"In the course of my life," says well-known financier and philanthropist George Soros, "I have developed a conceptual framework that has helped make money... It is about the relationship between thinking and reality... My goal is ambitious. It is that this conceptual framework should provide the foundation for a better understanding of human affairs" (p. vii,3) This book is short, to the point, and stuffed with interesting ideas. If you want to go for an exhilarating merry-go-round with an interesting thinker, I recommend Soros highly. His blend of extreme arrogance and unstudied humility is worth experiencing, as is thinking deeply about the principles he espouses.
Soros studied with the great philosopher Sir Karl Popper, and indeed Soros confesses that in his school days in London (having barely escaped the Nazis in his homeland, Hungary) he "harbored some fantasies of becoming an important philosopher." (p. 7) He has thus spent much of his life switching back and forth between making (lots of) money and writing semi-popular philosophical tracts. As he admits, and for which he blames only himself, these tracts were widely read but dismissed by serious philosophers and economists.
Soros learned from Popper that the "open society" is the only way to truth, and political democracy with civil liberties and a non-intrusive state are the key institutions of an open society. He learned from economics that buyers and sellers are by and large rational, and their judgments about the future are, on average, very accurate. This is the so-called "rational expectations macroeconomics" that developed in the mid-1970's in the hands of Robert Lucas and friends, but was long held in a more tacit form much earlier by most of the great University of Chicago economists, including Milton Friedman and George Stigler, and was doubtless taught at the London School of Economics.
The central principle of rational expectations macro theory is the so-called Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH). The weak form of the EMH states that financial markets are informationally efficient, so that the current price of a security contains all publicly available information concerning its future performance. Because the past performance of a security add no information concerning its future performance, one cannot on average "beat the market" by judicious buying and selling based on stock market levels or dynamics. I believe this principle is highly defensible. Indeed, investors who think they can beat the market using some daffy scheme or other based on market levels or dynamics do nothing other than line the pockets of their brokers.
The strong form of the EMH holds that investors' mean expectations about the future securities prices are unbiased. If the strong form of the EMH were it true, there should never be speculative bubbles, and financial markets should be intrinsically stable. Soros rejects rational expectations theory and the strong form of the EMH precisely because speculative bubbles and financial instability indubitably exist. He is, of course, not alone in holding this position.
It may seem that the weak form of the EMH implies the strong, because in the midst of a speculative bubble, those who get out before the collapse necessarily earn superprofits. Therefore the weak form of the EMH appears to imply that there are no speculative bubbles. The problem with the argument is that no one knows when the collapse will occur, and it may always be better to stay in for the ride rather than watch by the wayside.
Soros' alternative to rational expectations macroeconomics is the theory of reflexivity. "It so happened that the theory of reflexivity," he tells us, "provided me with a new way of looking at financial markets, a better way that the prevailing theory." (p. 8) The theory of reflexivity starts with the observation that there are two aspects of thinking about the social world: the cognitive (understanding the world) and the participatory/manipulative (changing the world). We thus accept an idea either when it true, or when it is very useful and by accepting the idea, we tend to induce others to accept the idea as well. Thus we may embrace ideas, whether true or false, that when conveyed to others, leads them to behave in ways we prefer. Soros gives the example of the idea `This is a revolutionary moment.' Soros observes, "That statement is reflexive, and its truth value depends on the impact it makes." (p. 13)
The most important form of reflexivity for Soros is the reflexive feedback loop: "The participants' views influence the course of events, and the course of events influences the participants' views. " (p. 14) Such feedback loops, suggests Soros, can be negative, in which case the participants' views and the actual situation are brought closer together over time, or positive, in which case they are driven ever further apart. Negative feedback loops are thus self-correcting, while positive feedback loops are inherently self-reinforcing, and hence unstable. Soros also calls positive feedback loops "fertile fallacies." (p. 16)
It is obvious how positive feedback loops can explain speculative bubbles, and hence how Soros' theory of reflexivity might provide an alternative to traditional financial theory. Soros goes further than this to argue that the problem with traditional economics is that it pretends that one can do social science in the same way that we do natural science, and that this is a mistake. "In the case of the natural sciences," says Soros, "events unfold irrespective of the views held by the observers." By contrast, in human affairs, the thoughts and ideas of the observers change the social dynamic. As a result, he says, "social theories themselves are reflexive." (p.23) Therefore social science is far different from natural science: the former is more challenging, simply because it is impossible to tease out the cognitive from the participatory/manipulative aspects of a social theory. In particular social theories can suffer from the same sort of positive feedback loops as occur in human thought in general. In the natural sciences, by contrast, there is no participatory/manipulative element to thought, simply because inert matter does not think, and we cannot persuade it to behave the way we would like. Thus there is never a positive value of an incorrect theory over a correct theory.
If Soros is correct, then we must abandon any attempt to base economic theory in general, and financial theory in particular, on the sorts of scientific models generally used today, and inspired by the successes of the natural science over the past three centuries. Rather, he argues, a philosophical analysis of economic activity, based on the notion of reflexivity and related ideas, can provide the basis for social policy, much as these ideas, he contends, made money for him. This doctrine should be carefully assessed before lending our agreement, because it implies that economic theory, solidly based on the principles of scientific research, is inevitably the enemy of sound social policy. I shall argue that Soros is incorrect in his relegating social theory to the annals of non-scientific discourse.
Soros' assessment of social science is a standard view of some prominent sociologists, especially those informed by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later writing (see for instance Peter Winch's The Idea of a Social Science, 1958). This assessment is rejected by most scientists, natural and social alike. The idea is also a key element of postmodern social theory, which I believe is a humanistic movement lacking any analytical core. Soros does distance himself clearly from postmodernism, asserting that reality eventually comes to bear even on the most vigorous positive feedback systems, holding that a positive feedback system "cannot go on forever because eventually the participants' views would become so far removed from objective reality that the participants would have to recognize them as unrealistic." (16) I infer from this that Soros takes positive feedback systems as occasionally large excursions from a basic equilibrium system in which the majority of feedback mechanisms are negative.
Soros defends his assertion that social theory cannot be scientific by stressing that science is about the natural world, but human thought and subjectivity, the core elements of social life, lie in a subjective realm beyond the natural world. Soros' subjective/objective, ideal/material dichotomy has a venerable lineage back to Hegel and Marx, but it is not at all persuasive. The fact is that the human brain is a part of natural reality, and is subject to the same natural laws as the rest of natural reality. Subjectivity is an expression of the genetic structure of Homo sapiens, and despite its complexity, is substantive part of the natural order. For instance, Soros' positive and negative feedback loops, which he is correct in implicating in humans social dynamics, are part of reality itself, and hence in principle can be studied by traditional scientific methods.
Moreover, the contention that in the natural world, events unfold irrespective of the views of the observers, whereas in the social world, observers and their theories change the course of events, is not correct. Astronomy, geology, epidemiology, evolutionary biology, and host of other natural science research areas have had huge influence on the direction and pace of social change in the modern world, and natural science theories are regularly espoused and rejected because of their social implications. Indeed, individuals have consistently attempted to interpret scientific principles in a way favorable to their political goals (think of Lysenko in the Soviet Union and George W. Bush and his cronies in the United States).
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