strengths of leading nations in world affairs never remains constant, there is an optimum balance between wealth creation and military strength over the long term. Time and again the leading power believed that it could neglect wealth production in favor of military adventures but others waiting in the wings closed the gap, the relative strength was eroded and a long, slow decline of the once-leading power followed. The rise of Europe was not obvious in 1500 considering Ming China, the Ottoman Empire, the Mogul Empire, Muscovy and Tokugawa Japan which were well organized, had centralized authority and insisted on uniformity of practice and belief. European knowledge of the Orient was fragmentary and often erroneous, although the image of fabulous wealth, and vast armies was reasonably accurate. Constantinople fell in 1453 and the Ottoman Turks were pressing towards Budapest and Vienna. Compared with the world of Islam, Europe was behind culturally, technologically and militarily. Few at that point would have predicted that Europe would soon be at the top of the pack.

Warlike rivalries between European states stimulated advances, economic growth and military effectiveness. The Habsburg bid for power was ultimately unsuccessful because other European states worked together, the Habsburgs overextended in repeated conflicts during which they became militarily top heavy upon a weakening economic base. The other European states managed a better balance between wealth creation and military power. The power struggles between 1600 and 1815 were more complicated as Spain and the Netherlands declined while France, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia rose to dominate diplomacy, and warfare. Britain gained an advantage by creating an advanced banking and credit system and, together with Russia had the capacity to intervene while being geographically sheltered from the center of conflict. Britain also started the industrial revolution before the others, providing a great wealth creation advantage. For a century after 1815 no single nation was able to make a bid for domination, allowing Britain to rise to its zenith in naval, colonial and commercial terms based on its virtual monopoly of steam-driven industrial production. Industrialization spread in the second half of the 19th century tilting the balance of power but also introduced more complicated and expensive weaponry that transformed the nature of war and made the world less stable and more complex. The European Great Powers declined while the US and Russia moved to the forefront. Germany was the only European country to stay with the future world powers; Japan was intent only on domination in East Asia and Britain, with its declining relative position, found it more difficult to defend its global interests. World War I was an exhausting struggle that left Europe and Russia weakened, Japan better off and the US indisputably the strongest power in the world. However, US and Russian isolationism allowed France and Britain to remain center-stage diplomatically - a position they did not justify in power terms - but by the 1930s Italy, Japan and Germany became challengers while Russia was becoming an industrial superpower. World War II eclipsed France, irretrievably weakened Britain, brought defeat to the Axis nations and left a bipolar world with military and economic resources roughly in balance.

Most of the book is devoted to tracing these events but the really interesting part of the book lies in the last two chapters where nuclear weapons, long-distance delivery systems and the arms race between the US and Russia changed the strategic and diplomatic landscape. But the global productive balances changed faster than ever before with the EU now the world's largest trading unit, China leaping forward, and Japan experiencing phenomenal economic growth. The US and Russian growth rates have been sluggish and their share of global production and wealth have shrunk dramatically since 1960. In economic terms we are in a multipolar world once again with five large power centers - China, Japan, the EU, the Soviet Union and the US - grappling with the age-old task of relating national means to national ends. Although the US appears to be supreme, the history of the rise and fall of great powers has in no way come to a full stop. Great powers in relative decline instinctively respond by spending more on security and thereby divert potential investment resources, compounding their long-term dilemma. Human kind makes its own history but within certain natural laws which become clear as the reader travels through this absorbing narrative.

In Chapter 8 Kennedy says: "What follows is speculation rather than history, therefore it is based upon the plausible assumption that these broad trends of the past five centuries are likely to continue." But certain trends are firmly in place. In 1951 Japan's GNP was 1/3 of Britain and 1/20 of the US; three decades later it was three times Britain and half the US. Japan has grown to be the world's biggest creditor nation while the US has changed from being the world's biggest creditor nation to the world's biggest debtor nation. This book was written before the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the fall of communism so the projection is outdated. Nevertheless the grand sweep of history presented lends support to Kupchan's argument in 'The End of the American Era' that the defining element of the global system is the distribution of power, not democracy, culture, globalization, or anything else. Add to that more recent projects that by 2020 China will be the largest world economy and that seven of the ten biggest economies will lie in Asia and the picture of the future becomes clearer. If you have the gut feeling that the US has over extended itself militarily compared to its economic base and its position in relation to its competitors, this book will make clear your worst fears.

42 of 46 people found the following review helpful

5.0 out of 5 stars A classic - unpleasant facts we have to face July 10, 2006

By Ami Isseroff

Format:Paperback

Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of the Great Powers" is a classic that should rank with the great books and great ideas of the 20th century. Anyone who wants to understand what has happened in history, and what will most likely happen, should read this book.

Great theories and great books are often so because they state, in a convincing way obvious facts that we want to ignore because they are inconvenient or unflattering. Sigmund Freud's Psychopathology of everyday life and "Interpretation of Dreams" shocked the Victorian world by pointing out that a lot of human behavior is about sex. Darwin's "Origin of Species" and "Descent of Man" was a shocker because it pointed out that we are animals, descended from animals. Karl Marx's contribution, shorn of polemics, was to point out the importance of economics in history and ideology.

Kennedy amasses considerable evidence for the unattractive theory that wars are won by economic might (and not because providence is on the side of the "good guys"), that all empires are mortal, and that empires can kill themselves by economic over-extension.

He correctly predicted the economic problems of the Soviet Union, before it was obvious to all, and he predicted the over extension and deficit spending that would could the lot of the US in the future - and are the lot of the US in Iraq. This is not a popular thesis.

Every historian from Thucydides, and Polybius to Gibbon, Toynbee and Spengler has understood that empires are "mortal." Yet every empire and every citizen of every empire insisted that their empire was the "exception" that could never be challenged and never fail. That is what makes many uncomfortable about this book, but it cannot be ignored.

It is really beside the point to say that it was written nearly two decades ago and is therefore "out of date." "The Origin of Species" was written nearly 150 years ago and is certainly "out of date" and "mistaken" in many details, but it is absurd to claim it should not be read for that reason. When Kennedy describes the dilemma faced by Spain in maintaining its costly presence in Flanders, he is describing essentially the same problems and considerations that face the USA in deciding whether to continue the war in Iraq.

Even if you think the US is exempt from the laws of history for some reason, you cannot ignore this book.

122 of 146 people found the following review helpful

4.0 out of 5 stars Great theory, but ... book badly in need of updating December 6, 2000

By "michaeleve"

Format:Paperback

The problem with this book (and maybe why reviews are so divergent) is that it tries to be two different things. It succeeds as a historical narrative about the development of various western powers. The Hapsburgs, Napoleonic France, Czarist Russia, Prussia, Germany, and the British Empire are all covered. The Soviet Union, Japan and the U.S. come in for later treatment. The book traces the influence of finance, geography, politics and innovations and shows how advantages in each were strategically applied. It excells in describing the emergence of the western world from Empires and rising and falling 'Great' and 'Middle' powers involved in various alliances and coalition wars, through to the post Vietnam era of a bipolar world ruled by two Superpowers. Where the book fails is in economic forecasting specifically as it relates to the U.S. today.

Four fifths of the book is good, as it is devoted to the development of Kennedys' theory, which is - economic wealth and military power is relative. Relative in terms of its distribution among nations and relative within a nation over time. Indeed, the U.K. of the 1980's and today,(a second rank power in comparison with the U.S and Japan) is wealthier in absolute terms than the huge British Empire of the late 19th century. The idea that that there is a strong relationship between economic power and military might, which seems obvious, is also illustrated with historical examples. What is less obvious (until shown by the author) are the variations on this theme. For example, an economic power may not also be a military power at the same time (Japan in the 1980's). There is also a tendency for declining economic powers to spend very heavily on the military, as their sense of security decreases (Soviet Union and U.S in the 1980's). It is this tendency the author states, that is a symptom of what is called 'imperial overstretch' and is a characteristic of ALL declining great powers. It is this argument and it's development in the last chapter, 'To the Twenty-first Century', where the book shows how outdated it is.

To be fair, Kennedy is very clear in that he knows that writing about trends and projecting how they will play out in the future is NOT history. He states that "many a final chapter in works dealing with contemporary affairs has to be changed, only a few years later, in the wisdom of hindsight; it will be surprising if this present chapter survives unscathed". That was the most accurate statement in the last chapter. It is ironic that a history book has been treated so badly by history, but when you stop and think about all the events that have happened since the book was originally published in 1987, it's not so surprising.

Obviously there is no analysis of the impact of the end of the Cold War, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany and most significantly from an economic point of view, the use of the 'peace dividend' to reinvigorate formerly heavily militarized economies. In general it is mostly a good book that suffers at the end from a brave but badly off target projection of what the 1990's had in store for the only remaining 'Great Power'.