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Theological-Political Treatise: Gebhardt Edition

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The Theologico-Political Treatise is often advertised as a manifesto for religious freedom. If that were all, it would hardly be worthwhile for a Westerner to read it these days. In fact, it may be Spinoza's most important book for us. It includes an essay on the principles of interpreting the Bible which any serious reader of anything will also find useful, an important essay on the ancient Hebrew religion, a clarification of the distinction between necessity-as-law and law-as-fiat, the distinction which is one of the bases of his Ethics, and a discussion of the moral principles of government. It is also a pleasant book to read, being free of the pseudo-Euclidean format which has driven so many students to hard liquor and Wittgenstein.
The Political Treatise, though including much of no interest to the modern reader, also contains a continuation of the discussion of existence and natural law, especially as they pertain to sovereignty and the relationship between the individual and the state, a discussion of the nature of contract, and a discussion of the nature of ownership, with an important aside on wills, those strange documents by which a person seems to continue to control his property after he is gone. The closing discussion of the natural inferiority of women ought to help Dover (and Amazon) sell some copies to feminists, for use as ammunition.
The introduction by the translator is good, including a short, informative and amusing biography with an evaluation of the primary sources, a good summary of the Ethics, and an authoritative explanation for the fuzziness of some of Spinoza's writing: "[Spinoza's Latin] vocabulary is restricted; his style is wanting in flexibility.". The Biographical Note is especially useful to Net researchers, who sometimes have trouble getting information from home on the older sources.
This volume is not only a pleasure, and required reading for everyone interested in modern Western philosophy; it is also important for anyone interested in constitutional and international law

I am the author of the May 1999 review that faults the typsetting of the Hebrew in Spinoza's notes.

You have attached my review to the wrong translation.

The review applies to the Samuel Shirley translation reprinted in 1998 by Hackett Publishing Company, ISBN 0-87220-398-0.

You originally had it attached to the correct edition. How did it get here?

Please fix it. I don't want to libel Mr Ewes.

Spinoza's notes contain discussions of the meaning of some Hebrew words. If this will be of any importance to you, then forget this edition. Almost every word of Hebrew is butchered beyond recognition by typesetting errors. In some of these words, not a single character of the Hebrew is correct.

This book came out in 1670 in a Holland that was a haven of freedom in a Europe under religious terror. Spinoza's relatives in Portugal had been murdered by the inquisition. When he was born, German catholics and protestants were fighting a 30-year war that cut Germany's population in half. 20 years before in Italy, Giordano Bruno had been burned at the stake for heresy, and France had been ravaged by its 16th-century religious wars. Religious violence abated only slowly after Spinoza's death, with
the Salem witchcraft trials 16 years later. On 7/1/1766, after failing to salute a catholic procession in Paris, an 19-year old boy had his tongue pulled out, and was beheaded and burned with a copy of a book found in his room! Today's death threats to Danish cartoonists hint at what Spinoza's world was like, and the courage it took for him to confront it. Besides living in Holland, Spinoza further protected his freedom by staying single, living with the bare minimum of possessions, and seeking no official post or recognition.

The point of this book, as announced in the preface, is that, as was practiced in his beloved Dutch republic, freedom of religion can be granted without prejudice to public peace and that, "without such freedom, piety cannot flourish nor the public peace be secure." Today, this point is obvious: the G7 countries, all have freedom of religion, and five of them -- the US, Japan, France, Italy and Canada -- have separation of church and state. In Spinoza's day, it wasn't, and he couldn't make his case based on empirical evidence. Instead, he makes it by deconstructing the Bible using Descartes' method, which is an astonishing choice. If Machiavelli, for example, had undertaken to prove the same point, he certainly would not have done it this way.

Spinoza spent his childhood memorizing the Torah in Hebrew, at the time and in the city where Descartes lived, and his fascination with Descartes is obvious even if their metaphysics disagree. One of Descartes' own applications of his method was on the art of cutting glasses for optics, which is how Spinoza earned his modest living. Among the many astonishing finds in this book is how, by simply reasoning on the original text, Spinoza arrived at conclusions on the authorship of the early books of the bible that nearly match those of modern scholars like Abba Eban, who have had full access to archeological evidence.

Spinoza's monumental treatise on God, the Bible and the Society is one of the founderstones of modern thought, and does not need any new reviews. Many ideas expressed in the book can serve as models for standpoints also today in the intellectual debate about matters of religious freedom, critical analysis of texts and ideas, and political theory. The English translation in the Gebhardt Edition is clear and easily understood, and the book can be read without feeling the three centuries that have passed since the original was published in Latin. In the context of a new emerging wave of religious fundamentalism on one hand, and post-modernist denials of the importance of Reason on the other, the book is as important as ever to the intellectual heritage of modern Society.

This is a wonderful translation of one of Benedict De Spinoza's most important works. Here he explains in great detail not only the Biblical exegesis for which he was excommunicated, but also expounds with great richness and unique insight on political systems. A seminal work in the history of thought, providing marvelous insight into one of the great minds in human history. A very good introduction goes thoroughly into the discrepancies between what he published and what he might truly have thought.

The life of Benedict Spinoza is unique in itself and is the coherent background to everything he wrote, which contradisdicted his family origin. First of all, his name was not originally Benedict but Baruch, which is Hebrew for Benedict("the blessed one").
Second, he was the son of a well-to-do Spanish or Portuguese family who had to imigrate to the then United States of the Netherlands to escape the persecution of the Catholic Holy Inquisition, which was at its heyday in Spain and Portugal. It was in the famous tradition of Holland's liberal thinking that he grew up and began his philosophical studies, which were latter to be the foudation for great philosophers like Hegel. Third, as soon as he could, he abrogated the Jewish religion and his Jewish origins and was then anathemized ever since by the Jewish community and by his own family, to the point of being barred to share his fathers' inheritance. He appealed to court, won the case, and voluntarily did not take possession of the money. Fourth, in the tradition of a few great philosophers (Rousseau among them), he disdained all the luxuries and prestige his intellect could bring him and prefered to work as a shoemaker , devoting much of his time to his philosophical thinking, particularly targeted to some tenets of the Jewish and Catholic religions. Sure, there is many more to tell from this unique philosopher, but the reader can be sure that this is the very appeal of the book and is mirrored all the time in his reflexions. His lack of a superior knowledge of Latin, the language in which the text was originally written in the very tradition of the time, allows the reader an easy understanding of the content Spinoza tries to convey, whithout in any way jeopardizing the strenght of the philosopher's arguments.

In the book, which was never his intention to be published in his lifetime, he addresses many religious and philosophical questions and one is appaled by the apparent easiness with which the philosophers runs down a lot of religious dogmas, both Jewish and Catholic, whithout any possiblity of being considered heretic. Take, for instance, the logic with which he approaches miracles, and the reader will be astounded by the clearness of his arguments, originally developed in Latin (one of the more than 8 languages he was able to read or read/write). Also of importance is the characterization of the differences between apostles and prophets, and many more. His vision of the best way politics should be conducted - he favored his concept of democracy - is less strong but none the less interesting.

This is a seminal book for everyone interested in the foundations of the modern philosophical thinking where Spinoza occupies a very important place.

"Men would never be superstitious, if they could govern all their circumstances by set rules, or if they were always favored by fortune..." Thus begins one of the greatest books in the history of philosophy. Spinoza is an esoteric writer; he doesn't shout everything he has to say, though an attentive reader has a chance, however slight, to discern at least part of it. The existence of this philosophical-political esotericism, first adequately described by Leo Strauss (in "Spinoza's Critique of Religion"), is now on the verge of becoming generally accepted. For a very good example of this new, but qualified, acceptance of Spinoza's esotericism from a left/postmodern perspective, check out the recent collection of essays, "The New Spinoza", edited by Montag & Stolze, especially the essay by Andre Tosel.

But the history of Spinoza reception is another story and another review. Many modern readers of Spinoza speak with vague unease about Spinoza's 'elitism', supposing it to be but another slight of the poor, weak and uneducated; we can perhaps begin to gauge the full length, breadth and depth of this philosophical 'elitism', and its true target, in a focused reading of the opening pages of the Preface to the Theologico-Political Treatise. "The human mind is readily swayed this way or that in times of doubt, especially when hope and fear are struggling for the mastery, though usually it is boastful, over-confident, and vain." Thus the problem with Man is not, strictly speaking, merely a lack of knowledge (and therefore the problem is not merely a lack of education) but also, and perhaps most importantly, a lack of self-control.

Immediately, Spinoza follows this sentence by saying, "[t]his as a general fact I suppose everyone knows, though few, I believe, know their own nature..." There is a disconnect not only between knowing and doing but also between 'knowing' in general and knowing oneself. In order to do good how important is it to know yourself? There are several ways to understand this. One possible way is to say that even those ('sainted' elites) that 'know' are, nevertheless, unable to control their emotional behavior. Perhaps it is even this emotiveness that is especially vulnerable to superstition...

But men, "in prosperity, are so over-brimming with wisdom [...] that they take every offer of advice as a personal insult"! Still, we are not surprised to read that "...superstition's chief victims are those persons who greedily covet temporal advantages...". (Note that it is not chiefly ordinary people that 'greedily covet temporal advantages' nor is it said that they are 'in prosperity'.) And, a little later, we learn that these people "are wont with prayers and womanish tears to implore help from God...". Indeed, Spinoza, when giving an example of this despicable behavior under duress turns to no less an exemplar than Alexander the Great - and his superstitious seeking of advice from seers. Now, the use of Alexander in this regard is a vital clue in our attempt to understand Spinoza's esotericism (i.e., his 'political' philosophy). The question is this: If Spinoza is indeed an elitist, exactly what is the position that can look down on not only the common people but also the actual 'elite'; i.e., the religious and political leaders?

Well, of course, Spinoza is a philosopher; indeed he is one of the greatest. This understanding of philosophy, as the heights from which one looks down on everyone, is an old one. See, for instance, Averroes (in the so-called 'Decisive Treatise') for an overt example of the philosophical attempt to control a faction of the medieval elite (i.e., the theologians) with another faction of the medieval elite - the Islamic Jurists. Also, one should of course consider Machiavelli's Prince for a somewhat more circumspect (or covert) example of philosophy attempting to control the direction of politics and the political elite. Spinoza's decision to view politics and theology (or politicians and theologians) as dangers that need to be moderated philosophically is thus not unprecedented. Also, on this line of thought one should perhaps also take into account Nietzsche who, in the 'Genealogy of Morals', seems to go so far as to present history itself as a struggle between priestly and warrior noble castes...

In electing to use Alexander as an example of superstition Spinoza is indicating that philosophy is above both religion and politics. Indeed, Spinoza continues in a (ahem) 'Nietzschean' vein and says, "that prophets have most power among the people, and are most formidable to rulers, precisely at those times when the state is in most peril. I think this is sufficiently plain to all, and will therefore say no more on the subject." Well perhaps not entirely plain; this basically says, for those that have ears to hear: 'Statesman! Either satisfy the common people or forfeit your right to rule to the prophets and their theologians.' Thus the 'war' between priestly and warrior castes was quietly noted, by Spinoza, long before Nietzsche. As an aside I should perhaps note that one also finds oneself (perhaps) nervously asking, at this point, are people today 'satisfied'?

Kojeve, the architect of the most recent apotheosis of the political (i.e., the Universal Homogenous State), seems to confirm this interpretation (in his "Introduction to the Reading of Hegel") by saying that as "long as History continues, or as long as the perfect State is not realized [...] the opposition of these two points of view (the "philosophical" and the religious or theological) is inevitable." Of course Kojeve, following a Hegel that never existed, attempts to convince us that politics and philosophy are exactly the same and that theology was ever nothing. His mistake, from the viewpoint of philosophy, can perhaps be said to be that he took sides in the interminable war between elites. ...But that is another story. However, Kojeve is correct insofar as he is understood to be maintaining that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the political and the religious...

Back to Spinoza. Satisfying the common people seems to be easier said than done. In a terrifyingly memorable passage - that is both a diagnosis and a prophecy - Spinoza writes, "[f]or, as the mass of mankind remains always at about the same pitch of misery, it never assents long to any one remedy, but is always best pleased by a novelty which has not yet proved illusive." Thus, given the perpetual emotional dissatisfaction of the people, Spinoza seems to be indicating that no one ever rules for long. He also seems to be indicating that emotions (at least among the 'mass of mankind') are uncontrollable and that the people are, in the long run, unsatisfiable. (...So exactly what is Enlightenment - and exactly why is Spinoza supporting it? ...Hmmm.)

"Superstition, then, is engendered, preserved and fostered by fear", Spinoza had earlier said. But fear is an opportunity for philosophy, I mean for philosophical intervention. Machiavelli (in 'The Prince', chapter 6), after all, had already confirmed that the oppression, dissatisfaction and dispersal of the people was, above all, an opportunity for the creative One. Spinoza says that, "Prophets have most power among the people, and are most formidable to rulers, precisely at those times when the state is in most peril." The fundamental argument (and struggle), of course, between philosophers and the political-religious elites, seems to be over the exact identity of the creative One. For the religiously inclined the creative one is God and those who act in his name, for the politically 'pious' the creative one is the (hereditary, patriotic or revolutionary) 'Prince'. For Machiavelli, Spinoza, and Nietzsche one suspects that, 'behind the scenes and between the lines', the creative one (the bringer of New Modes and Orders, to quote Machiavelli) can only be the philosopher.

Spinoza continues, quoting Curtius (the historian of Alexander): "The mob has no ruler more potent than superstition," and Spinoza immediately adds, "and is easily led, on the plea of religion, at one moment to adore its kings as gods, and anon to execrate and abjure them as humanity's common bane." Thus 'superstition' would seem potentially to be either a weapon of the religious or the political... This is a warning; but to exactly whom seems to be a bit unclear. I should mention that it is not impossible to read Machiavelli, with his high praise of ancient pagan religion, to be indicating much the same: that is, the necessary permanence of superstition. ...But, exactly what can and can't be done with superstition?

The way out of this (seemingly) unpredictable and uncontrollable mess? One possible solution, according to Spinoza, is given by the 'Turk'. They have instituted a system that invests "religion, whether true or false, with such pomp and ceremony, that it may rise superior to every shock..." Of course, as Spinoza indicates, this absolutism leaves no room for either individual freedom or a thoughtful philosophy. But then Spinoza adds, "yet in a free state no more mischievous expedient could be planned or attempted." So, after discussing (and discounting) the possibility of theocracy (the Turks) Spinoza advocates the system allegedly reigning in Amsterdam: freedom and commerce. (Whew!)

Now, in case some have been asleep for the past 300 years, I will point out that the rise of democracy was not always accomplished peaceably, nor, after its rise, has it been able to always maintain the peace. The test of being able to maintain the peace that Spinoza flings in the face of the Religion of his times can today, with equal appropriateness, be flung in the face of politics. I of course mean all politics. ...But that too is another book and another review.

Spinoza can be said to here begin a process that leads to us. I hope I have begun the process of showing that the target of Spinoza's contempt was not the common people, but the ignorance and weakness of all their tormenters. I also want to note, given both the nature of these elites and also the perpetual suffering of the people, that all solutions are transient. And that the early-modern philosophical turn to the politicos, made in the teeth of ceaseless religious war, was only a maneuver. Over the past century philosophy found itself again in an era of civil wars, revolutions and world wars; - one wonders where philosophy will now turn in its never-ending struggle to moderate elites...

Who will write the next Theologico-Political Treatise that will do to political Ideology what Spinoza here does to religious Revelation? Where is the next 'novelty'?

I write thise review after having written a major end of term paper on this treatise, so I may be a little close to the issue and to my own personal observations and biases to offer a good review. That being said, Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise is a superbly reasonable and logical work essentially devoted to the necessity of freedom of speech and expression in a well ordered state. That's the short version, and if that were all that there was this work would would be neither controversial nor brilliant.

That, however, is only a part of the picture. What makes this treatise so tantalizingly obnoxious is the steps by which Spinoza achieves his aims; and be forwarned, this is a work springing from a very definite aim and not from a spirit of open inquiry. Spinoza knows where he wants to go, and is not above twisting arguments to his own ends. That being said, he performs these feats beautifully. As the title suggests, this work deals with both theolgical and political aspects and their correct placement in society. Spinoza begins with what can be considered some of the earliest modern biblical exegesis, in that he views the Bible not fundamentally as a divinely inspired handbook, but as a work that should be read in a specific historical context, its teachings aimed to deal with specific problems relating to distinct peoples and not to be taken as philosophical explanations. Because of this fact, and a complex train of arumentation which I shall not attempt to recreate here, Spinoza determines that theology and philosophy must be seperated, the former dealing with obediance and the latter with truth. From here he goes on to speak of the relationship of man to society (basically he reiterates Hobbes' argument) and the necessity of the toleration of conflicting ideas and beliefs.

There are many aspects of this work that are right on target, not the least of which are Spinoza's appeals for freedom of speech (perhaps fueled by the problems he himself was facing as a result of his ideas) and his basic model of biblicasl exegesis. The devil, however, is in the details and how he reaches these conclusions. It is obvious from his work that he is contemptuous of the majority of men who lack intelligence and can merely find solace in religion. He begins his work with a number of bold presupositions (not the least of which being his wiew of the Bible as a book obviously bereft of authority concerning clues to the true nature of God) and stacks his argument in such a tight manner, constantly sub-refferencing itself, that the average reader will have a hard time following it without the aid of diagramming it. That being said, his arguemnt is brilliant, if only in his ability to accept one easy premise which he then goes on to show necessarilly leads to a more uncomfortable one.

This is a work that needs to be read with much care. The first time I read it, I found myself enthralled with it, but upon more careful reading I became much less impressed. Is is without a doubt a classic of philosophy (or at least a very good political pamphlet) and is well worth the read, but do yourself a favor and read Spinoza's Ethics as well. Not to spoil anything, but much of what he shows here he directly refutes in his ethics. This seems likely to be intentional, and provides a warning to all those readers who wish to take the idea of this book too seriously. This work was meant to convince people of a politically expediant idea, not to show to show them the truth.

There are two points about the treatise I wish to talk about.

Spinoza's view of miracles in the Bible (Old Testament). He took up a trend that began years before. Maimonidese, for example, gives species survival, not Sin in the Garden, as the
reason for death. Spinoza takes all alerations in natural law
stated in the Bible to be poetic or symbolic, not real and not consistent with the Nature of God.

Secondly, Spinoza defends democracy over other forms of government is that in democracies there are numerous factions,
and it is difficult for any one faction to grain arbitrary power
as to engage in wars. For example, though not mentioned by Spinoza, Peter The Great saw one year alone as Czar when Russia was not at war. Spinoza thinks this sort of thing less probable in democratic government. Democracy's value is that it leadss to free, unhindered discussion of matters at hand. He does not exactly say it, but I think Spinoza took free and open discussion of issues as the principal "Sine qua non" of democracy. This is quite relevant to current US foreign and domestic policy. In early 2006 Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government publish a study by a
Harvard professor and another from U of Chicago on the Israel lobby; the study contends that US foreign policy is dictated by The Lobby, meaning Jewish pressure groups acting on Congress and the White House regardless of political party. The professors contend that free discussion and debate are impossible when "The Lobby" has a particular position. Congressmen and Senators live in fear of Jewish funding of opponents, smear tactics and other similar actions. They describe the Prime Minister in Israel as saying he had President Bush (the second) "wrapped around his finger." The Giant Question is: within Spinoza's notion of democracy, does Judaism de facto oppose democratic government and is Judaism inconsistent with democratic/representative government in a diverse democracy? The answer is of utmost importance. Another aspect of democracy is defended by Spinoza's argument for free and open and fearless debate is that fundamental decisions that shape society and direct governmental actions will be done in this open, fearless, free environment. The Suypreme Court's string of decisions starting in 1940 making states subject to the "Bill of Rights" is the antithesis of democracy.

Spinoza is a great introduction to real thought. And the Tretise is not difficult reading at all.

A great assignment for High School government or History.