Since the wars of Louis XIV have not been covered comprehensively in English, this volume by a renowned historian is particularly welcome. In this work, John Lynn combines a succinct, but thorough blow-by-blow narrative account of the wars fought by Louis XIV with a cogent historical analysis that places these conflicts in their proper perspective. Lynn's main hypothesis differs from some other historians who view Louis XIV as a would-be European conqueror intent on endless wars of conquest. Rather, Lynn regards Louis' wars as essentially defensive after achieving limited territorial gains in Holland after 1675. Lynn explains these conflicts as wars-as-process that rather than seeking to annihilate enemy armies or achieve decisive victories, sought lesser objectives like extorting taxes from occupied lands, deciding dynastic issues or achieving defensible borders for France. Inevitably Louis XIV sought short wars against isolated opponents, but the indecisive nature of 18th Century conflict led to protracted, attritional struggles against coalitions.
The Wars of Louis XIV consists of eight chapters, beginning with a background chapter on European conflict in 1495-1661. Two other excellent opening chapters cover French strategic concepts in this period as well as the strength and methods of the French army and navy. The next two chapters cover the relatively painless War of Devolution and the Dutch War, which were fought to achieve martial Gloire for Louis after he came to the throne. At relatively low cost, Louis added to his territory and seemed to confirm the use of violence as a useful tool of statecraft. The fifth chapter covers violence and state policy, specifically the so-called "reunions" which were coercive annexations of adjacent territory similar to Hitler's "Anschluss" with Austria, and violent suppression of the Protestant minority in France. The sixth and seventh chapters - which comprise nearly half the book - cover the fateful Nine Years War and the War of the Spanish Succession. Although France did well militarily in the first conflict, it was financially exhausting to fight protracted attritional struggles against coalitions. In the last war, fought for dynastic reasons, the French did fairly well until Marlborough showed up in 1704. Marlborough changed the slow operational tempo - typically one big siege attempted per season - and sought to fight big battles. He smashed the French at Blenheim and Ramillies, and succeeded in rolling back most of Louis' gains over the past 20 years. Nevertheless, Louis outlasted his enemies and eventually managed to achieve a favorable peace. The final chapter consists of an analysis of all of Louis' wars and attempts to place them in proper historical perspective.
Overall, this work is excellent - it is well-written, well-researched and provides fresh insight into a long-neglected subject. Students of Napoleonic warfare would be well-advised to read this book as background on the development of French doctrine (particularly a preference for fortifications) and strategy in pre-Revolutionary France. The chapters that cover the wars are sub-divided into sections on each year, which are cover the different fronts sequentially. The only flaw is this volume is the lack of decent maps; many important towns mentioned in the text are not depicted in the simple sketch maps nor are the movement of armies depicted. Nor is there a map of the Spanish theater of war, which was particularly important in the last two wars. It is particularly difficult to follow gains and losses of towns in the main battle front of Flanders, and the author should have provided at least a summary map to depict major territorial changes in each war. Readers should keep a good atlas handy in order to follow the campaigns.
Although France was able to achieve some strategic gains in these wars of Louis XIV, the main military legacy of the Sun King was near financial bankruptcy. John Lynn concludes, "for fifty years, French armies had been strong enough to stand against coalitions of all the other great powers. But the treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt, and Baden marked a watershed in international relations. No longer could France maintain its former dominance. This reality reflected not only the relative decline of France, but the increased power of other European states."
