The focus of this monograph is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. The monograph is structured into two parts. The first part (Chapter 2) contains an overview of foundational concepts and key results in mechanism design. This chapter is intended as a self-sufficient introduction to mechanism design theory with the help of numerous stylized examples from network economics. The second part of the monograph contains an exposition of representative game theoretic problems in three different network economics situations and a systematic exploration of mechanism design solutions to these problems. This part has three chapters: Chapter 3 deals with the sponsored search auction problem, Chapter 4 with the resource allocation problem in computational grids, and Chapter 5 with the robust broadcast protocol design problem in ad hoc networks. The monograph concludes with Chapter 6 which provides several pointers to the relevant literature to facilitate a deeper and broader investigation of problem solving with mechanism design.
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From the reviews: "The book consists of six chapters. … This is one of the first monographs that deals solely with algorithmic mechanism design. … it will be useful to researchers in computer science, operations research, e-commerce, and multiagent systems. The book is also suitable for an advanced undergraduate or graduate-level course in computer science and operations research. … In any case, the book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers." (Haris Aziz, ACM Computing Reviews, April, 2009)
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With the advent of the Internet and other modern information and communication technologies, a magnificent opportunity has opened up for introducing new, innovative models of commerce, markets, and business. Creating these innovations calls for significant interdisciplinary interaction among researchers in computer science, communication networks, operations research, economics, mathematics, sociology, and management science. In the emerging era of new problems and challenges, one particular tool that has found widespread applications is mechanism design. The focus of this book is to explore game theoretic modeling and mechanism design for problem solving in Internet and network economics. It provides a sound foundation of relevant concepts and theory, to help apply mechanism design to problem solving in a rigorous way.
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Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs):
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grid computing, generalized second price, node list, grid information system, auction theory, supplier selection problem, weakly dominant strategy equilibrium, critical resource provider, quasilinear environment, resource procurement problem, sponsored search auctions, optimal auction mechanism, dominant strategy incentive compatibility, dominant strategy incentive compatible, public project problem, revelation theorem, interim individual rationality, compatible broadcast, price procurement auction, optimal mechanism design problem, single indivisible item, overpayment ratio, network formation problem, mechanism design environment, incentive compatible protocols Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Bayesian Nash, Foundations of Mechanism Design, New York, Electronic Commerce, Cambridge University Press, Algorithmic Game Theory, Economic Sciences, International Conference, Ann Arbor, Nobel Prize, San Diego, Substituting Equation, Management Science, World Wide Web, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast, Springer-Verlag London Limited, William Vickrey, University of California, Oxford University Press, Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol, Groves Mechanisms, Harvard University, Design Solutions, Myerson Optimal Auction Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Surprise Me!
grid computing, generalized second price, node list, grid information system, auction theory, supplier selection problem, weakly dominant strategy equilibrium, critical resource provider, quasilinear environment, resource procurement problem, sponsored search auctions, optimal auction mechanism, dominant strategy incentive compatibility, dominant strategy incentive compatible, public project problem, revelation theorem, interim individual rationality, compatible broadcast, price procurement auction, optimal mechanism design problem, single indivisible item, overpayment ratio, network formation problem, mechanism design environment, incentive compatible protocols Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Bayesian Nash, Foundations of Mechanism Design, New York, Electronic Commerce, Cambridge University Press, Algorithmic Game Theory, Economic Sciences, International Conference, Ann Arbor, Nobel Prize, San Diego, Substituting Equation, Management Science, World Wide Web, Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast, Springer-Verlag London Limited, William Vickrey, University of California, Oxford University Press, Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol, Groves Mechanisms, Harvard University, Design Solutions, Myerson Optimal Auction Browse Sample Pages:
Front Cover | Table of Contents | First Pages | Index | Surprise Me!
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