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Editorial Reviews
Review
In eminently lucid and often charming language, Professor Schelling's work opens to rational analysis a crucial field of politics, the international politics of threat, or as the current term goes, of deterrence. In this field, the author's analysis goes beyond what has been done by earlier writers. It is the best, most incisive, and most stimulating book on the subject. (Annals of the American Academy )
An important contribution to understanding the conduct of the ambiguous conflict between the communist bloc on the one hand and the United States and its Free World Allies on the other. (Journal of Politics )
Against the backdrop of the nuclear arms race in the late 1950s, Thomas Schelling's book The Strategy of Conflict set forth his vision of game theory as a unifying framework for the social sciences. Schelling showed that a party can strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more credible and more efficient than certain retaliation. These insights have proven to be of great relevance for conflict resolution and efforts to avoid war. Schelling's work prompted new developments in game theory and accelerated its use and application throughout the social sciences. Notably, his analysis of strategic commitments has explained a wide range of phenomena, from the competitive strategies of firms to the delegation of political decision power. (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences )
An important contribution to understanding the conduct of the ambiguous conflict between the communist bloc on the one hand and the United States and its Free World Allies on the other. (Journal of Politics )
Against the backdrop of the nuclear arms race in the late 1950s, Thomas Schelling's book The Strategy of Conflict set forth his vision of game theory as a unifying framework for the social sciences. Schelling showed that a party can strengthen its position by overtly worsening its own options, that the capability to retaliate can be more useful than the ability to resist an attack, and that uncertain retaliation is more credible and more efficient than certain retaliation. These insights have proven to be of great relevance for conflict resolution and efforts to avoid war. Schelling's work prompted new developments in game theory and accelerated its use and application throughout the social sciences. Notably, his analysis of strategic commitments has explained a wide range of phenomena, from the competitive strategies of firms to the delegation of political decision power. (The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences )
About the Author
Thomas C. Schelling is Distinguished University Professor, Department of Economics and School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland and Lucius N. Littauer Professor of Political Economy, Emeritus, Harvard University. He is co-recipient of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics.
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35 of 35 people found the following review helpful
By P.C.
Format:Paperback
"The Strategy of Conflict" changed the development of game theory in several ways, but none was more important than Schelling's focus on real life examples, situations or games that are relevant to what we encounter in our daily lives. Before Schelling, game theory analysis was abstract and mathematical; it focused on zero-sum games, where interests were purely conflicting and there were no incentives to cooperate. Game theorists built convincing abstract models for these types of games, but its application was limited, since most interactions were a mixture of conflict and mutual dependence. In other words, analysis focused on pure conflict, a limiting cases of real world interactions, while in "The Strategy of Conflict" Schelling attempts to generalize game theory analysis to richer games that are `played' in the real world. His generalization introduced the concepts, commitments, threats, promises, communication systems, focal points, and randomization of strategies into game theory (chapters 1~8), which was then used to analyze the its applications in national security (chapters 9 and 10).
If you are studying game theory, this book is a must read. If you are just interested in game theory, I'd recommend reading this book too.
If you are studying game theory, this book is a must read. If you are just interested in game theory, I'd recommend reading this book too.
93 of 103 people found the following review helpful
By A Customer
Format:Paperback
Schelling's major contribution to game theory (and the study of culture) was the concept of focal points. He observed that in real life bargaining each player would rather make a concession than fail to reach any agreement at all. And there are a wide range of outcomes that would be preferable to both of them than no agreement at all. Now without some procedure to select among those acceptable alternatives, people might never come to a satisfactory agreement. This is where the key concept of "focal points" comes into play. Schelling defines focal points as "intuitively perceived mutual expectations, shared appreciations, preoccupations, obsessions, and sensitivities to suggestion." He criticized traditional game theorists for failing to recognize that "players" actually achieve much better coordination and cooperation when they are able to rely upon focal points. Although he does not make this analogy, it seems that focal points represent some sort of a "templat! e" or "blueprint" that helps to unify understanding and coordinate action. However, for Schelling, "focal points" are quite arbitrary-whether and to what degree they serve to coordinate action and expectations is the key question.
34 of 35 people found the following review helpful
By A Customer
Format:Paperback
I disagree with the review that describes Schelling's primary contribution here as the idea of focal points. This is one of the key insights in the book, but only one. He also has a fascinating discussion of threats, promises, and credibility and the relation of these issues to national security issues. The connection is explored further in Schelling's Arms and Influence, while this book is more theoretical in its orientation. I highly recommend this book to anyone who knows a little game theory but is frustrated by the level of abstraction which pervades the theory.
Most Recent Customer Reviews
5.0 out of 5 stars
enjoyable game theory
Other reviewers have explained Schelling's insights, so I won't bother to touch on them.
Often you read books where economists find new applications for known... Read more
Often you read books where economists find new applications for known... Read more
Published on April 24, 2010 by Grant Gibbs
4.0 out of 5 stars
still captivating and relveant
By far the easiest to read and most conversational of all the game theory books I've read (which are several). Read more
Published on August 20, 2009 by R. Robinson
3.0 out of 5 stars
New Media and Game Theory
A great analysis of the strategy of conflict grounded in the framework of Game Theory. Thomas Schelling applies Game Theory to deconstructing cold war negotiations and other fairly... Read more
Published on November 18, 2007 by Laurent Pacalin
4.0 out of 5 stars
NOBLE PRIZE WINNER ON CONFLICT
The 2005 Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Robert Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling. Schelling is professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and applied game theory... Read more
Published on October 10, 2005 by Laurence J. Stybel
5.0 out of 5 stars
Major contribution and still relevant after decades
Since its first publication in 1960, the strategy of Conflict is still relevant today. His concepts of strategic moves and random strategy can still be applied to the increasing... Read more
Published on November 8, 2003 by Bill Jia Xie
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