Customer Reviews

The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society

5 star:		(6)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(1)

 

 

I would like remind readers that this book is the first volume of the two that constitute "The Theory of Communicative Action" (the second volume has as subtitle "Lifeworld and System - A Critique of Functionalist Reason"). The first volume was published in English in 1984, while the second volume appeared in 1987. The two volumes are not independent books and should be read as a single book.

Habermas can be linked to the group of German philosophers and social theorists associated with the Institute of Social Research, founded in 1924 at the University of Frankfurt. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, the two most distinguished members of the "Frankfurt School" (as the Institute was nicknamed), developed a social analysis that departed from orthodox Marxism and was known as "critical theory". According to critical theory, the ailments of modern capitalist society were due to its encompassing rationalization, resulting in a complete alienation of the working class. Following Weber's pessimistic diagnostic, Horkheimer and Adorno considered that Enlightenment's dream of a society guided by reason had degenerated into an "iron cage": human beings were condemned to live without freedom, following rules devoid of meaning. "Instrumental reason", that is, the manipulative, self-interested, technical use of reason in administration, economics, and science, had become so encompassing that there was no hope for escaping from it.

Habermas, who arrived at the Institute of Social Research in the early 1950's, concluded that Horkheimer's and Adorno's analysis of contemporary society hit a dead end. Critical theory, which was supposed to guide individuals in their struggle for emancipation, turned contemplative, pessimistic. The problem with the "old" critical theory, Habermas believed, was that it remained attached to the philosophy of consciousness. In order to put critical theory back to its original track, Habermas switched to the philosophy of language and expanded the concept of reason to include "communicative rationality". With these theoretical moves, Habermas reestablished the centrality of reason as the guiding principle for attaining emancipation. Because language presupposes unrestricted communication and mutual understanding, coordinated action is an always present possibility to speaking subjects. Parting from this philosophical outlook, Habermas developed the concept of "communicative action", defined as "the type of interaction in which all participants harmonize their individual plans of action with one another and thus pursue their illocutionary aims without reservation" (TCA, v.1, p. 294). According to this perspective, the predicaments of modern society are the consequence - as Horkheimer and Adorno had argued - of an excessive reliance in instrumental reason (or purposive rationality, as Habermas prefers to call it). However, Habermas argued that there is a way out of this situation: In order to overcome social crises, it is necessary to counterbalance purposive rationality by bringing communicative rationality back into play.

Habermas' communicative action argument was already present in his writings of the early 1960's. In TCA Habermas presents a detailed justification of his theoretical approach and expands it into a social theory aimed at explaining the occurrence of social pathologies. In support of his argumentation, Habermas introduces a new concept of society that intertwine the lifeworld concept (the common pool of knowledge that individuals use in order to attach meaning to the world) and the social system concept. According to this "dual" approach, society evolves by differentiating itself both as system and as lifeworld. "Systemic evolution is measured by the increase in society's steering capacity, whereas the state of development of a symbolically structured lifeworld is indicated by the separation of culture, society, and personality" (TCA, v. 2, p. 152).

The argumentation Habermas conducts in TCA is highly abstract at times. This has lead to misunderstandings of his key arguments, particularly of the communicative action concept. According to this distorted interpretation, Habermas had advocated for the establishment of an ideal, utopian society in which all human beings would reach consensus about everything. Taken out of the context of the full argumentation, the communicative action concept acquires a naïve twist that Habermas' detractors - as well as some of his supporters - have contributed to establish. Nevertheless, the reader that endures the abstract aspects of TCA will be recompensed by a bright and clear interpretation of contemporary society. Habermas argument on the limitations of socialist states is particularly enlightening. Leftists will finally understand why democracy should not be seen just as a bourgeois invention and right-wingers will find reasons for not rejoicing at the downfall of socialism.

Prospective readers of TCA should be warned that they are at risk of establishing Habermas as a benchmark to every other social theorist. This risk, however, is worth taking.

This review is in response to the negative review posted here by Justin Evans. This is also more of a defense and appreciation of Habermas' work in general.

I've read a lot of Hegel, and I do not think Habermas misreads Hegel. It is a profoundly insightful critique of Hegel to say that while he recognized the dialectical construction of History he wrongly insisted on making its comprehension the possession of a monological absolute subject. I don't think there is any better way to explain the persistent conflict that irrupts in a room of Hegelians (I've seen it many times) than that there is a fundamentally problematic monomania in Hegelian philosophy (reflective of most previous Western philosophy as well).

Don't misunderstand what Habermas means by "universal". It would be a mistake to take his critique of relativism vis-a-vis universalism as a search for some kind of Platonic purity apart from the situated individual. Habermas only uses the term "universal" in conjunction with "pragmatics", referring to the easily reasonable claim that any use of language (thus meaning) in any time or place, implies communicative action between language users.

A better comprehension of Habermas' approach here is aided by a critical reading of Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of Dasein. Despite Heidegger's own clearly frustrated desire for a monological meaning of being, his committed phenomenology reveals Dasein's essential being-with-an-other. When Heidegger discloses the inauthenticity-of-understanding-as-they-understand as the very condition for first developing one's own authenticity, it is better understood in Habermas' less morally pejorative terms of moving from being a conventional language user to becoming a post-conventional language user.

Habermas' theory of communicative action brings great clarity to critical thinking if you've been frustratingly spellbound by the parade of egocentric failures in theory from Cartesian foundationalism to Hegelian absolute subjectivity to Heideggerian ontology.

In the end it just seems difficult for people with strong intellects (like those attracted to theory) to accept that our own meanings are contingent upon interaction with an other in an open-ended way. Thus most of the great philosophers and theorists tend to fantasize about an ultimate closure which can be grasped within themselves by themselves.

I would like to thank to great scientist for his great contribution to social sciences and yet to all humanity. It can be your life-saver if you strive to make real research in this post-modern condition.
If you cannot see the importance and meaning of the books and important difference between two volumes, it is better to question your own "dasein" in academic field. Good luck..

A slow, difficult read for me; but introduced me to Habermas work, which has been invaluable.

This is a difficult book to rate, since it's obviously very important/influential. And the horrific style could bias anyone against it. But I finally settled on two stars. Why? [I actually gave it one star, since the other reviewers were so effusive in their star-giving. I do this in the spirit of Verstandigung, nothing more.]

* Habermas' theory is meant to be an advance beyond previous critical theories. He argues that their focus on consciousness philosophy (broadly speaking, an individualist approach to social theory, which assumes that individuals are the primary bearers of meaning) leads them into all sorts of problems. But his interpretations of those previous critical theories are, not to put too fine a point on it, appalling. He misreads Hegel; he misreads Marx to such a great extent that one might almost believe he'd never even read *Capital*; and his take on earlier critical theorists is more or less limited to Horkheimer's 'Eclipse of Reason.' Habermas' main criticism of Adorno is that Adorno seeks a solution to the problems of modern societies in a kind of irrationalist mysticism. It is no surprise that almost all of his evidence for this is taken from books *about*, rather than *by* Adorno. (Good rebuttals of Habermas' readings of Hegel and Marx can be found in Pippin's 'Idealism as Modernism,' and Postone's 'Time, Labor and Social Domination' respectively.)
* For Habermas, the main problem with previous critical theories is that they don't seem to be grounded. Habermas sees a strict dichotomy here. Either you ground your theory by taking on a universalist perspective, or you lapse into relativism. Because critical theory has tended to avoid universalism, it must be relativistic. This is tied to his failure to understand Hegel's work. Hegel shows that the dichotomy between universalism and relativism is flawed; that something can be grounding without being universal. On this approach, critical theory is right to find its foundation only in an immanent critique of the present, without a universalist standpoint.
* Habermas claims to find his universalist standpoint in language. He argues that any any speech act assumes the possibility of rational agreement, and that this can be a basis of a critical theory. Language becomes the inalienable repository of freedom and reconciliation. This is where Habermas' rejection of 'consciousness philosophy' hurts him most. Why is it that language can remain more or less pure? He has no answer for this question. 'Consciousness philosophy,' of course, would argue that since language is bound up with consciousness; and since consciousness somewhat obviously cannot remain 'pure' in an impure world; then language itself cannot remain pure, and cannot be the universal standpoint Habermas seeks.
* Finally, Habermas tries to combine two sociological approaches: systems theory and action theory. He never asks, however, if these theories themselves might be reflections of actual social problems which cannot be merely 'combined' at the theoretical level. A critical theory will show the problems with these theories, and explain how to move past them. Habermas does not do this, because he accepts Daniel Bell's thesis of 'end of ideology.' Theories are now just different standpoints from which we view the same content, not reflections of that content itself. Again, a bit more 'consciousness philosophy' would have led Habermas to see that this separation of form and content - which he sees as a key moment of modernism - is theoretically untenable.
* On a somewhat more obvious level, this was a theory designed for a welfare-state world. This world collapsed just as these volumes were being published in German. Habermas himself said, in an interview around the time they were being published, that this work assumed such a welfare state world ("The Dialectics of Rationalization," in 'Telos'). The disappearance of that world made it clear that 'power' was no more than a handmaiden to 'money.' The best recent work of critical theory, Postone's book mentioned above, makes this argument very well.

That's all substantive stuff. On a less high-falutin' level, this book is horrifically written, spends far too much time summarizing previous sociological theories, and shows a frankly bizarre addiction to unnecessary, quasi-scholastic hair-splitting. For those interested in critical theory, I recommend reading the 'intermediate reflections' and 'concluding reflections.' Otherwise, it's like reading a freshman-comp paper written by a staggering genius.

I was quite surprised when I noted that there was no review to this book. In fact, this book will be considered in the future as a real classic lecture. As the figure of Habermas becomes more important every day his most important work become crucial. A must-read.

it took me 1.5 years to read this book and to make an attempt to understand it in its whole power and beauty.
Real contribution to social theory, a great synthesis...
But for ordinary readers there are two ways to approach this book:
1.to undertand the main idea, but even it in only 20-30%
2. to penetrate into the magical world of social philosophy and sociological theory..
you choose...
Thanks to Habermas for such an epical book...