11 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Logos or Chaos?, September 22, 2009
This review is from: Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency (Hardcover)
Timothy O'Connor has written an interesting book full of meaty metaphysics (plus some theology). The central goal of the book is to present an up-to-date cosmological argument from contingency for the existence of a transcendent necessary being (NB). My favorite part of the book was the comparison of two competing visions of the NB: Logos and Chaos.
Laying some groundwork in the first two chapters of the book, he discusses the case for modal realism and sketches a theory of modal epistemology. He argues that the concepts of contingency and necessity are so fundamental to explanation and reasoning (as well as to everyday life) that they are grounded in real truths.
In Chapter 3, we begin to look at where the quest for explanation will take us. If the contingency of the world is real and acknowledged, and the necessities we come to know (if imperfectly) are also real, what explains this situation?
First, O'Connor discusses the common naturalist option which asserts that there is an infinite causal chain of contingent things, and that no further explanation is needed. O'Connor says we can still coherently ask for an explanation of why THIS chain of things, and not another. The rejoinder at this point is to point out that a fully contrastive explanation of why this chain is as it is, if it existed, would convert the contingent chain to a necessary one. But O'Connor responds by saying that we can still seek a complete explanation, even if it is a non-fully-contrastive one.
But how can a necessary being provide the right kind of explanation? The necessity of the cause would seem to "prove too much" and convert the contingent chain to necessary status. O'Connor says this can be avoided by invoking an explanation based on a model of the NB as an agent: the NB-agent's creative activity of forming an intention, based on reasons (which is then satisfied by the creation of the world), need not be seen as a necessary sequence of steps. The buck stops with the (contingent) intentions of the NB-agent. This is the "Logos" model (a model friendly to traditional theism).
To his credit, O'Connor sees the existence of another alternative (Ch. 4). He starts by noting that, in addition to his agent model, there are many instances where we accept causal explanations even when they are not fully contrastive ones. Specifically, we do this in case of indeterministic processes in the natural world. So, the question becomes: could the NB be an impersonal random world generator (A "Chaos" model)?
How might one choose between Logos and Chaos? At this point, O'Connor invokes the fine-tuning argument. He believes that the fine-tuning argument fails as a stand-alone design argument for the existence of a NB, but given independent motivation of the NB, he thinks it can help choose between the options as to the NB's nature. He concludes that it does succeed in elevating the Logos option over Chaos. He thinks the particular nature of our world argues for a NB which is an agent acting on purpose-driven intentions in creating our world.
Chapter 5 deals with the matter of how many worlds a Logos NB would create and discusses how this applies to the problem of evil and other matters. Finally Chapter 6 is of less purely philosophical interest as O'Connor discusses issues in Christian theology and the problem of reconciling the God of metaphysics to the God of the Bible.
This is a very thought-provoking book for those who take the quest for metaphysical explanation seriously.
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Theism as th Ultimate Explanation, May 29, 2011
This review is from: Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency (Hardcover)
Timothy O'Connor (Professor: Philosophy, Indiana University) delivers a fascinating and innovative new volume: "Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency." Professor O'Conner presents the reader with a fine overview of philosophy, metaphysics, with an aim toward philosophical theology. Herein O'Conner provides a fine leap into various unexplored regions (not fully metaphysically surveyed) within philosophical religion; the examination and application thereof. The author partitions this volume into two chief divisions as he explores the truth and relationship relating to that which is possible and/or necessary. He then proceeds to posit a coherent metaphysical structure that seeks to advance an "ultimate explanation."
This volume may be a bit pricey, nonetheless the reader receives much more than what he paid in dollars; a unique, provocative, and I affirm, compelling work which discloses captivating conjectures concerning an ultimate explanation of the cosmos and human experience.
In the chapter on "Modal Knowledge" the author asks:
"How do we rationally discern the possible truth of some claim that is actually false or the necessary truth of some claim that is actually true . . . and what, ideally, is the overall structure of our modal beliefs, and how do they inferentially connect with other beliefs?" (p. 32)
O'Connor adds:
"The proponent must make his case for such a revision either in classical logical terms -- reasoning classically both in showing the supposed 'incongruence' of classical logic and certain quantum phenomena and in defining the quantum logical connectives and rules of inference -- or in terms of the new logic. If the former, he hasn't really repudiated the normative status of classical reasoning. If the latter, he fails to persuade us, as pointing out that there are difficulties with our system of reasoning if one accepts another system of reasoning is necessarily underwhelming" (p. 46).
Alexander Pruss opines: "This is a superb book in the philosophy of religion, the like of whose quality and originality is rare."
Chapters include:
The Explanatory Role of Necessity:
- Modality and Explanation
- An Epistemological Worry About Modality: Causal Contact With Modal Facts
- Modal Nihilism
- Modal Reductionism and Deflationism
- Modal Anti-Realism and Quasi-Realism
The Necessary Shape of Contingency:
- Ultimate Explanation and Necessary Being: The Existence Stage of the Cosmological Argument
- Necessary Being as the Explanatory Ground of Contingency?
- From Necessary Being to God, I: Transcendent, Not Immanent
- From Necessary Being to God, II: Logos, not Random Chaos
- Necessary Being and the Scope of Possibility
- Necessary Being and the Many Necessary Truths
- The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Anselm?
- Natural Theology in the Understanding of Revealed Theology
- and much more.
O'Connor argues:
"It is open to the theist . . . to suppose that it is a divine intention that human cognitive abilities are disposed to modalise reliably in accordance with modal fact. In this way, there can be a tie between modal fact and human modal judgments that plausibly accords with the proper function of human cognition while preserving the integrity of the purely natural causal processes generating such judgments. Our typical naturalist will be scandalised at this Leibnizian solution, but can he do any better?" (p. 129).
His goal is: "to articulate a theoretical framework that make possible ultimate explanation of reality -- that is, a natural or non-arbitrary stopping point . . . to the nested series of available plausible explanations for increasingly general aspects of the world" (p. 65). I think the author has, under consistent rational precommitments, has accomplished such.
Oppy notes: "O'Connor defends a cosmological argument from contingency for the existence of a transcendent necessary being that is the ground for an ultimate explanation of why particular contingent beings exist and undergo particular events. While O'Connor's argument has affinities with arguments defended by Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, among others, it nonetheless marks a highly original and extremely interesting contribution to contemporary philosophy of religion."
O'Connor asserts, within his rational pre-assumptions, there is the strong possibility that "The core metaphysical feature of freedom is being the ultimate source, or originator, of one's choices, and that being able to do otherwise is for us closely connected to this feature . . . . Only by there being less than deterministic connections between external influences and choices . . . is it possible for me to be an ultimate source of my activity, concerning which I may truly say 'The buck stops here'" (p. 121). Moreover he adds: If God is not a necessary being, if He might not have existed, then it is possible that there is a being which neither owes its existence to Him nor derives power from Him. From this it follows that, possibly, there is a being over which God has no causal control. But if this last is so, then whether our world, the actual world, contains such a being (or indeed, an arbitrary plurality of such beings) is an entirely contingent fact, and more particularly, one whose obtaining God has not controlled. And this would seem to call into question God's sovereignty on even a hazy, untheoretical grasp of this notion, let alone strict omnipotence"(p. 141).
One of the essential commitments: "Once you give up the assumption . . . that the existence of anything requires an explanation, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, there is no principled basis for maintaining that in those possible worlds . . . in which God exists there must always be an explanation for every existing thing, in terms of God's power; . . . . there could have been objects other than God who do not owe their existence to anything, who just 'happen' to exist. So how could it be that God's nature nonetheless prevents them from inconveniently appearing in His own backyard, so to speak, that is, in a world in which He does exist? It is as if the objector were positing a divine modal force field, that keeps away uncaused occurrences that are otherwise perfectly possible. To borrow a phrase from Leibniz, it is a mythology somewhat ill conceived" (pp. 142-3).
This important volume has some technical language, but with concentration most college grads should gain comprehension of this essential topic.
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Great Things Come in Small Packages, December 16, 2010
This review is from: Theism and Ultimate Explanation: The Necessary Shape of Contingency (Hardcover)
Timothy O'Connor's brief Theism and Ultimate Explanation has already garnered much discussion since its publication in 2008. Notably, the most recent edition of Philosophia Christi features a book symposium on the work. What is all the fuss about?
Theism and Ultimate Explanation is broken into two parts. Part I addresses "The Explanatory Role of Necessity" while Part II addresses "The Necessary Shape of Contingency."
Part I contains some fantastic arguments. O'Connor outlines various views on modality and seeks to defend modal realism, which takes modal truths to be actual truths about our world (and other worlds). Further, he defends the possibility of a priori truths against attacks from those who argue that all such truths need to be established empirically.
There are some who argue that empirical evidence (such as quantum mechanics) helps to undermine belief in some methods of reasoning, such as the law of non-contradiction, but O'Connor counters this by pointing out that those who make the argument that the "odd" data which may seem to contradict the method of reasoning against which their argument is directed are using the very methods of reasoning which they are trying to undermine. Another possibility is that the empiricist making this claim has switched to a different method of reasoning in order to critique that which holds to things like the law of non-contradiction, but O'Connor points out that a critique from such a method is "underwhelming" at best (46).
In Part II, O'Connor argues that it is coherent to ask the question, "Why is there anything (contingent) at all?" (65). He further argues that the only possible answer to this question is a termination in a necessary being. "If the universe truly is contingent, the obtaining of certain fundamental facts or other will be unexplained within empirical theory, whatever the topological structure of contingent reality... it will have to ground in some way... in a necessary being, something which has the reason for its existence within its own nature" (76).
He then turns to the question of what the nature of that necessary being may be, by examining two possibilities: "chaos" and "logos". Logos is the view which calls the necessary being God, whilst chaos argues that it is a random being or a brute fact. O'Connor argues that logos is the most rational view to hold.
Finally, in chapter 6, O'Connor turns to theological reflections on the argument thus far. He argues that the concept of an immutable, timeless being seems contradictory to things like the trinity, but maintains that a less restricted of both of these views is plausible. He argues against molinism briefly, by stating that the counterfactuals involved would have no truthmakers.
O'Connor's book weighs in at about 144 pages of text, but he makes use of every word. My biggest complaint about the book is how short it is. Often, it seems as though O'Connor simply doesn't take the time to address the issues he is discussing in enough detail. Part I and the argument for the necessary being do seem to be adequately established, but chapter 6 in particular doesn't do justice to opposing views. For example, the molinist could respond to O'Connor's argument by saying that the "truthmaker" of such counterfactuals is simply existence in the mind of God. This could lead to an argument for determinism on molinism, but then the molinist could point to the distinction between de re and de dicto necessity. The arguments leveled against a timeless deity or an immutable one suffer similarly from limitations of space. I think O'Connor should have used the space of this chapter to expand the other ideas already present in his work.
As it stands, Theism and Ultimate Explanation is a fantastic work which is great reading for the philosopher of religion. It can be finished in one sitting, but the ideas therein will keep readers contemplating the work for quite a while afterwards. It comes recommended, but with the stipulation that readers may be left wanting more.
SDG.
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