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While this has the makings for an Orwellian nightmare, Brin argues that we can choose to make the same scenario a setting for even greater freedom. The determining factor is whether the power of observation and surveillance is held only by the police and the powerful or is shared by us all. In the latter case, Brin argues that people will have nothing to fear from the watchers because everyone will be watching each other. The cameras would become a public resource to assure that no mugger is hiding around the corner, our children are playing safely in the park, and police will not abuse their power.
No simplistic Utopian, Brin also acknowledges the many dangers on the way. He discusses how open access to information can either threaten or enhance freedom. It is one thing, for example, to make the entire outdoors public and another thing to allow the cameras and microphones to snoop into our homes. He therefore spends a lot of pages examining what steps are required to assure that a transparent society evolves in a manner that enhances rather than restricts freedom. This is a challenging view of tomorrow and an exhilarating read for those who don't mind challenges to even the most well-entrenched cultural assumptions. --Elizabeth Lewis --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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David Brin throws this notion in the trash.
In "The Transparent Society", David Brin suggests that to embrace heavy crypto is to embark in an "arms race" of secrecy that lowly private citizens can't possibly win. The age of ultra-surveillance, universal wiretapping, and data regulation is upon us, and there's only one true way to avoid a scenario that seems straight out of Orwell- universal transparency and accountability. In Brin's view, the technologies of data retrieval and surveillance should be made available to anyone who would make use of them- neighborhood watches could monitor their streets, parents could keep track of their children, and, while governments and agencies would have the ability to spy upon citizens, citizens and watchdog groups would have the power to spy back- and thus hold the powers that be accountable. While we'd lose the anonymity provided by modern society, we would gain safety, not only from crime, but from abuse of authority. We'd be able to form new community bonds that utilize distributed computing to keep tabs on each other. And, most importantly, we'd gain peace of mind.
In theory, anyway.
While Brin's thesis is unique, formidable and provacative, it does seem to fall short in places. For instance, there would still be a huge division between technological haves and have-nots- between the people who know how to utilize this technology and those who lack the skill, the patience, the time, the resources, or the simple will to use it. Brin is more than a bit of a technophile (not insulting technophiles, I'm one too), and seems to assume that everyone in the neo-West is on the same page as him. Also, despite his numerous appeals to pragmatism, the book is extremely idealistic, and runs counter to the trends we're seeing today, in both the increased scope of government surveillance powers, the increased intrusion of companies into our lives, and the ever-escalating privacy arms race being fought on the internet and in the courts. The world is going the way of Orwell, and not the way of Brin.
Yet, in the end, would there be any difference? In addition to public apathy, the sheer amount of data created by a surveillance infrastructure would be daunting to an individual attempting to make use of it. We're already facing a massive "information glut" today, both in terms of the internet, and in terms of government agencies who, despite their increased powers in the wake of 9-11, lack the ability to sort through all the data they're recieving. Between these problems and the haves-have nots gap, Brin's vision seems to fall short.
Also annoying was Brin's obsession with Plato-bashing, which seems to be a popular hobby among political philosophers ever since Karl Popper tackled "The Republic" in his book "The Open Society and It's Enemies". Last year, however, my government advisor gave me a different view of the Republic- that the book is actually a satire, meant to show how and why totalitarianism never could work. This flies in the face of these Popperians, who seem caught up in the idea that Plato was a proto-Nazi.
However, weaknesses aside, The Transparent Society is an excellent read. I'd suggest that, for an alternative (fictional) view, anyone with an interest in this title also pick up a copy of Neal Stephenson's "Cryptonomicon".
Based primarily on rampant, uncontrolled growth in visual surveillance, Brin argues that the technological imperative is irresistible; and that privacy protections are futile. He believes that privacy can only be sustained by focussing instead on freedom of information for everyone: to achieve privacy, rely on freedom, not secrecy.
Brin's argument can be most succinctly expressed as a question-answer pair: Q: Who will keep a watch on the watchers? A: The watched. His antidote is ubiquitous openness, with the powerful just as subject to visual and data surveillance as everyone else. Policemen will be judged by the viewers who, on the Internet, watch them watching others.
Brin's argument is based on the premise that the watchers will not exercise political power in order to preclude others from watching them. The history of societies suggests that there have always been uneven distributions of power, and that the powerful have had incentives, and in most cases the ability, to exercise their power, and to resist diminution of their power. It would appear that Brin's transparent society can only be achieved if the patterns repeated across millenia of human experience are able to be overturned in short order.
So his argument is undermined by the implicit presumptions that the less powerful are more powerful than the more powerful, that no-one will succeed in establishing enclaves of privilege, and that the actions of all will really be able to be monitored by all. Brin's counter-argument (private communication, 30 June 1998) is that the powerful will be only as successful in avoiding observation as they already are in resisting privacy laws that offend their own interests.
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